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ABSTRACT 
It is probable that no new doctrine of international 
law has received universal recognition so rapidly as has 
that of the Continental Shelf. Its being an extension 
of the outer limit of coastal state sovereignty endeared 
it to nationalistic pride, a matter evidenced by the time 
spent in discussing the nature of the rights, which ended 
by according the coastal state sovereign rights over its 
natural resources. These were further defined as being 
exclusive and unshared rights. 
As in the case of the territorial sea, the area of 
control was difficult to define. The present seaward limit 
of national sovereignty is defined as the edge of the 
Continental Shelf at 200 metres isobath or the depth to 
which the submarine areas can be exploited. Exploitability 
appears to be a poor criterion in these days of rapidly 
expanding marine technology. 
All reasonable geological boundaries of the sea floor 
(shore line, shelf edge, base of Continental Slope, toe of 
continental rise, axes of trenches, deepest parts of 
abyssal plains, and the mid ocean rift) are described 
i. 
11. 
according to their origin and value as seaward limits of 
national sovereignty for exploitation purpos:es. All contain 
uncertainties or deficiencies stemming from present inadequate 
knowledge of bathymetry, ambiguity of definition, or 
unreasonable relationship to areas of possible mineral 
resources. Accordingly a more precise definition of seaward 
boundaries for the areas under present national jurisdiction 
is most desirable, with some form of international regime 
applied to the deeper areas of ocean floor. 
For the purposes of this study the subject is divided 
into three main parts, namely:-
(1) The theory of the Continental Shelf in international 
law. 
(2) The legal regime of the Continental Shelf, and 
(3) The legal regime of the deep-sea floor. 
Before considering the legal norms of the new doctrine, 
a geological and geographical study of the nature, origin 
and :rormation of the s:helf is given in Section One of Part 
One. This study is relevant to the legal aspects of the 
Shelf area in that it provides full data about the geophysical 
structure of the Shelf and associated areas. It also helps 
to determine how far jurists were willing to establish the 
legal framework of the Shelf in accordance with its geogra-
phical limits. A comparison between the geophysical and 
legal definitions of the Shelf is a good evidence of the 
limited extent to which the two concepts are uniform. 
In Part Two the question of the legal regime of the 
Shelf is examined from the point of view of the legal 
basis of claims to the Shelf area which, until recently, 
was regarded, like the waters above it, res communis. 
The nature of the rights asserted is also explored under 
both the unilateral claims of coastal states and the 
provision of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
The third item, which is examined under this heading, is 
the problem of delimitation. Here, a special consideration 
is given to the decision of the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases. 
Part Three deals with proposals de lege ferenda on the 
question of the legal regime of the deep-sea floor. The 
limited scope of this thesis did not allow more than 
recording the results achieved by the U.N. General Assembly 
and other international and national bodies. 
iii. 
I have attempted in this study to present, in an 
inductive fashion, the work of all those who contributed to 
the establishment of the doctrine of the Continental Shelf. 
My task did not go further than displaying the various 
opinions on the subject, adding my own views where necessary. 
I am relieved to find that Dr. Mouton, in the introduction 
to his great work "The Continental Shelf," states," •••• one 
can not solve a new problem alone. One has to put the 
opinions next to each other in their original wording, in 
order to be able to attain a certain amount of progression 
in thought and give the reader the chance, without forcing 
him to go through all the sources, to compare the arguments 
and judge whether he can or can not agree with the conclu-
sions we have reached." 
Finally, as I read and re-read the manuscript and 
corrected the proofs, the words of a twelfth century Syrian 
judge repeatedly came to my mind: 
"Never have I met an author who is not ready to 
proclaim on the morrow of finishing his book, 'O, 
had I expressed this differently, how much better 
would it have been! Had such a statement been 
added, how much more correct, it would have been~ 
Had this been moved forward, it would have read 
better and had that been omitted, it would have 
certainly been preferable.' In such experience 
there is indeed a great lesson; it provides full 
evidence that defect characterizes all works of 
man.·" 
Van Mildert College, 
April, 1969. 
H, B. KOZAK 
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PART ONE 
The Theory of the Continental Shelf in 
International Law 
Section I - Geological and Geographical Study of the 
Continental Shelf 
1 • General Outlook 
From a geological and geographical point of view, the 
history of the Continental Shelf started from the middle 
of the last century when an increasing number of soundings 
in the seas and oceans were carried out for scientific 
purposes.1 In law, the point of departure with regard to 
the use of the term "Continental Shelf" is usually the 
Truman Proclamations of September, 1945.2 
It is a geological fact that continental-land masses 
do not terminate abruptly at the sea shore, nor always at 
1. Dr. Otto Krummel, in his 11Handbuch der Oceanographie, 
Band 1, Stutgart, 1907, pp.103-104, refers to the 
Geographer Hugh Robert Mill as the first to use the 
term "Continental Shelf" in his "Realm of Nature" 
published in 1887. 
2. Green, L. c., "The Continental Shelf," CLP, 1951, 
pp.54-57. 
a reasonable distance therefrom. Frequently the sea bed 
slopes off gradually and represents a continuation of the 
continent which in former ages wasabove the sea level.3 
Generally speaking, it was found that the land shelves 
away to the sea with a small angle to an average depth of 
200 metres, after which the gradient increases rather 
rapidly to a steeper slope going down to ocean depth. The 
isobath of 200 metres forms in this simplified picture an 
edge.4 The part of the sea bottom between the shore and 
this edge is called the Continental Shelf, and the part 
3.This is the view of most geologists such as Krummel, 
Umbgrove, Visser, and others (see Dr. Mouton, M.W. 
'The Continental Shelf,' The Hague, 1952 pp.34-35). 
However, in u.s.v. Texas, 1950, the Attorney-General 
of Texas argues the other way; he maintains that much 
of the present land territory of that state was 
formerly submerged, and he contends that much of what 
is now submerged will in the future be a dry ground 
(see Daniel, P. "Sovereignty and Ownership in the 
Marginal Sea," 1950, Joint Memorandum of Ten Counsel, 
p.5, published in Baylor Law Review, Vol.III, No.2, 
1951 ); both theories will be discussed later when 
dealing with the 'operations of nature' as a mode of 
losing or acquiring state territory. 
4.In 1957, an arbitrary depth of 300 fathoms (550 metres) 
was chosen for the outer limit of the shelf by a group 
of marine geologists in making a report to the U.N. 
(see comments by S.hepard, F .P. 'Submarine Geology', 
2nd ed. 1963, p.206). 
2. 
between the edge and the bottom of the ocean is called the 
Continental Slope.5 
The extent and the geographical form of the Continental 
Shelf is not always the same in every part of the world. 
According to Kossina, 6 the shelves all over the world cover 
27,500,000 square kilometres, i.e. 7.6 per cent of the 
surface of the oceans. As Umbgrove makes a distinction 
between inner shelves and outer shelves, the figure for 
the outer shelves is 9,900,000 square kilometres, i.e. 
3.1 per cent distributed as follows:-
Atlantic Ocean 
Indian Ocean 
Pacific Ocean 
Sq. Km. 
(in millions) 
4.6 
2.4 
2.9 
Percentage of 
sea surface 
5.6 
3.2 
1 • 7 
The distinction made by Umbgrove between inner and 
outer shelves is of great importance for the subject we 
are dealing with. He leaves "The origin and history of 
inner shelf regions out of consideration since they do not 
belong to the marginal zone proper of the continents."7 
5. This is the geological nomenclature of the Shelf and 
associated areas in its simplest form; for more specific 
definitions, see infra PP·39-J/.0. 
6. Dr. Kossina 'Die Erdoberflashe Handbuch der Geophysit,' 
Berlin, 1933; also cited by Umbgrove, J. H. F. 'The 
Pulse of the Earth,' 1947, p.99. 
3. 
7. Ibid, Umbgrove, p.99; Krummel, .supra, p.105 makes a similar 
distinction when he speaks of "echte oder randschelfe" 
(real or margin shelves) and "folsche schelf" (false . 
shelves) such as inner shelves of which he mentions those 
in the Baltic, the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the Hudson Bay. 
It seems that he does not include the inner shelves under 
the notion "Continental Shelf." In other words, certain 
shallow terraces belong geologically speaking, rather to 
the continental masses proper than to the part which geolo-
gists call the "Continental Shelf." 
This means that vast areas of shallow seas such as the 
North Sea, the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Mexico 
would be excluded from the scientific terminology and 
definition of the Continental Shelf. Such exclusion caused 
much diversity of opinion in the ILC and at the Geneva 
Conference on the law of the sea in regard to the juridical 
meaning of the shelf; and that is why the geological concept 
was abandoned in favour of a more comprehensive juridical 
definition which includes all "The submarine areas adjacent 
to the coast but outside the area or· the territorial seas 
to a depth of 200 metres (100 fathoms) or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas. 118 
Whereas the above definition refers to the geological 
limit of 200 metres depth, it deviates from that in two 
respects: (a) it does not make any distinction between 
inner and outer shelves as it refers to all submarine areas 
B. See Article 1(a) of the Convention. 
4. 
outside the territorial sea, and (b) it extends the limit 
to exploitable areas beyond the 200 metres depth. In fact, 
as it is explained later, the 200 metres in the definition 
was adopted for practical considerations of exploitability.9 
It is concluded that the concept of the Continental 
Shelf is a concept of geology and indicates the fact that 
land masses do not normally terminate abruptly at the water's 
edge off the coast line, but tend to slope away gradually, 
finally falling away to the deep-sea floor when the super-
jacent waters reaches a depth of about 100 fathoms (200 
metres, or 600 feet). 
2. Origin and Formation of the Continental Shelf 
Soundings by geophysical methods and geological and 
geophysical explorations carried out in this century have 
revealed many features which were unknown about the nature 
and structure of the shelf and its outer slopes. 
Geologists and geographers are divided on the issue 
concerning the origin of the shelf. As to inner shelves, 
Umbgrove believes that regions like the North Sea and the 
s:unda Sea have been a land area during low stands of the 
sea-level in pleistocene times.10 He supports his view 
by referring to bathymatric charts which show those areas 
to be furrowed by river like trenches. Their course, he 
remarks, can be followed towards the debouchement of 
present-day rivers. This theory is further supported by 
9. Ini'ra, p .I/!/. 
1 o. Supra, p.98. 
5. 
the frequent finding of remains of large vertebrates as far 
as the Dogger Bank. 
In regard to outer shelves, Umbgrove is of the opinion 
that the surface of the shelf is built up by the dual 
processes of erosion and accumulation. He states that 
"waves laden with sediment and shingle attack the shore. 
Their continual bombardment undermines the coast. Gradually 
the sea encroaches upon the land, abrades and invades it. 
Undertwo transports the abraded material seaward, and tidal 
currents assist in the submarine distribution of the sedi-
ments . . . . . . . . . the surface of the shelf, therefore, seems 
to be a plane of equilibrium between two anatognistic 
forces. One of these is the demolishing, erosive and 
transporting action of the sea. The other is the accumulat-
ing action of the same medium •••••••• the surface of the 
shelf expresses a balance between two opposing sets of 
factors which in short might be indicated by the terms 
submarine erosion and aggradation. 1111 Figure 1 represents 
part of the shelf of Saint Helena Island which, according 
to Umbgrove, was formed by the processes of erosion and 
accumulation. 
This theory was first anticipated by Nansen, 12 the 
11. Supra, p.1 00. 
6. 
12. Nansen, F., quoted by Rudmoss Brown, 'The Polar Regions,' 
pp.67-71, Mathuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1927; see also 
Pratt, w. E. 'Petroleum on Continental Shelves,' Bull. 
Amer. Assoc. Ptrol. Geol., vol.31, No.4 (April 1947) p.659. 
. . 
Figureil- Formation of a gradation-plane along the coast of Saint Helena; 
(after Umbgrove). 
Umbgrove exl?lains, on page 100 ,how the small shelf round the ·island St .• 
1 Helena \-Jas formed as follmvs :From the cliffed coast over some distance 
sea\-Jard ·the surface of the submarine bank consists of! ah :·a.bra.si·on-plane 
formed by the erosive action of _the breakers.The more distant suriace of 
its surface ,hovJever, is 'built up· by the accumulation of sediments derived 
largely 'from the li=lond.From the edge of the shelf;situated here at a deptt 
of 100 metres, the outer s:tol_)e of the small shelf may be follm·Jed dovm 
\ra.rds .. 't;o a depth of 700 metres~At that depth the slope diminishes·the 
. .. ' 
reason for this seems obvious:on that level the normal slope of the St • 
Helena volcano is reached,as is suggested by the broken li~e in fig. 1. 
Norwegian zoologist whose Arctic explorations made him 
famous a generation ago. Nansen was a pioneer in the study 
of the Continental Shelf. He concluded that the landward 
portion of the Arctic shelf had been planed off by tides 
and currents to become a surface of marine abrasion, while 
the seaward portion is built up by the accumulation of the 
material swept out toward the Continental Slope by the same 
forces. 13 He perceived also that on the inner, abraded 
portion of the shelf~ little deposition takes place, except 
in local downwarps or depressions. The general surface of 
the shelf became a "base level" of erosion and a "top level" 
of deposition. Nansen, however, attached much importance 
to the deposition of sediments as a cause of subsidence.1 4 
On the other hand, according to the theory of Jessen, 
Novak, and others the formation of the entire shelf surface 
7. 
is controlled exclusively by the demolishing action of waves 
and currents.15 According to their theory the shelf is con-
sidered to be a feature which originated mainly by abrasion;16 
13. Loc. cit. 
14. This theory was advocated by Pratt, above No.12, to prove 
that great petroleum and gas resources are located in 
coastal and adjacent submarine areas as a result of 
deposition of fine-grained sediments which are rich in 
organic material. 
15. Cited by Umbgrove, supra, p.101. 
16. Ibid, p.1 01. 
so that its whole surface was carved out of the continental 
blocks. In order to explain the frequent occurrence of the 
Shelf edge at a depth of 200 metres, those authors put 
forward.hypothetical theories which, for several reasons, 
are .untenable.17 
In fact the whole idea of the shelves being carved into 
the continental blocks is rendered out of date since the 
geophysical explorations carried out by Ewing's team.18 For 
they made it highly probable that the Atlantic shelf of 
North America is composed of an accumulation of sediments 
ranging from triassic to recent times resting on the sub-
merged part of the former continent and attaining a thickness 
of 4,000 metres at a distance of 60 miles off the shore-line. 
Similar results were obtained by Bullard for the Shelf to 
the west of the English Channel.19 
Shepard, in his book "Submarine Geology," 2nd ed. 1963, 
suggests a multiple origin of Continental Shelves. Figure 2 
represents several modes of origin for Continental Shelves, 
put forward by him. His conclusions on this matter may be 
summarized as follows:-
17. Ibid, p.102. 
18. Ewing, M., Crary, A. P., Rutherford, H. N., and Miller, 
B. L. 'Geophysical investigations in the emerged and 
submerged Atlantic coastal plain,' Bull. Geolog. Soc. 
Amer. vol.48, 1947. 
19. Bullard, E. c., and Gaskell, T. F., 'Submarine Seismic 
Investigations' (Royal Society of London, Series A, 
No.471, vol.177, 1941 ). 

1 • Most of the outer terraces of the shelves can be 
accounted for as either the result of low-level 
wave abrasion or as deltas built during the low 
stands. 
2. As to wide shelves, some must have resulted from 
the filling of relatively deep basins, some must 
have undergone a long his.tory of submergence, 
and some others are probably in part the result 
of down warping processes along the continental 
margins. 
It is concluded that the Continental Shelf must not be 
regarded as a huge step incised in the continental block. 
On the other hand, the theory of Umbgrove, that the 
Continental Shelves represent a combination of wave-cut 
and wave-built terraces, mus.t not be generalised. Hence, 
Shepard's views, which comprise the best views of the two 
classical schools of thought, seem to be based on solid 
grounds. 
3. Variations in the Surface of the Shelf 
(a) Different Shelf-Burfaces 
According to Weaver, 20 there are two types of Continental 
Shelf, and each is associated with a corresponding type of 
topography of the land inshore. Examination of Continental 
Shelf areas in the world lead to the fact that the Shelf 
20. Weaver~ P., 'Variations in History of Continental Shelves,' 
Bull. Emer. Assos. Petrol. Geolog., vol.34 (March, 1950) 
pp .351 -352. 
forms a physiographic unit with its adjacent coastal plain. 21 
In other words, it was found that the broader the Continental 
Shelf, the broader the coastal plain inland from it; the 
narrower the Continental Shelf, the steeper the Continental 
Slope of it seaward, and the land rise inland from it. 
Beyond the Continental Shelf seaward is the Continental 
Slope. There are also two types of Continental Slope, as 
there are of Continental Shelf. In one type, Weaver states, 
the Continental Slope has a single steep slope from the 
Continental Shelf's outer edge to the ocean deep. In the 
other, it is compound, and part way down the slope is a 
plateau, or at any rate a lessening of the slope rate, so 
that it consists of a steeper upper segment and a gentler 
22 lower one. 
Extreme cases of these types were cited by Nansen. 23 
Drawings of the profiles of the two examples of Nansen are 
shown in Figure 3. The shorter one is from the west coast 
21. Ibid, p.353; however, slight differences are admitted by 
Weaver due to differences between marine agencies and 
aerial agencies. 
1 o. 
22. It has been suggested that this lower slope be called the 
continental rise, and that it be separated from the much 
steeper upper cont·inental slope. In some places the 
continental rise is "relatively narrow band that is rather 
closely related to the Continental Slope, but elsewhere it 
extends for hundreds of miles out into what clearly seems 
to be a part of the deep ocean territory: See Shepard, 
supra, No.4, p.279. 
23. Nansen, F. Amer. Geog. Soc. Spec. pub. 7 (1928) pp.4-7. 
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of Norway, the longer one from the north coast of Siberia 
near the mouth of the Lima River. It is apparent that the 
Continental Shelf is narrow off Norway and the land is 
mountainous down to the sea shore; off Siberia a wide 
Continental Shelf adjoins a wide coastal plain and a very 
gently sloping hinterland. It is also obvious that the 
Continental Slope in the shorter profile is steep and 
nearly uniform; in the longer profile the slope consists 
of two s·egments. 
(b) Formations on the Outer Shelf-Burface. 
Continental Shelf areas are not as simple as maps 
show them. Topographic features, ranging from ordinary 
roughness to a variety of elevations and depressions, appear 
in the surface of most shelves and slopes·. Figure 4 shows 
three profiles, cited by Weaver, from the north Gulf of 
Mexico. 24 It is obvious that much of topographic roughness 
appears on the slope of the two upper ones, and it may be 
observed from the profile of Houston that this roughness 
extends upon the Continental Shelf. However, it is a 
geological phenomenon that topographic features are mostly 
found in the Continental Slope. 
11 • 
Geologists are by no means in agreement as to the nature 
and origin of topographic features on the Continental Slope. 
Shepard interprets the topographic plugs off Louisiana as 
24. Weaver, supra, p.356. 
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piercement salt domes. He found that most of these features 
on the Continental Slope correspond in size, shape and 
number with some of the subsurface salt domes, folds and 
faults which have been outlined by drilling on land in 
Texas and Louisiana, and more recently have been shown to 
be present off shore from these states, at least for a few 
miles in the Continental Shelf zone. 25 In regard to the 
interpretation of local roughness on the Continental Shelf, 
offshore from Houston, shown in Figure 4, both Weaver and 
Pratt suggest that these rugged features have been active 
tectonically in recent geologic time, when the depth of 
water was like it is today. 26 Had they been formed by 
differential erosion on land before submergence they should 
have been degraded, as to the elevations, and filled up, 
as to the depressions. Such modification would not be 
expected if they were formed in water of the present depth, 
because in deep water neither erosion nor sedimentation is 
active. They also agree that these topographic contours are 
really structural contours indicating very active tectonic 
forces in the area. 27 
25. Shepard, F. P. 'Salt domes related to Mississippi 
Submarine Trough,' Bull. Geol. Soc. Amer., vol.48, 
pp.1349-62. 
26. Weaver, supra, p.355. 
27. Ibid., p.357. 
12. 
Pratt, however, making no distinction between the 
Continental Shelr and Continental Slope, considers that 
"The region or the Continental Shelr takes on the character 
28 or an extremely mobile segment or the earth's crust,'' 
and develops the theory that this mobility has resulted in 
downwarping (including also raulting and rolding) or the 
Continental Shelr outside the shore line relative to the 
land area inside the shore line. In other words, his 
theory is to the erfect that the submergence or the 
Continental Shelf (including the Continental Slope) is 
tectonic. 
Weaver challenges the theory just summarized as far 
as the shelr area is concerned. 29 To him the physiography 
or the Continental Shelr is due to erosion, and thererore 
that it is in the same geologic province as the adjacent 
land. He does believe that one border or the Continental 
Shelr is tectonic, but that is the outer one, and is 
localized in the Continental Slope rather than in the shelr 
area. 30 
In fact, Pratt's views are mainly based on explorations 
and surveys carried out in the Gulr or Mexico, an area well 
known by its active movement or tectonic nature. Thererore, 
28. Pratt, supra No.12, p.658; This theory was rirst 
suggested by Nansen as it is admitted by Pratt himselr 
on p.659. 
29. Weaver, supra, p.352. 
30. Loc. cit., p.352. 
13. 
that local area cannot be recommended for test of the two 
theories. 
It would be wise to come to the same cautious conclusion 
as Keunen that "The problem of the shelf is still far from 
being definitely solved. 11 31 The problem, however, may be 
solved when we get to know more about submarine canyons, 
which remain to be examined here. 
Finally, the two theories - one that the coast line is 
a hinge line, and the other that the zone of active movement 
is on the Continental Slope - will be reconsidered when 
dealing with the two notions of continuity and contiguity 
or adjacency as a legal basis of claims to the Continental 
Shelf. 32 
(c) Submarine Canyons 
Another concept supplied by the geologists in regard to 
the surface of the shelf is "submarine canyons.u33 Kuenen 
describes this geomorphological feature as follows: 
"A typical canyon starts as a steep narrow gorge 
cutting across the continental shelf for a few dozen 
kilometres and running straight down the continental 
slope to great depths. At the edge of the shelf the 
bottom may lie many hundreds to a thousand metres 
31. Kuenen, ph.H. 'Marine Geology,' p.169. 
32. Infra, p.€5. 
33. The most recent study on the subject is given by 
Shepard, supra No.4, Chapter XI. 
14. 
below the adjoining sea floor . . . . . . . . . The trans-
verse section is V-shape, and in ground plan a 
moderately sinuous course is followed •••••••• 
tributaries, generally heading well into the shelf 
or beginning at the top of the Continental Slope, 
come in, forming a dendritic pattern."34 
Umbgrove tentatively distinguishes three types of 
canyons: 35 
(i) As a first group submarine gorges originating 
near the edge of the shelf and running downward 
to great depth have to be mentioned. In many 
places they were found crowded together in great 
numbers. They are cut back only a short distance 
into the platform of the shelf, the headward 
extensions being seldom more than 5 to 10 miles. 
(ii) A few gorges of the type mentioned just now 
extend across the continental platform, their 
much shallower headward extensions reaching the 
vicinity of the shore near or at the debouchement 
of a large river. 
(iii) Another type of submarine canyon was revealed 
by soundings off the coast of California. They 
are characterized by a dendritic river-like 
34. Keunen, supra, p.487. 
35. Supra, pp.122-125. 
15. 
pattern, deeply incised in the surface of the 
Continental Shelf and thence continuing towards 
the great depth of the Pacific Ocean. 
In spite of the amount of writings on the subject, the 
origin of canyons remains shrouded in mystery. However 
canyons cannot be older than the Continental Shelf and. 
Slope, since they are cut into it. Some twenty years ago 
there was a large number of hypotheses used by geologists 
as canyon explanations. 36 In recent years most of these 
hypotheses have been discarded, leaving only the following 
theories which are also subject to criticisms in one way or 
another: 
(i) Subaerial erosion:- This theory was advocated by 
Veatch and Smith.37 To explain the effect of 
subaerial river erosion they allege that the sea 
was lowered 12,000 feet and again restored to its 
former level in the last 20,000-25,000 years. 
There are many objections to this theory, 
especially the enormous biological changes which 
should have resulted from such a shrinking of 
the oc·eans, and the impossibility of explaining 
in this way the Mediterranean canyons as this 
sea could not have been lowered below the level 
36. For further details, see Shepard, supra No.4, pp.337-338. 
37. Veatch, A. c., and Smith, P. A. 'Atlantic submarine 
canyons of the u.s. and the Congo submarine valley,' 
Geol. Soc. Amer. Spec., paper 7 (1939) p.101. 
1 6. 
of sea-floor in the Strait of Gibraltar.38 
(ii) Submarine erosion or turbidity currents:- In 
contrast to the idea of subaerial erosion, 
Daly39 Kuenen, 40 and Heezen41 concluded that the 
bottom currents in the ocean itself caused this 
topography. This theory is also untenable since 
it is impossible that canyons thousands of feet 
deep in hard rock walls could be cut by density 
currents. They would be more likely to form 
isolated closed depressions than canyons. 
However, the results of an intensive study of 
canyon heads, by Dill, appeared recently in a 
thesis on "submarine erosion."42 
(iii) The flexure theory:- According to Bourcart~3 _ 
canyons are quaternary river valleys submerged 
by a recent movement of the continental marginal 
flexure. This hypothesis has the advantage of 
39. Daly, R. A., 'Origin of Submarine Canyons,' Amer. Jour. 
Sci. Vol.31 , 1936, pp .401 -402. 
40. Kuenen (ph.H) considered currents actions as one of the 
major causes: 'Origin of submarine canyons,' Bull. Geol. 
Soc. Amer., vol.6L~, 1953, pp.1295-1314. 
41. Heezen (B.C.) considered the o~rents actions as the sole 
cause of submarine canyons: 'Corrientes de Turbidez del 
Rio Magdalena, '.Bal. Soc. Geogr/of, Colombia, 1956, nos. 
51 and 52, pp.135-42. 
1 7. 
42. Dill, R. F., cited by Shepard, supra No.4, p.348; see 
Dill's basic work on the subject 11Sedimentary and Erosional 
Features of Submarine Canyons,tt 1962, editor: National 
Science Foundation and Office of Naval Research. 
43. Bourcart, J. 'La Theorie de la flexure continentale,' 
c. R. Cong. inter. geog., Lisbonne, 1949, vol.11, pp.167-90. 
offering an explanation of the canyons which are 
abnormally steep for river valleys. However, the 
explanation would be easier to accept if canyons 
of apparently recent origin were all concentrated 
in regions where large scale earth movements are 
known to have occurred. Therefore, it is impossible 
to invoke this theory in some regions, notably on 
the Atlantic coast of the u.s., where canyons are 
cut into the pliocene and where there is no evidence 
of recent movements of any importance.44 
To conclude, from the foregoing discussion it will be 
evident that there is much yet to be learned about submarine 
canyons. The detailed study of the valleys of the sea bed 
makes it constantly more evident that they cannot be 
explained by any one process alone. 
Finally, this lack of simplicity and uniformity in the 
geophysical structure of the Continental Shelf causes 
problems in the attempt to aelimit the Shelf and ways have 
to be found to overcome these difficulties.45 
44. See Guilscher, A. 'Coastal and Submarine Morphology,' 
1958, p.223; also Shepard, supra No.4, p.344-5. 
1B. 
45. Mr. R. Young who devoted several years to the study of 
this subject suggested a method of delimitation where the 
submarine area is interrupted by canyons, depressions and 
other feature~. His method was recommended to the ILC 
when dealing with this question. See Young 'The Legal 
Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas,' AJIL, 
vol.45(2), 1951, p.235; also YBILC, 1951, vol.1, p.271, 
paragraph 65. 
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Section II - The Legal History and Resources of the 
Continental Shelf 
1 • The Continental Shelf from lex lata to lex ferenda 
In the forties, more than twenty-five proclamations 
were made by coastal states to the adjacent submarine areas 
of their coasts. 46 These enactments largely differ to the 
extent of the area claimed, the rights asserted and the 
terms used. 47 Such claims were most influenced by the 
economic interest of the claimant in the natural resources 
of the area claimed, commonly known by the name 'Continental 
Shelf.' This economic interest of some states motivated 
earlier jurists to propound the right of a state to assume 
jurisdiction and control over certain areas of what was 
46. These states are: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Equador, Guatemala, Iran, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
P~nama, Peru, Philippines, U.K. (on behalf of Bahamas, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,and nine Sheikhdoms in 
the Arabian-Persian Gulf), Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.A. 
47. The contents of such claims will be discussed later in 
Part Two of this work. 
1 9. 
formerly regarded as part of the high seas.48 
From the late forties and onward the regime of the 
Continental Shelf as lex lata has been discussed by many 
scholars.49 Their works have no doubt contributed a great 
deal to the cause of the shelf doctrine. While these 
theoretical discussions were taking place, the ILC set out 
to· establish a lex ferenda for the exploitation of the 
20. 
48. To mention a few lawyers, Sir Cecil Hurst "Whose is the bed 
of the sea" BYIL 1923-24, pp.34-43, where he advocates the 
theory of the ownership of the natural resources of the 
seabed by occupation based on enactment made to that effect 
by the adjacent state; see also his comments on Vattel~s 
statement "Who can doubt that the pearl fisheries of 
Bahrein and Ceyloh may lawfully become property," p.40. 
Suarez, J. L., "Report on the Exploitation of the Products 
of the Sea," 20 AJIL, 1926, Supp.2, pp.230-241. This 
Argentinian jurist proposed, ~n his report to the sub-
committee of experts on the topic of the exploitation of 
the resources of the sea, the extension of the marginal 
sea to include the Continental Shelf, which, according to 
him, is the only natural limit for the territorial sea. 
He justified his proposal by the necessity of adapting 
international law to the needs of maritime industries. 
See comments on that report by Anderson C. P., 'Exploita-
tion of the Resources of the Sea,' 20 AJIL (1926) pp.752-3. 
See further Borchard E., 'Jurisdiction over the littoral 
bed of the sea,' AJIL 35 (1941) pp.515-19; also by the 
same writer 'The Resources of the Shelf,' 40 AJIL, 1946,p.59. 
49. The reading list on the subject is rather extensive. However, 
the following articles and text books are most informative: 
Vallat, F. A.~'The Continental Shelf,' 23 BYIL 1946, 
pp.333-338; Hurst, 'The Continental Shelf,' Transactions 
of the Grotius Society, 34 (1948); Green, L. c.~'The 
Continental Shelf, CLP 4 ( 1 951 ) ~ w'aldock, 'Legal Claims to 
the Continental Shelf,' Transactions of the Grotius 
Society, 35 ( 1950)" -young, R. 'Recent Developments with 
respect to the Continental Shelf,' AJIL 42 (1948) 849-857; 
also 'The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High 
Seas,' AJIL 45 ( 1951) 225-239 ;. Kunz, J. 'The Continental 
Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse', AJIL 
50 (1956) 828-853; Mouton, M. W. 3 'The Continental Shelf,' 
The Hague, 1952; Anninos, P. c. L.,'The Continental Shelf 
and Public International Law' The Hague, 1953. 
submarine resources. In his report to the ILC, Professor 
Francois, special rapporteur on the regime of the high seas 
devoted a full chapter for the question of the Continental 
Shelf.50 After extensive discussions and long debates for 
a period of seven years, the ILC prepared its final draft 
articles on the Continental Shelf in 1956.51 
Apart from independent writers and the ILC, various 
governmental and non-governmental organizations have also 
endeavoured to work towards the codification of the regime 
21 • 
of the shelf.52 The resolutions passed by these organizations, 
50. Report on the High Seas by Francois, YILC, 1950 - II, 
Chapter III - Le Plateau Continental, pp.87~13. 
51. ILC Report with commentary to the General Assembly, 
Articles 67-73, YILC, 1956 - II, pp.295-301. 
52. The Inter-American Council of Jurists, at its third meet-
ing held at Mexico City in 1956, agreed upon the idea of 
the Continental Shelf; see MacChesney; Situation, Docu-
ments and Commentary on Recent Developments in the Inter-
national Law of the Sea, 1957, pp.244-45. The OAS, at 
its conference held at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956, unani-
mously supported the concept of the Continental Shelf 
and passed a resolution in that respect; see also 
MacChesney op.cit. p.256. The ILA, at its 1948, 1950 
and 1952 conferences studied the problem of the Continental 
Shelf; In 1954, the Conference passed a resolution that 
the ILA would be in favour of the ILC draft on the 
Continental Shelf: see ILA report 43 (1948) p.168, 44 (1950), 
pp.87-138, 45 (1952), pp.143-163 and 46 (1954), pp.411-442. 
Furthermore, the International Law Bar Association, El 
Congresso Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho International 
and the American Law Institute all passed resolutions 
in support of the ILC draft: see IBA Report of the Third 
Conference (LondOl!l:) 1950, p.184 and the Fourth Conference 
(Madrid) 1952, p.279. The resolution of El Congresso 
Hispano-Luso-Americano is reprinted at Universidad de 
Buenos Aires, Rivista de la Facultad de Derecho Y 
Ciencias Sociales, Ano 9 (1954) p.252. The ALI report 
is published in The Foreign Relations Law of the u.s.: 
A Restatement, Tentative Draft No.1, 1957, p.50, para.23. 
so far as the concept of the Continental Shelf is concerned, 
are almost identical to that of the ILC. Therefore, and 
as Oda remarks, "it is not an over statement to say that 
the concept of the Continental Shelf can be properly 
understood by reference to the work of the ILC."53 
At the Geneva Conference of 1958, the draft articles 
of the ILC relevant to the Continental Shelf were inten-
sively examined by the Fourth Committee before being 
submitted to the plenary meeting.54 The Convention on 
the Continental Shelf was adopted on 26th April, 1958. 
Several comprehensive works, which mainly deal with defi-
ciencies and other shortcomi~gs in the convention, have 
already been published.55 
53. Oda, s., 'International Control of Sea Resources,' 
1 963' p .1 61 • 
54. Geneva Conference 1958, Vol.II (Plenary Meetings): 
Vol.VI (Continental Shelf). 
55. Consult: Dean, A.i'The Geneva Conference on the Law of 
the Sea: What was Accomplished,' AJIL, 52 (1958); 
Gutteridge, 'The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, BYBIL 35 (1959); Whiteman, 'Conference 
on the Law of the Sea: Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf,' AJIL 52 (1958); Young, 'The Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First Impression,' 
AJIL, 52 (1958); Garcia Amador, 'The Exploitation and 
Conservation of the Reso~ces of the Sea,' 1959. 
22. 
Recently, in the light of technical advancement and 
the increasing demand on the exploitation of deep-sea 
resources, discussions on the Convention took a new turn. 
Matters left unsolved,. by the Convention rather than in the 
Convention, are considered the-contemporary problems by most 
observers. Their main concern is. to find a proper solution 
' to crucial points such as the legal regime· of .the deep sea 
floor, and the future status of Mare Liberum. The answers 
to most of these problems belong to another part· of this 
work. 56 However, the key answer to any question connected 
with the status of the bottom of the oceans depends largely 
on what is legally meant by the term "Continental Shelf." 
2}. 
2. The Concept of the Continental Shelf in International Law 
From a legal point of view the theory of the Continental 
Shelf is dealt with under three main headings which represent 
the whole body of literature on the subject. These are:-
(a) Proclamations and decrees 
(b) Publications and writings, and 
(c) Judicial decisions 
(a) Proclamations and decrees 
The point of departure with regard to state practice is 
normally the Truman Proclamations of September, 1945. There 
56. One Je~R is devoted to the question of the legal regime 
of the deep-sea floor and its relation to the doctrine of 
the Continental Shelf. 
24. 
were, in fact, earlier acts which served a similar purpose, 
but these made no reference to the Continental Shelf eo 
nomine. 
The 1858 Cornwall Submarine Mines Act cannot be taken 
as the earliest state instrument dealing with the question 
of the Continental Shelf.57 The Act applies only to minerals 
won from mines and workings below low water mark under the 
open sea adjacent to the county of Cornwall. This has nothing 
to do with the regime of the Continental Shelf since the 
Convention does not affect the right of the coastal state 
to exploit the subsoil by means of tunnelling, whatever may 
be the height of the waters above the subsoil.58 
It has been suggested that the first reference to the 
Continental Shelf in a state instrument was a decree of the 
Imperial Russian Government circulated to the powers in 1916 
and reissued by the Soviet Union in 1924.59 According to 
this Russia claimed certain Arctic islands as forming "a 
northern extension of the Siberian continental platform." 
In his comments on the Russian decree, Professor Francois says 
57. See the story of this Act in Sir Cecil Hurst's article 
'Whose is the Bed of the Sea, ' BYIL, 1 923-1924, p. 34. 
58. Article 7 of the Convention. 
59. An English translation of the 1924 decree appears in J. 
Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1951, p.476; 
see also Lakhtine, AJIL 24 (1930) pp.703-708. 
"the term 'continental platform' is clearly not used in the 
same sense as that employed today: it does not refer to an 
underwater plateau. The rights claimed by the Soviet Union 
in Polar waters should be considered in relation to the 
'Theory of Sectors60 ••••••• The Soviet Government has not 
submitted any claims on the basis of the 'Continental Shelf 
Theory' nor has it replied to the claims of other states." 61 
In the same year, 1916, at a Fisheries Conference in 
Madrid, de Bruen, who became Director General of Fisheries 
in Spain, proposed the extension of territorial waters to 
include the Continental Shelf. 62 Nothing came of this at 
the time. However, in 1925, Ceylon issued a Pearl Fisheries 
Ordinance which made no actual reference to the Continental 
60. 'Sectors Theory' or the 'sector principle' was applied 
by states asserting sovreignty in Arctic and Antarctic 
regions: Oppenheim's International Law, Vol.1, p.556, 
note 6. Green, No.49 above, equated the sectors theory 
under international law with the political concept of 
spheres of influence. "Sphere of influence" is the 
name of territory exclusively reserved for future 
occupation by a power which has effectively occupied 
adjoining territories: Oppenheim's International Law, 
1955, Vol.1, p.562. 
61. Report on the High Seas to the ILC, 1950, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/17, p.34. 
62. Report of Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, League of Nations 
Doc. L. N.C. 1 96, M. 70, 1 927, p. 63. 
25, 
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Shelf, but defined the pearl banks as a "determinate area 
between the three, or in some places five, fathom line and 
the 100 fathom line;"63 which is in fact the Continental 
Shelf. Finally, in 1942, the U.K. and Venezuela signed a 
treaty relating to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria. 64 
By the terms of the treaty the two powers agreed not to 
assert any claim to sovereignty or control over the submarine 
areas, defined as the seabed and subsoil outside territorial 
waters, lying outside of specified demarcation lines, and 
each undertook to recognise any claim put forward by the 
other on its own side. 
One is therefore left with the conclusion that the 
concept of the Continental Shelf appeared for the first time 
in a State document in the U.S. Proclamations of 1945. 
The legal aspects of the various proclamations and 
decrees shall be dealt with in another chapter. Our only 
concern here is to find out whether any distinction has 
been made by states as to the notion of the area claimed 
when the Continental Shelf became a subject of national 
claims. 
63. Cited by Francois, Second Report on the High Seas, ILC, 
Third Session, A/CN.I+./42, 10th April, 1951, p.54; See 
also U.N. Legislation Series, Laws and Regulations on 
the High Seas, ST/LEG/SER .B/1 , 11th January, 1951 , p. 61 , 
(Note under No.5(C)). 
64. Treaty Series No.10(1942), Cmd.6400; This Gulf.is a 
narrow stretch of water lying between Trinidad and 
Venezuela and is not normally used by international 
shipping. 
.. ..... ···-
The proclamation by President Truman, to start with, 
only used the term "Continental Shelf."65 In a press 
release of the same date, a depth limit of 100-fathom 
t . d 66 was men 1one • The declaration of the President of 
Mexico of October, 1945, mentions the Continental Shelf 
which is delimited by 200 metres isobath. 67 The Decree 
Law of Costa Rica, November, 1949, refers to the 
submarine platform on the continental and insular coasts 
of the national territory at whatever depth it is found. 68 
The Royal pronouncement of Saudi Arabia with respect to 
the seabed and subsoil of areas in the Arabian-Persian 
Gulf of May, 1949, speaks of those areas in the Gulf sea-
ward from the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous 
to its coasts. 69 Nine sheikhdoms on the Gulf followed the 
65. 40 AJIL, 1946, Official Doc., p.45-48; The President 
issued two proclamations and two executive orders with 
regard to fisheries and the natural resources of the 
Continental Shelf. The executive order connected to the 
proclamation of the Continental Shelf merely placed its 
natural resources under the control and jurisdiction of 
the Secretary of the Interior. 
66. 13 Department of State Bulletin, 30 Sep., 1945. 
67. Law and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, 
Vol.I., ST/LEG/SER.B/1, 1951, p.13. 
68. Ibid, p.9; The Congressional Decree No.102 of Honduras, 
1950, Ibid, p.11, uses the same wording, adding however 
"and whatever its extent." 
69. 43 AJIL, 1949, Supp. p.154-156. 
27. 
28. 
same line of the Royal pronouncement in their proclamations. 70 
From this summary record three main groups of 
proclamations and decrees emerge, namely:-
(i) Those of the western hemisphere where the 
Continental Shelf is used with or without 
further delimitation. 
(ii) Those of Costa Rica and Honduras where the 
term insular shelf is mentioned along with 
the Continental Shelf, and 
(iii) Those of Saudi Arabia pronouncement and the 
proclamations of the Arabian-Persian Gulf 
Sheikhdoms where no Continental Shelf is 
mentioned. 
(b) Publications and Writings 
The basic issue with regard to theoretical discussions 
on the subject was whether the geological term "Continental 
Shelf" is adequately applicable to certain adjacent submarine 
areas. This was expressed by Hudson at the very beginning 
of the ILC debates on the subject. While Mr. Hudson admits 
that in the Arabian-Persian Gulf there is no Continental 
70. These sheikhdoms are: Bahrein, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, 
Kuwait, Dubei, Sharjah, Ras-al-Khaimah, Ajmon, and 
Umm-al-Qaiwain; see Laws and Regulations on the 
High Seas, supra, pp.23-29. 
Shelf, he, nevertheless, felt that lawyers had no right 
to prevent the exploitation of the resources of that gulf 
for the benefit of·mankind. 71 Mr. Young, who was always a 
big opponent to the use of the term "Continental Shelf," 
states "as a factual matter, no Continental Shelf exists 
in the Persian Gulf, which is merely a basin much less than 
100 fathoms deep on the Asian continental mass." 72 In a 
later article, he is more precise in saying "in the Persian 
Gulf, in which there is, strictly speaking, no Continental 
Shelf tt73 According to him, the bottom and subsoil . . . . . . . . . 
of the Arabian-Persian Gulf must be classified under the 
group "seabed and subsoil beneath shallow seas and gulfs." 
Rinton also states that "the theory of jurisdiction on 
which the Arabian claims are based is necessarily somewhat 
different from that supporting the American policy due to 
the fact that there is no Continental Shelf in the Persian 
Gulf." 73.a 
71. YBILC, Vol.1, 1950, The 66th Meeting, p.214, para.73; at 
the 67th meeting, Ibid, p.218, para.11, Hudson declared 
that if it was desired to use the expression "Continental 
Shelf," he would ask for shallow waters to be assimilated 
to it. 
72. Young, R. 'Saudi Arabian off-shore Legislation,' 43 AJIL, 
1949, pp.530-31. 
73. Ibid, 'Further claims to areas beneath the high seas,' 
pp. 790-91. 
73a. Rinton, J. Y.·B., 'Jurisdiction over sea-bed resources 
and recent developments in Persian Gulf Area,' Revue 
Egyptienne de droit international, vol.5, 1949, p.133. 
29. 
Professor Francois, in his report ·to the ILC, referred 
to these statements and added "in point of fact there is no 
Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf."74 However, as a 
solution to the problem, he suggested " ••••••• where the 
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depth of the waters permitted exploitation it should not 
necessarily depend on the existence of a Continental Shelf. 1175 
It appears that the denial of the existence of a Shelf 
in the Arabian-Persian Gulf and similar areas is based on 
the distinction made by Umbgrove between inner and outer 
shelve8. 76 In fact, unless we accept this distinction, the 
argument that. there is no edge in the Arabian-Persian Gulf 
would be rebutted by the fact that the edge of the Continental 
Shelf of the Asian continental mass lies outside that Gulf, 
in the Gulf of Oman.77 
It is still more doubtful whether we can speak about a 
Continental Shelf when the coast of a continent is dented 
into bays or into gulfs, or where there is a drop to the 
bottom of the ocean from the coastline. As a result, Young 
suggested use of the term "submarine areas" which was employed 
74. Supra, note 61, p.31. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Umbgrove, supra. pp.3 and 4.~. 
77. This was Siuggested by Dr. Mouton, supra, p.11; presumably 
it is this view which the Iranian Bill of May, 1949, had 
adopted when it talked about 'The Continental Shelf of 
the Iranian Coasts in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea,' 
Revue Egyptienne de Droit International, vol.5, 1949. 
in the British-Venezuelan Treaty on the Gulf of Paria, 
26th February, 1949.78 In his opinion, this term does not 
only apply to places where no edge exists, but it would 
also include that land portion of the Continental Shelf 
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lying within territorial waters, as well as "insular shelves." 79 
Young's view was suggested by Mr. Amador, the Chairman, 
to the ILC, but for reasons other than those mentioned by 
Young. 80 In fact, Young's suggestion to include the seabed 
and subsoil lying within the territorial waters is meaning-
less since the coastal states' sovereignty over that area is 
part of the main domain. What the Chairman had in mind was 
the continental terrace which is not included in the 
Continental Shelf according to the definitions approved by 
the International Committee on the Nomenclature of Ocean 
Bottom Features adopted by the International Committee of 
Scientific Experts at Monaco in 1952.81 These definitions 
and Mr. Amador's proposal will be discussed later. 
(c) Judicial Decisions 
From a judicial point of view the distinctive character 
of the term "Continental Shelf" was brought out in this 
78. Supra, note 64. 
79. Young 'The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the 
High Seas,' Supra, note 49, p.227. 
80. Infra, P·36. 
81. Infra, Pp. 39-J/.0· 
passage of Lord Asquith award in Ab~ Dhabi Arbitration: 82 
" •••••••.• it follows, if I am right, that the 
claimants succeed as to the subsoil of the 
territorial waters (including the territorial waters 
of islands) and that the Sheikh succeeds as to the 
subsoil of the shelf; by which I mean in this connec-
tion the submarine area contiguous with Abu Dhabi 
outside the territorial zone."83 
32. 
It is not without risk to assume that Lord Asquith asserts 
the existence of a Continental Shelf stricto sensu in the 
Persian Gulf where he says "The sheikh succeeds as to the 
subsoil of the shelf," because it follows immediately the 
explanatory line "by which I mean in this connection the 
submarine area contiguous with Abu Dhabi outside the 
territorial zone." However, one cannot read the judgment 
without assuming that the main point of dispute was in regard 
to the so-called Continental Shelf area. Lord Asquith 
studied in his award the origin, history and development of 
the expression "Continental Shelf." He examined with an 
enormous amount of care the legal norms of the new doctrine 
before he arrived at a conclusion. Therefore, it is supposed 
that he was influenced by the notion "Continental Shelf." 
82. ICLQ, Vol.1, 1952, pp.247-261. 
83. Ibid, p.260. 
Such conclusion, however, is inconsistent with another part 
of the judgment where Lord Asquith says "The claims (of the 
Latin and American Republics) were often not limited to the 
shelf as a geological entity or even to the area ending 
where the depth of the sea began to exceed 100 fathoms, but 
sometimes extended to a z:one 200 miles from the mainland; 
33. 
an area quite unrelated to the width of the physical shelf. 1184 
The fact that Lord Asquith can speak about "a shelf in the 
Persian Gulf, 11 on one hand, and "The shelf as a geological 
entity" and "The physical shelf," on the other hand, does 
not elucidate our problem in the least. Instead, he compli-
cated the issue by using these two sets of inconsistent terms. 
Hence, it is more likely to suggest that Lord Asquith referred 
to a Continental Shelf in the Arabian-Persian Gulf by fiction 
of law rather than as a geological reality. 
Finally, in the Ruler of Qatar Award, Lord Radcliffe 
avoided using the term ncontinental Shelf" and talked of 
seabed and subsoil beneath the high seas in the Arabian-
Persian Gulf. 85 
Conclusion 
From these various views a picture of the Continental 
Shelf as a legal notion emerges. By relating them to the 
articles of the Convention on the Shelf, we find that this 
84. Ibid, pp.254-255. 
85. ILR, 1953, p.534; See comments on this case by Lord 
Asquith in his conclusion on Abu Dhabi Arbitration 
supra, p. 261 • 
legal notion differs from the geological one in many 
respects:-
1. Unlike the geological concept, it includes shallow 
water areas, 
2. The legal edge will not always be parallel with 
the real edge, and 
3. The exploitation of the submarine areas does not 
depend on the existence of a Continental Shelf. 
This last point follows immediately from Professor 
Francois' proposed solution. 86 
As a result, we are going to use this term in a legal 
sense. This means that we have to find a new definition 
since the issue involved represents more than an academic 
dispute as it relates directly to a newly established 
right which, if not defined specifically, would lead to a 
major dispute between states. 
86. Supra, no.75. See also Amador's comments in 1YBILC, 
1956, p.131. 
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Section III - Attempt to Define the Continental Shelf 
1. Terminology and Definition 
(a) Terminology 
Before defining the term 'Continental Shelf,' it is 
highly important to study the different names under which 
this notion appeared in various instruments. It is 
necessary to inquire into the significance of the fact that 
these instruments do not invariably refer to the Shelf by 
name; that those which refer to it do not necessarily use 
it in the same meaning, and that the expression 'Continental 
Shelf' has become no more than a convenient formula covering 
a diversity of titles to the· seabed and subsoil adjacent to 
the territorial waters of the state. 
The term 'submarine areas.' was suggested by Mr. Young 
as a more appropriate term to cover shallow water areas 
and areas whose depth is more than 200 metres off the coast-
line.87 In the light of the terminology and definitions 
approved by the International Committee on the Nomenclature 
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of Ocean Bottom Features adopted at Monaco in 1952, the term 
'submarine areas' was raised again by Mr. Amador in the ILc. 88 
87. Young, R. 'The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath 
the High Seas,' 45 AJIL 1951, pp .225-237, ( 227-228). 
88. YBILC, Vol.1, 1956, pp.130-140. 
He submitted three objections to the use of the 'Continental 
Shelf':-
(1) The term Continental Shelf does not include the 
continental terrace according to the nomenclature 
adopted at Monaco. He explained to the Commission 
that the continental terrace was formed by the right-
angled triangle, the hypotenuse of which was the 
Continental Slope, the other two sides being the 
perpendicular dropped from the outer edge of the 
Continental Shelf and the horizontal line join~gthe 
base of that perpendicular and the base of the 
Continental Slope. 89 Mr. Amador reminded the 
Commission of the vitality of the natural resources 
of that area which is formed by sediments and 
89a 
currents. Furthermore, the continental terrace 
has been the subject of a resolution which was 
unanimously adopted by all American states. 90 
Therefore, the distinction drawn between the two 
areas was no arbitrary one and was not at variance 
with scientific facts. 
89. But see the definition of the "continental terrace 11 as 
given by the International Committee on Nomenclature of 
Ocean Bottom Features; infra, 6(i). 
89a. This theory was advocated by Pratt in his article 
'Petroleum on Continental Shelves,' Bull. Amer. Petrol. 
Geol •. , Vol.31, No.4 (April, 1947), pp.657-72; also 
referred to in Section I; see also Amador, YBILC, Vol.1, 
1956, p.138, paragraph 26. 
90. Infra, note 110. 
(2) Another objection was the problem of coastal 
states whose adjacent submarine areas, owing 
their configuration, did not constitute a 
Continental Shelf.91 It was a matter of 
elementary justice that such states should 
also be entitled to exploit those areas. 
Equally important was the question of coastal 
to 
states who did not possess a Continental Shelf 
in its geological sense.92 
(3) Finally, similar difficulties had been experienced 
in expressing the term 'Continental Shelf' in 
Russian as in rendering it into Arabic.93 
Mr. Amador rejected Professor Francois' contention that 
the term 'Continental Shelf' was in common use and generally 
recognised. He referred to the fact that about 50 per cent 
of national legislations, referred to both Continental Shelf 
and continental terrace: and that the term 'submarine areas' 
was used in a treaty between the U.K. and Venezuela and 
other official documents. It was a generic term which 
included the Continental Shelf, the continental terrace and 
other areas which, on account of their depth, did not fall 
within either of those categories. 
91. Such as Chile, Peru, Dominican Republic, and Norway. 
92. Such as countries on the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the 
North Sea. 
93. The term 'Continental Shelf' was expressed in Arabic by 
words conveying the idea of 'continental terrace,' or 
'continental projection.' 
~-
On the other hand it has been argued that governments 
preferred the term 'Continental Shelf' because it possessed 
a certain fixity and was a conventional one which had a 
clear connotation in the mind of the public.94 
In fact, and as we have seen, the term 'Continental 
Shelf' is scientific in its origin. Its pecularity of 
being an identifiable physical feature throws doubt on the 
status of certain important areas of adjacent seas which 
would be excluded if the term is applied stricto sensu. 
Therefore, the decisive point in law is the definition 
applied rather than the terminology used on the principle 
'falsa demonstratio non nocet.' 
(b) Definition 
The Continental Shelf, though a physical term long 
recognised by geographers, geologists and oceanographers, 
has come to gain strong legal significance in Law of the 
Sea matters. At the Geneva Conference it was associated 
with a rather indefinite off-shore area beyond the outer 
limit of the territorial sea. Nevertheless, the actual 
physical description of the Continental Shelf should be 
one of the motivating factors in the formulation of legal 
texts pertaining to the off-shore area in question. There-
fore, it is worthwhile to start with definitions on the 
physical characteristics of the Continental Shelf before 
we pass to any legal definition of this term'. 
94. Francois ~ on page 132 of the 1956 YBILC, Vol.1. 
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(i) Geophysical Definitions of the Continental Shelf and 
Allied Features 
A large measure of international agreement on the 
definitions of the Continental Shelf and associated areas 
of the ocean floor was achieved at a meeting of the 
International Committee on the Nomenclature of Ocean Bottom 
Features.95 The terms and definitions agreed upon by the 
Committee are based to a large extent on earlier definitions 
given by Boggs. 96 Those that pertain to the Continental 
Shelf are as follows:-
"Continental shelf, shelf edge and continental 
borderland - the zone around the continents, extending from 
the low water line to the depth at which there is a marked 
increase of slope to greater depth. Where this increase 
occurs the term shelf is appropriate. Conventionally its 
edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or 200 metres) but instances 
are known where the increase of slope occurs at more than 
200 metres or less than 65 fathoms. When the zone below 
the low water line is highly irregular, and includes depths 
in excess of those typical of continental shelves, the term 
continental borderland is appropriate. 
95. Wiseman and Ovey, 'Definitions of features on the deep-
sea floor: Deep-s.ea Research, Vol.1, 1953, p.14; also 
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, Bulletin 
of Information, Vol.2, 1953, p.555. 
96. Boggs, s. w.~'Delimitation of Seaward Areas under 
National Jurisdiction,' 45 AJIL, 1951, pp.240-245. 
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"Continental slope - the declivity from the outer edge 
of the Continental Shelf or continental borderland into 
great depths. 
"Continental terrace - the zone around the continents 
extending from low water line to the base of the Continental 
Slope. 
"Island shelf - the zone around an island or island 
group, extending from the low water line to the d~pths at 
which there is a marked increase of slope to greater depths. 
Conventionally its edge is taken at 100 fathoms (or 200 
metres). 
"Island slope -the declivity from the outer edge of 
an island into great depths." 
On the basis of the foregoing terminology and 
definitions, Dr. Amador classified the submarine areas 
adjacent to continents and islands into three broad 
categories, namely:-
(1) The "continental and insular shelf," or simply 
"Submarine shelf," which is the zone between 
the low-water mark and the point at which the 
slope begins a rapid descent to the great 
oceanic depths, conventionally determined by 
the 1 00-fa thorn line. 
(2) The "continental and insular terrace," which 
is the mass enclosed between the limits of the 
shelf, the continental slope and an imag~nary 
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straight line drawn horizontally from the base 
of the slope to a corresponding point in the 
terrestrial subsoil of the continent or island. 
(3) The third category embraces all those submarine 
areas contiguous to a continent or island whose 
extension cannot be determined with the same 
degree of accuracy as in the case of the first 
two categories because of their irregularity 
and difference in depth.97 
(ii) The Juridical Definition of the Continental Shelf 
The members of the ILC gave much consideration to the 
definition of the Continental Shelf in their debates on 
the subject.98 The two main theories which attracted much 
attention from the Commission relate to the criterions of 
(a) depth, and (b) exploitability. 
Two preliminary definitions were prepared by the ILC 
in 1951 and 1953 before adopting the third and final 
definition in Article 67 of the 1956 draft articles con-
cerning the law of the sea. Article 67 became Article 1 
of the convention on the Continental Shelf. 
97. Garcia Amador, "The Exploitation and Conservation of 
the Resources of the Sea," 1959, p.88. 
98. The Commission's debates on the Continental Shelf are 
reported in the YBILC of 1950, Vol.1, pp.214-239, 1951 
Vol.1, pp.267-301, 1953, Vol.1, pp.72-163, and 1956, 
_ Vol.1, pp.130-159. 
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The 1951 draft of the ILC had defined the Continental 
Shelf as follows:-
'As here used, the term 'continental shelf' refers 
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of 
territorial waters, where the depth of superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the seabed and subsoil.'99 
This meant that the Commission had undertaken to do 
something for states which did not possess a Continental 
Sh lf . th 1 . 1 100 Th" 1 e 1n e geo og1ca sense. 1s was express y 
provided for by Mr. Brierly's proposal to the Commission. 
He suggested that 'the area for such control and jurisdic-
tion will need definition but it need not depend on the 
existence of a Continental Shelf.' 101 It is also supported 
by Professor Francois' proposal, which was referred to 
earlier.1 02 
In view of the comments of some governments and of the 
consideration that the 1951 text was not specific enough 
and might give rise to uncertainty and disputes, the 
Commission abandoned the criterion of exploitability in 
99. YBILC, 1951, Vol.II, p.141. 
100. Commentary, Ibid. 
101. Brierly, YBILC, Vol.1, 1950, p.222. 
102. Francois, Supra, No.75. 
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favour of the depth limit of 200 metres, a depth which was 
sufficient for all practical needs then.103 Accordingly, 
the corresponding article of the 1953 draft of the ILC 
reads:-
'As used in these articles, the term Continental 
Shelf refers to the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside 
of the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 
200 metres.' 1 04 
In comment on this definition, Colombos stated' ••••••• 
the practical reason for adhering to this limit (200 metres 
or approximately 100 fathoms) is obvious, as it is usually 
marlced on nautical charts. There is a further advantage 
in adopting this limit since it is at this depth that the 
Continental Shelf, in the geological sense, generally 
comes to an end and begins to fall s;teeply to a much greater 
depth.105 
In 1953, when the above definition was adopted by the 
ILC, it was thought that the criterion of 100 fathoms depth 
found support from both geologists and national claims to 
the shelf.106 The edge of the shelf, which is the important 
43. 
103. See comments by Egypt and France on p.249 of YBILC, 1953, 
Vol.II; also the Commission's comments on p.213, loc.cit. 
104. Ibid., p.212. 
105. Colombos, 'International Law of the Sea,' 1954, p.61. 
106. See a press release from the White House following 
Truman's proclamations and the declaration of the 
President of Mexico, notes 66 and 67 above. 
feature for boundary purposes, has commonly been spoken of 
as occurring at the average depth of 100 fathoms and this 
view has been encouraged by the fact that most maps and 
charts giving ocean depths indicate one or the other of 
these lines with a good deal of assurance.107 
However, one must admit that, in reality, the edge of. 
the shelf does not appear to be as simple a phenomenon as 
the maps may lead one to suppose. In addition, as a 
result of more recent geological surveys, the theory of 
100 fathoms shelr edge is no longer universally accepted 
by modern geologists. 108 Apart from that, the criterion 
of the 100-fathom line would exclude from the definition a 
considerable part of the continental and insular terraces 
and also any other submarine area adjacent to a state's 
territory which had a special configuration of the coast, 
as in the case of Chile. 
Consequently, at the Commission's eighth session in 
1956, the members found themselves facing crises from 
inside and outside the Commission.1 09 While they were 
107. See a recent map of 'The World', Amer. Geogr. Soc.,1947. 
108. Supra, Section 1, No.4. For other considerations in 
adopting this limit see infra No.120. 
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109. Inside the Commission, Dr. Amador presented his proposal, 
which has been discussed at the beginning of this section; 
he was also backed by the results of Ciudad Trujillo 
Conference, March, 1956. 
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debating the subject in May of that year, a copy of the 
resolution which was passed by the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference at Ciudad Trujillo one month earlier, was 
circulated to them.110 The formula of the definition adopted 
in that resolution is designed to place all coastal states 
on an equal footing with respect to the submarine areas 
adjacent to their respective territories. Furthermore, 
where the geographical configuration of the bed of the sea 
contiguous to the coast is so irregular that it cannot be 
defined in terms of the shelf or terrace concepts, the coastal 
state may exercise the same exclusive rights enjoyed by those 
which have a continental or insular shelf and terrace, 
provided the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
110. Final Act, Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
'Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental 
Shelf and Marine Water,' Ciudad Trujillo, March 
15-28th, 1956 (Pan American Union, 1956) 13; paragraph 
1 of the Resolution states:-
'The sea-bed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf, 
continental and insular terrace, or other submarine 
areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the 
area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, 
appertains exclusively to that state and are subject 
to its jurisdiction and control.' 
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exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and sub-
soil and that the submarine area be adjacent to the terri-
tory of the coastal state.111 
The ILC was impressed by this conclusion and, as a 
result, agreed to amend the 1953 definition so as to include 
the seabed and subsoil of other areas beyond the limit of 
100 fathoms "to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
"d 11112 sa1 area1s. Clearly, this is not quite the same as the 
criterion of exploitability pure and simple which the 
Commission had adopted in the 1951 draft. As Dr. Amador 
remarks: "There is now a distinction between the broad 
categories of submarine areas and also, as in the conclusion 
of the Inter-American Conference, between two classes of 
rights: an existing right with regard to the Continental 
Shelf proper, and a potential right with respect to the other 
areas covered by the defini tion."11 3 Therefore, the net 
result of this combined definition is that the element of 
arbitrariness in the 1953 definition had been mitigated by 
the principle of equality which was imported from the Ciudad 
Trujillo resolution. 
At the Geneva Conference, there were numerous proposals 
to change or amend the 1956 draft of Article 67 as it came 
111 • Ibid. 
112. YBILC, Vol.II, 1956, p.296. 
113. Amador, No.97 above, p.111. 
47. 
from the ILc.114 In spite, however, of considerable dis-
satisfaction voiced in Committee IV with the ILC draft, the 
only proposal obtaining a majority vote in Committee IV was 
a proposal by the Philippines to add a second paragraph to the 
ILC text to read: 'All references in these articles to 
"Continental Shelf" sha.Ll be understood to apply also to 
similar submarine areas adjacent and surrounding the coasts 
of islands. 1111 5 This amendment is in conformity with the 
general rule which assimilates islands to the mainland whether 
under the convention on territorial sea and contiguous zone, 116 
or in the nomenclature of ocean bottom featureso 117 Therefore, 
the assimilation by the U.S. Government of the seabed and 
subsoil of the territorial sea to thoae of the high seas, 
up to the limits of the shelf, is not justified by the 
historical development of the law in the matter.118 
114. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, off.rec., Vol.VI, 
Fourth Committee. 
115. Ibid., p.47. 
116. Article 10(2). 
117. Supra, No.95; but Oda, loc.cit., p.168, regards the 
proposal of the Philippines to be redundant since the 
term 'Continental Shelf' was not defined as only meaning 
the shelf contiguous to continents. 
118. See Hudson's comment on pp.267-268 of the YBILC, Vol.1, 
1951, para.21; however, the effect of the bill is merely 
national as it relates to disputes between some federal 
states and the union over the Continental Shelf area. 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, in its first draft, prepared in 1951, the 
Commission defined the Shelf by the criterion of possible 
exploitation pure and simple. It followed from this defini-
tion that areas in which exploitation was not technically 
conceivable by the reason of the depth of the water were 
excluded from the Continental Shelf. In 1953, the Commission 
had considered the possibility of adopting a fixed limit 
for the Continental Shelf in terms of the depth of the super-
jacent waters. It seemed likely that a limit fixed at a 
point where the sea covering the Continental Shelf reaches a 
depth of 200 metres would at that time be sufficient for all 
practical needs. This depth also coincides with that at 
which the Continental Shelf in the geological sense generally 
comes to an end. In 1956, the Commission felt, however, 
that such a limit would have the disadvantage of instability. 
Technical development in the near future might make it 
possible to exploit the resources of submarine areas at a 
depth of over 200 metres. Moreover, the members realised 
that this arbitrary depth would deprive coastal states in 
Latin America and somewhere else of the right to exploit 
submarine areas adjacent to their coasts. Hence, the 
Commission decided to amend the 1953 draft so as to include 
in the definition both the 200 metres dept~ and the criterion 
of exploitability. As a result, the system of ostensible 
inequality in the 1953 text was eliminated. With an· 
additional paragraph, this definition became Article 1 in 
the convention on the Continental Shelf.11 9 
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This is not, however, the end of the story. By attempt-
ing to solve a problem, this combined definition inherited 
problems of its own, which are not less dangerous to the 
regime of the shelf and the doctrine upon which it is based. 
2. The Main Problems of the Existing Definition 
(a) Exploitability versus 200 Metres Depth: How Should the 
Definition be Best Construed? 
The first impression which one might get from this 
combined definition is that the criterion of exploitability 
does not leave much place for the operation of the criterion 
of depth, especially when it becomes conceivable to exploit 
areas at greater depths in the light of technical advance-
ment. However, it appears from the ILC discussions that 
the adoption of 200 metres limit is not the outcome of the 
geological situation of the shelf only, but it also reflects 
the practical exploitability of the area concerned.120 On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that the formula of 
exploitability was not brought into the definition to cope 
119. Article 1 reads: "For the purposes of these articles, 
the 'Continental Shelf' is used as referring (a) to the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, 
to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where 
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploi-
tation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) 
to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas 
adjacent to the coasts of islands." 
120. YBILC, Vol.1, p.137, Francois' comment (Paragraph 14); 
also his comment in YBILC, Vol.1, 1951, p.270, para.55, 
and Hudson, loc. cit., para.50. 
with the future advancement in technology; but as a safe-
guard for the rights of those states which do not have a 
Continental Shelf in the geological sense of the term.121 
This means that the limit of 200 metres depth bears a 
meaning to the criterion of exploitability and restricts its 
application to that limit except where no Continental Shelf 
exists. In the latter case, where no Continental Shelf 
exists, a distinction must be made between areas of shallow 
seas where the depth of waters does not exceed 200 metres, 
and areas whe~e the depth exceeds 200 metres off the coast-
line. Areas falling under the first category are covered by 
the limit of 200 metres, where our only concern would be 
delimitation between the neighbouring states, a problem 
which belongs to another part of this work. It is only in 
regard to areas of the second category that the criterion of 
exploitability receives full and unrestricted application 
as long as exploitation is practicable122 and tenable.123 
121. In the Commission's commentary on p.296 (paragraph 4) 
of the 1956 YBILC, Vol.II, this point was not made 
clear; however, it is apparent that this provision comes 
originally from the resolution of Ciudad Trujillo 
Conference which adopted it as a principle of equality 
between coastal states. 
122. As to what is 'practicable,' see Amador, infra, Nos. 
124 and 125. 
123. It depends on whether a coastal state could invoke the 
depth &Chieved by another coastal state, to extend its 
jurisdiction and control to adjacent areas lying at 
such depth; see further details below, No.128. 
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Such interpretation to the meaning of Article 1 would 
invite crises and chaos into the convention and the doctrine 
which it embodies. It is, indeed, against the spirit of 
the doctrine of the shelf that coastal states having no 
shelf area should be given a free hand for exploitation, 
while other coastal states, with more natural and technical 
ability, ought to be tied down to a fixed limit. If it is 
a matter of elementary justice that the former states should 
be allowed to exploit submarine areas adjacent to their 
coasts without regard to waters depth, it is equally 
important that the latter states should have the same right. 
The only correct conclusion is to give the criteria of 
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'exploitation' in Article 1 a free interpretation for all. 
As some coastal states are now technically prepared to 
penetrate beyond the physical boundaries of the shelf, the 
limit of 200 metres depth would be meaningless. As a result, 
'exploitability' becomes the sole order of the definition. 
(b) Exploitability versus Continental Shelf: Expansionist 
Move to the Oceanic Floor 
The concept of exploitability admitted by the ILC seems 
too vague. Neither the Commission nor the Fourth Committee 
attempted to reflect on what they actually thought they 
were approving. To reveal some of the ambiguity, one must 
follow the text of the convention and the individual opinions 
of some leading scholars. 
With regard to 'possible exploitation,' recent technical 
information shows that the place where the depth admits of 
exploitation is not exclusively determined by the technical 
ability to build in that depth of water an installation or 
to use a device for exploitation.124 According to Dr. 
Amador, 'In this respect one needs to take into account the 
interaction between three different elements, i.e. technical, 
geological and commercial considerations. Exploitation is 
only proven possible if it actually takes place, and this 
does not depend only on the technical possibility but also 
on the presence and character of the minerals and a con-
sideration of whether the exploitation will be a paying 
proposition.' 125 Dr. Mouton is also of the opinion that if 
a technician invented an installation whereby resources 
could allegedly be exploited at a depth of, say, 300 metres, 
but the apparatus failed to function after it had been 
installed, the state concerned woul~ have committed an 
illegal act. 126 
This means· that the potential right of a coastal state 
to extend its jurisdiction and control to submarine areas 
of Class II (areas beyond the 200 metres) depends on the 
accumulation of the three elements mentioned by Amador. 
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124. Mouton, M. W., 'Recent Developments in the Technology of 
Exploiting the Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf,' 
preparatory document No.20, U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (A/CONF.13/25); see also Amador, supra, p.89. 
125. Ibid. 
126. Mouton, Fourth Committee, No.114 above, p.37, para.28. 
Further, if Mouton's conclusion, in the example referred 
to above, is correct, then it may well be said that this 
potential right depends rather on geological and commercial 
considerations than on technical possibilities.127 
Another difficulty is the question whether, once 
exploitation has been achieved at a record depth by one 
state in one locality, this fact operates to extend the 
shelf areas of all other states irrespective of their 
technological capacity or the physical obstacles present 
off their coasts. Most writers believe that logically the 
answer must be in the affirmative; however, the point is 
controversial and remains unsettled.128 
In fact, two provisions in the Shelf Convention confirm 
the view expressed above: first, the criterion of possible 
exploitation in Article 1 .is an objective one indicating 
the most advanced standards of technology in the world and 
not the technical ability of the particular ~oastal state.129 
127. Amador, supra, p.90. 
128. Supporting the view expressed in the text are: Young, 
'The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,' 52 
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AJIL 1958, pp.733, 735, Oda, supra, p.167, Gutteridge, 
'The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,' 
35 BYIL, 1959, pp.102-110. Verzjil, 'The U.N. Conference 
on the Law of the s.ea,' 6 Netherlands Tijdschrift voor 
International Recht, 1959, pp.115~34, Amador, supra, 
p.121, and Green, CLP, 1959, pp.224, 232; But see 
contra, Ely, 'The Administration of Mineral Resources 
underlying the High Seas,' paper presented at the 
Conference of the American Bar Association, Institute 
of Marine Resources, Long Beach, California, June, 1967. 
129. The objectivity is in the words ' ••••• to where the depth 
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation •••• ' 
Secondly, by the terms of the convention each coastal state 
is free to grant to any foreign country or foreign nationals 
the right to explore its Continental Shelf or exploit its 
natural resources. This is inferred from Article 2(2) which 
expressly declares that the rights are exclusive and if the 
coastal state does not explore the Continental Shelf or 
exploit its natural resources, any claim or exploitation by 
another state is dependent upon the express consent of the 
coastal state. 
Since the rights over the Continental Shelf belong to 
the coastal state ipso jure so long as the seabed or the 
subsoil is exploitable, it would appear that every coastal 
state has an inchoate title to an unlimited area of the 
seabed and subsoil notionally attached to its land territory. 
This title vests as soon as any state anywhere is technolo-
gically able to exploit the seabed or subsoil neighbouring 
its own territory, regardless of whether the particular 
coastal state is able to exploit that adjacent to itself. 
However strange it may look, such interpretation leads 
to the proposition that this Geneva Convention has divided 
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all the areas of the oceans among coastal states irrespective 
to the intentions of the ILC and the delegates to the Geneva 
Conference.13° 
130. This is the view of' Oda, supra, p.167-168, where he 
suggests that, whatever the delegates at the conference 
had in mind, the only logical interpretation of the 
provision is that it effected an allocation among coastal 
states of all submarine areas of the world; this (contd.) 
If this conclusion is correct, and there seems no 
reason to dispute it, then it would mean that the high seas 
are going to be another scene of rivalry between maritime 
nations. This might give rise to international conflict 
over the richer sites, and it might encourage 'gold\rush' 
tactics and uneconomic exploitation activities. As only 
few countries are now possessing the technology and capital 
required for such undertakings, charges of 'neocolonialism,' 
unjust advantage and the like might well be raised by most 
nations. Finally, the freedoms of the high seas, which have 
been defended since the early days of Grotius, would be 
handed to the forces of anarchy instead of being preserved 
to the international community at large. 
Therefore, before the advances of coastal states 
penetrate beyond the physical boundaries of the shelf, it 
is advisable to work toward modification of the shelf 
convention in terms of substituting some fixed limit for 
the present indefinite standard. The desirability of such 
a step has been widely recognised, and in 1969 the Convention 
by its own terms becomes open to revision.131 
contradicts what the delegates had, in fact, in mind. Dr. 
Mouton expressed their opinion by saying in the Fourth 
Committee, 'beyond the outer limit of the submarine areas 
over which the coastal state enjoyed limited sovereignty, 
the situation was governed solely by the regime of the 
high seas; there was no longer any question of exclusive 
rights ••••••••• ' 6 Official Records, 44 (U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.13/42). This statement passed without challenge. 
131. Article 13(1); for further details, see infra 'The 
Legal Regime of the Deep-seA Floor.' 
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PART TWO 
The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf 
Section I - The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf 
1 • Juristic Opinion 
In dealing with the legal basis of claims to the 
Continental Shelf, all writers make a distinction between 
the seabed and subsoil. However, for the purposes of this 
study, I shall deal first with the status of submarine areas, 
seabed and subsoil, beneath the high seas. Then, the 
subsoil shall be given a special consideration on the 
account of mines and tunnels. 
A. The various Theories of Acquisition of Land Territory and 
the Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas 
In his article on the status of submarine areas beneath 
the high seas, Young put forward the following points of 
view: -1 
1. That submarine areas are incapable of exclusive 
appropriation by any state; 
1. Young, R., Supra, No.45 in Part One, pp.225, 229. 
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2. That submarine areas may be acquired by occupation, 
which according to some is only fictitious, and 
3. That submarine areas appertain to the adjacent 
land territory and are automatically subject to 
the soverignty of the state which holds that 
territory. 
To these three theories one may add the principle of 
the 'operations of nature' as a fourth argument in establish-
ing a good title to submarine areas. Which of these theories 
determine the legal nature of the submarine area of the Shelf 
is the subject of the following discussion. 
1. The Theory of Res Communis: 
It is apparent that the first contention of Young's 
summary is derived from the theory that the high seas are 
the common property of all peoples and capable of exclusive 
acquisition by none. The fact that the waters of the high 
seas are primarily a high way of commerce, and for this 
purpose are most useful when open freely to all, does not, 
according to Young, justify the subjection of the submarine 
2 
areas to the same legal regime of the waters above. In 
fact, since the high seas are the property of the inter-
national community, the development of submarine resources 
beneath them should also be entrusted to the international 
community.3 In spite of the fact that the practice of 
2. Ibid, p.~29. 
3. This view was suggested by Mr. Hsu to the ILC; for further 
details on this point see ~ The 66th and 67th 
meetings of the ILC. 
of states rejected this view in the past, it has been 
raised recently in the light of deep-sea mining activities.4 
As we shall see later, the internationalization scheme of 
submarine areas is more likely to be limited to the deep-
sea floor without affecting the national interests of 
coastal states in the adjacent submarine areas.5 
2. The Theory of res nullius 
Many writers are of the opinion that submarine areas 
are, like land territory, res nullius until claimed and 
occupied by some state, which acquires rights of sovereignty 
thereupon. Gidel, making a distinction between the subsoil 
and seabed, regards the former as being capable of occupa-
tion which does not disturb the latter. 6 Opinions of other 
writers are not all in favour of this distinction.? However, 
all writers, whichever view they took of the atatus of the 
4. This is one of the proposals put forward by some writers 
for the establishment of a new regime to the ocean floor: 
see Young 'The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor,' 1968, 
62 AJIL, pp.641-653. 
5. Infra, p. 2.%~. 
6. Gidel, Le Droit International Public de laMer, 1932, 
Vol.1, pp.507-517 and 498-501. 
7. Supporting Gidel's view are Higgins and Colombos: 
International Law of the Sea, p.54; Contra: Fauchille, 
Traite de Droit International Public, 1925, Vol.1, 
Part II, p.19; Westlake, International Law, 1904, Vol.1, 
pp.187-8; Hurst, C. 'Whose is the Bed of the Sea' BYIL 
1923-24, p.34; Smith, Great Britain and the Law of 
Nations, Vol.II, p.122. 
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seabed itself, regard the subsoil as capable of 'effective 
occupation,' subject to no unreasonable interference with 
the area of the high seas above. Those who considered the 
seabed to be incapable of occupation, went further and 
insisted that occupation of the subsoil is only permissible 
by operations which are begun on terra firma or in terri-
torial waters and are carried beneath the high seas wholly 
8 
underground. 
If the opinion of Gidel that the seabed has the same 
status as the sea is correct, the whole concept of the 
shelf-doctrine is in conflict with international law. The 
fact that the whole doctrine of the Continental Shelf is at 
variance with existing international law was rightly stated 
by the Foreign Minister of Peru in the Onassis whaling fleet 
incident: 'The world must accept the fact that America is 
elaborating its own code of rights based on social needs 
which are at variance with the freedom of the seas.'9 
This was also expressed earlier by Lord Asquith in Abu 
Dhabi Award, where he refused to accept the draft articles 
adopted by the ILC on the subject of the Continental Shelf 
as recording, or even purporting to record, established 
rules.10 According to him, the articles were expressive 
of the development and not the codifying task of the 
comrniss ion.11 
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8. Gidel, op.cit., p.510, and Higgins and Colombos, op.cit.p.55. 
9. The Times, Dec.3, 1954. 
10. Abu Dhabi Arbitration, ILQ, Vol.II, 1951, pp.247-261. 
11 • Ibid. 
On the other hand, the state practice in regard to 
sedentary fisheries supports the view that the seabed is 
open to some degree of occupation by individual states.12 
Such occupation, though dictated by the economic interest 
of the coastal state, must not unreasonably interfere with 
the freedoms of the high seas. This was clearly expressed 
by F'auchille where he states 'the freedom of the super-
jacent waters must be regarded as the dominant principle.' 13 
Following the view of Fauchille and the evidence of 
state practice, we therefore reach the conclusion that the 
Continental Shelf under the high seas is capable of occupa-
tion but that the seas themselves are not. This assumption 
that the submarine areas under the high seas are res 
nullius capable of being appropriated by occupation, raises 
the question of what kind of occupation is required? 
(i) Effective Occupation 
The modern theory of appropriating land territory by 
occupation asse~ts that the occupation must be physical and 
effective.14 Applying it to submarine areas, this rule 
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12. See Vattel's oft-q~oted dictum about Ceylon's and Bahrein's 
pearling rights, Droit des Gens, Book 1, Chapter XXIII, 287. 
13. Fauchille, Supra No.7; The same view was expressed by Miss 
Whiteman, the u.s. delegate to the Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Fourth Committee, p.76. See also commentary 
on article 69 of the ILC's draft articles on the Continental 
Shelf: 2YBILC, 1956, p.298, mentioned infra, p. 
14. Oppenheim's International Law, 1955, Vol.1, p.557. 
would mean that only those areas under actual exploitation 
could be regarded as being under the exclusive authority 
of the claiming state. Several important objections emerge 
from this theory:-
1. The main objection to any rule based on occupation 
would appear to be its disregard of the interests of 
the adjacent coastal state. Rights would vest in the 
occupant, no matter whence he came or how tenuous 
his prior connection with the region. In his comments 
on this doctrine, Young states 'A principle which 
permitted such a situation would rightly seem 
intolerable to most coastal states, and especially 
so to one unable to proceed immediately with develop-
ment on its own account. Considerations of security, 
of trade and navigation, of pollution, and of customs 
and revenue, would all militate against recognition 
of such a doctrine. It is not sufficient to say that 
a coastal state by forehanded action may place itself 
in the position of occupant; many coastal states do 
not have the technical or financial means at hand to 
win a race for occupation against some other state on 
the hunt for additional resources.' 1 5 
15. Young, supra No.1, p.230. 
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2. Another objection is the difficulty of determining 
what constitutes effective occupation at the bottom 
of the sea? By looking at some of the early claims 
to the Continental Shelf, it appears that, instead of 
only appropriating limited areas in respect of 
particular resources after their exploitation has 
been in progress, certain states have already appro-
priated extended areas in respect of all resources 
before their exploitation.16 Where there is no 
exploitation, the acts of appropriation have 
necessarily taken the form of legislative declaration 
of claim which, in several cases, have been reinforced 
by the issuing of regulations, and by the grant of 
concessions for exploration. The question which 
one may ask is whether such purported appropriations 
can satisfy the test of 'effective occupation' which 
they must do if they are to give a sound title under 
the law of occupation. The answer is certainly not an 
16. Strictly speaking, this is the case with all coastal 
states including, in 1945, the U.S.A. This is apparent 
from the wording of Truman's proclamation on the Shelf: 
The second recital of the preamble reads, ' ••••••• and 
that with modern technological progress their utiliza-
tion is already practicable, or will become so at an 
early date.' The last phrase of the third recital also 
says '······when and as development is undertaken,' 
which means that the U.S. Government was not yet in a 
position which enables her to exploit all the area 
claimed. 
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easy one but after the Island of Palmas; 7 the Eastern 
Greenland, 18 and the Clipperton Island18a cases, it 
seems impossible to maintain that actual settlement 
is a sine qua non of effective occupation. These three 
cases lay down clearly that what is required is effec-
tive display of state activity in such a manner as the 
circumstances of the territory demand. In his comments 
on these cases, Professor Waldeck says 'no doubt an 
international tribunal will still seek to distinguish 
between a genuine, effective manifestation of state 
functions and a purely paper claim but in desolate, 
or, in the case of the seabed, submerged territory, 
it will only demand the minimum state activity which 
the nature of the territory calls for. On this basis, 
effective assumption of jurisdiction over fairly 
extensive areas of seabed can probably be established 
without necessarily showing much or even any physical 
activity on the seabed itself.' 19 
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17. The Island of Palmas Case, (u.S.A. and Netherlands) 1928 
AJIL, Vol.22, p.867 (decided by Judge Huber). 
18. The Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark and Norway), 1931 
P.C.I.J. Series A-B, No.53. 
Mexico 
1 8a .The Clipperton Island Case, ~ and France), 1932, 
AJIL, vol.26, p.390 (decided by the King of Italy). 
1 9. Waldeck, C. "Legal Claims to the Continental Shelf," 
Grotius Transactions, 1950, pp.115, 141. 
3. Finally, and as Young remarks, it is still more 
objectionable since it might lead to 'snatch-and-squat' 
tactics reminiscent of the California gold rush and 
the Cherokee Strip. 20 
(ii) Fictitious or Notional Occupation 
The concept of a 'notional' occupation permits a state 
to acquire by proclamation, in lieu of occupation, the 
submarine areas which it claims. As a result, coastal 
states would be in a better position to protect themselves 
by a timely action against unwelcome intrusions. Notional 
occupation, however, does not meet all the foregoing 
objections arising from the principle of effective occupa-
tion. Further, by making a state's unilateral declaration 
an essential element, it may appear to sanction unlimited 
power in the declaring state to deciae the scope and nature 
of its claim. It also reintroduces into international law 
the idea of fictitious occupation as a valid basis of title. 
This concept, being controversial, has been largely 
rejected; save perhaps for the Polar regions. 21 Young does 
not approve readmitting it with respect to submarine areas 
64 •. 
20. Young, Supra, p.230. In the Cherolcee Strip, the rewards 
went to owners of the fastest horses, not the best farmers. 
21. On the status of Polar Regions, see J. B. Scott, AJIL 3 
(1909), p.928, and T. w. Bach, AJIL 4 (1910) p.265; see 
also Antarctica Treaty, 1959 (Cmd.913). 
where he states: 'to insist that occupation is necessary 
under a general rule, and then to admit a spurious occupa-
tion as sufficient, is devious reasoning. The necessity 
of a fiction strongly suggests that the problem is in 
the wrong pigeon hole and that claims to submarine areas 
require different treatment from claims to land territory.' 22 
3. The Principle of Adjacency: Contiguity, or Continuity 
The framework within which we have to set up the legal 
basis of claims to the shelf, is incomplete unless something 
is said about the place of contiguity and other related 
geographical doctrines in modern international law. During 
the 19th century, various geographical doctrines, embodying 
the ideas of contiguity, continuity or unity of territory, 
were advanced in support of territorial claims. 23 But 
these doctrines, in their most extravagant forms, were seen 
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to be merely pretexts for attempts to pre-empt the sovereignty 
of large areas which the states concerned were not yet in a 
position to acquire by effective occupation. At any rate, 
ever since the Berlin Africa Conference of 1885, geographi-
cal doctrines have been rejected as distinct roots of title 
apart from effective occupation. 24 This conclusion was 
confirmed by Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Award 
22. Young, supra, p.230. 
23. For example, the doctrines of the hinterland, Watershed, 
middle distance, and contiguity of territory. To these 
the 20th century has added 'polar sectors.' See Waldock, 
supra, p.120. 
24. Westlake, International Law, Peace (1910), Chapter V. 
'The title of contiguity, understood as a basis of 
territorial sovereignty, has no foundation in international 
law.' 25 
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To say that the principle of continuity - or contiguity -
has no place in international law, is to state a proposition 
of doubtful accuracy. The principle of contiguity played a 
useful part in the period when some compromise between the 
fanciful assertions of pure discovery and effective occupa-
tion best fulfilled the needs of the time. This applies to 
the rule, which is no more than a variant of the principle 
of contiguity, that the occupation of the portion of the 
shore confers title to interior territory up to the limit 
of the watershed or that the occupation of the coast carries 
with it a right to the entire territory drained by the 
rivers emptying their waters within its line. 26 
25. Supra, No.17. 
26. This rule was described by Hall as unobjectionable (Hall, 
International Law, 3rd ed. 1890, p.109); but Lord Stowell 
doubted its accuracy except in relation to islands. 
This exception is based on the decision of Lord Palmerston 
in the Lobos Island case, where he gave to Peru, being 
the closest main land to the island, a prima facie title 
to it: Moore, International Arbitrations, vol.IV, p.3554 •. 
(The opinion of Lord Stowell is reproduced in Smith, 
Great Britain and the Law of Nations, Vol.II, 1935, p.3). 
This rule o~ contiguity was utilized to establish a 
geographical unity between the main land and the adjacent 
submarine areas, so that the principle o~ sovereignty - or 
state control -exists over the annexed area. 27 Accordingly, 
the submarine areas contiguous to the coasts o~ a state are 
regarded as appertaining to that state by automatic attribu-
tion of law and without any requirement of occupation, either 
real or fictitious. It is at this point that the proximity-
relation between the coastal state and the adjacent 
Continental Shelf - assumes importance, ~or it serves to add 
an element of effectiveness to what might otherwise be a 
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t . 28 paper occupa 1on. In fact, the coastal state has potentially 
much greater means of control than other states. Therefore, 
whereas a bare proclamation by 'The non-coastal state' would 
surely be a paper claim, a similar one by 'The coastal state' 
may well be an act of appropriation which is effective as the 
first step in an occupation. 29 
27. This is the· main argmnent of most Latin-American countries, 
see the Latin-American practice, infra, p. 91 : the second 
argument in the fourth recital o~ the Truman proclamation 
on the shelf reads 'The Continental Shelf may be regarded 
as an extension of the land mass of the coastal nation and 
thus appertenant to it,' see the u.s. practice, infra p.go 
28. The ~irst argument in the fourth recital of the Truman 
proclamation on the shelf upholds this view where it says 
'The effectiveness o~ measures to utilize or conserve these 
resources would be contingent upon co-operation and protec-
tion from the shore' ; again this point is discussed under 
the U.S. practice. 
29. 'The non-coastal s,tate' here, means any state, whether 
coastal or non-coastal, which is not adjacent to the shelf 
claimed, while 'The coastal state' means the adjacent state. 
There may be an element of artificiality in this 
argument which starts from the proposition that contiguity 
is a dangerous doctrine unless confined within the principle 
of effective occupation and ends by reducing the 'effective 
occupation' to a proclamation which can be only issued by 
the coastal, the contiguous, state. It may be essentially 
unhelpful to relay, as a check upon exorbitant claims of 
contiguity, on the doctrine of effective occupation and to 
proceed to argue that the effectiveness required is the 
effectiveness of 'a symbolic act of appropriation in the 
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form of a proclamation' which can issue only from the coastal 
state.3° In both the Eastern Greenland and the Clipperton 
Island cases it was decided that full effectiveness of occu-
pation is not essential.31 Further, these decisions show 
that there are situations in which occupation, in the normal 
meaning of the word, is not required at all and in which the 
conception of occupation is a more or less deceptive figure 
of speech.32 If this is so with regard to inhabited or 
sparsely inhabited territory, it is particularly true in 
relation to uninhabitable areas such as the seabed and its 
subsoil. Following this view, Professor Waldeck suggests 
that the area annexed under this principle must be limited 
30. Lauterpacht, H. 'Sovereignty over Submarine Areas,' 
BYIL, 1950, pp.376,420. 
31. Supra, notes 18 and 18a. 
32. This is the view of Lauterpacht, supra, p.421. 
to the Continental Shelf proper. 33 Then, according to him, 
the physical edge of the shelf might constitute a natural 
legal boundary of the submarine territory.34 Professor 
Waldock admits that this principle would not so readily 
operate where the coastal state had no well-marked shelf-
edge off its shores.35 It is apparent that Professor 
Waldock applies the principle of contiguity to the shelf 
area on the grounds that state activity is effectively 
present, at least in some parts of this area.36 In other 
words, he is inclined to support a contiguity which goes 
side by side with 'effective occupation.' Such situation 
is presumed to exist in coastal states with regard to the 
Continental Shelf, the outer limits of which is 200 metres 
depth.37 
The principle of contiguity is subject to further 
criticisms based on the geological nature of the Continental 
Shelf region. Contiguity implies that the area claimed is 
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not only contiguous to the mainland, but that it is continuous 
to, an extension to, the state territory. Therefore, the 
33. In principle, Waldock rejects any claim which is ba~ed on 
contiguity, loc.cit., pp.120 and 147; but he accepts 
contiguity within the principle of effective occupation. 
34. Ibid,,p.142. 
35. Ibid, 
36. Ibid, 
37. This assumption is inferred from the definition adopted 
in Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf; 
see p.4gabove, in particular note 1ZQ on that page. 
principle of contiguity cannot be reduced to a mere discovery 
of land, which may be occupied on the principle of res 
nullius. From this point of view, the similarity in topo-
graphy between the two areas becomes relevant. If the 
Continental Shelf area corresponds in type of topography 
with the land inshore, as most geologists ascertain,38 then 
the principle of contiguity may be validly invoked. If, as 
Pratt suggests, the region of the Continental Shelf (includ-
ing the Continental Slope) is a mobile segment of the earth's 
crust, which, unlike the land inshore, is tectonic in its 
nature, 39 then the concept of continuity, or extension, does 
not apply. However, the uncertainty and defects in Pratt's 
theory have been dealt with in Part One, and there is no 
need to mention it again.4° Finally, following the view 
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of most geologists, one may say that as far as the Continental 
Shelf (excluding the slope) is concerned the principle of 
contiguity, although not a title in itself, has a certain 
im~ortance within the principle of effective occupation.41 
A different interpretation to the theory of contiguity 
was suggested by Mr. Feith before the ILA in Brussels in 1948. 
He assumes that submarine areas could be dyked and drained, 
and would then be acquired on the principle of accretion.42 
38. See pp ·!J-11 above. 
39. See pp./.1-/#above. 
40. Ibid. 
41. The Eastern Greenland case, supra No.18. 
42. ILA, Rep. of the 43rd Conf. p.174. 
This view is impracticable, and the method suggested by 
Mr. Feith is, with regard to most areas, inconceivable. 
It would have been nearer to the ideas of some geologists, 
if he had given as an example the natural accretion produced 
through operation of nature. However, to accomplish this 
study, it is necessary to discuss the principle of accretion 
and other natural causes as a proposed solution to the 
legality of the claims under customary international law. 
4. The Operations of Nature as a Mode of Losing or Acauiring 
State Territory: Accretion, Erosion, and Avulsion. 3 
71 • 
By accretion and erosion, the territory of states may be 
slowly gained and lost respectively. Accretion is the name 
for the increase of land through new formations. And it is 
a customary rule of the law of nations that enlargement of 
territory, if any, created through new formations, takes , 
place ipso facto by the accretion, without the state concerned 
taking any special step for the purpose of extending its 
sovereignty.44 The natural phenomenon of accretion is of 
two kinds: 
(a) Alluvion, which is the name for an accession of land 
washing up on the seashore or on a river-bailie by the 
waters. Such accession as a rule is produced by a 
slow and gradual process.45 
43. We leave out the process of avulsion as it relates to 
boundary disputes where the dividing line is a turbulent 
river. 
44. 
45. 
Oppenheim's International Law, Supra No.14, p.563. 
Ibid, p.392; Sir Scott relied in part on this principle in 
(contd.) 
(b) Dereliction,46 as when the sea falls below the usual 
water mark. 
Erosion, on the other hand, is the gradual eating away 
of the land by currents, wind~ or tides. Both accretion 
and erosion are of minor importance as modes of territorial 
gain and loss. However, it is important to note that, 
whatever territory may be gained by one process or lost 
through the other, such gains and losses are recognised 
as valid under the law of nations.47 
With regard to the seabed of the Continental Shelf, the 
theory attributed to most geologists, as we have seen, is 
that the surface of the shelf is formed by erosion and 
accumulation.48 It is presumed that the ultimate result 
of these two antagonistic forces, the one the demolishing 
act ion of the sea to the coast, the other the building up of 
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the abraded material, is a plane of dry land. One phenomenon 
of this is the formation of deltaso 49 It is a scientific 
his decision concerning the mud islands off the mouth of 
Mississippi, in 1804: see comments below, No.71a. 
46. Svarlien, An Introduction to the Law of Nationa, 1955, p. 
182. Oppenheim uses the word 'dereliction' to indicate 
the loss of territory through the owner state completely 
abandoning it with the intention of withdrawing from it 
for ever; supra, p.579. 
47. Svarlien, supra. 
48. See pp.S-.9 above. 
49. 'Delta' is the name for a tract of land at the mouth of a 
river like the Greek letterA, and owing its existence to a 
gradual deposit by the river of sand, stones, and earth on 
one particular place at its mouth. As the deltas are con-
tinually increasing, the accession of land they produce may 
be very considerable and, according to the law of nations, 
(contd.) 
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fact that the waters of the oceans neither increase nor 
decrease. Therefore, an invasion by the sea of a previously 
continental or insular area is not explained by any increase 
in the waters of the globe. Apart from additional geologi-
cal causes, the rising of the sea in some parts of the world 
can be explained by the process of abrasion. This happens 
when the erosive action of the sea is not in equilibrium 
with the transporting and accumulating action of the same 
medium. Such submersion, however, is temporary because, in 
the long run, neither the sea conquers the land, nor the 
land gains terri tory fPom the sea. Hence, .the argument of 
Attorney-General of Texas, in U.S. versus Texas, is based 
on a misapprehension of this theory.5° Seas do not shrink 
or rise as a result of a change in the volume of their waters, 
but because of the fopegoing natural operations, and other 
geological causes which are beyond the scope of this study. 
B. The Subsoil Beneath the High Seas and the Channel Tunnel 
Project 
The subsoil beneath the bed of the open sea requires 
special consideration on account of coal or other mines, 
tunnels and the like. For the answer to the question whether 
mines and tunnels can be driven into that subsoil at all~ and 
is to be considered an accretion to the territory of the 
state to which the mouth of the river belongs, although 
delta may be formed outside the territorial maritime belt: 
Oppenheim, loc.cit., p.565. 
50. See p • .Z., No.3, above. 
if so, whether they can be under the territorial supremacy 
of a particular state, depends entirely upon the character 
in law of such subsoil. If the subsoil of the open sea 
stands in the same relation to the· open sea as the subsoil 
beneath the territory of a state stands to that territory, 
all rules concerning the open sea would necessarily have to 
be applied to the subsoil beneath its bed, and no part of 
this subsoil could ever come under the territorial supremacy 
of any state. 
Oppenheim is of the opinion that it would not be 
rational to consider the subsoil beneath the bed of the open 
sea as an inseparable appurtenance of the open sea, just as 
the subsoil beneath the territorial land and water is an 
appurtenance of such territory.51 The rational of the open 
sea being free and forever excluded from occupation on the 
part of any state is that it is an international highway, 
which connects distant lands, and thereby secures freedom 
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of communication,and especially of commerce, between states 
separated by the sea. There is no reason whatever for 
extending this freedom of the open sea to the subsoil beneath 
its bed. On the contrary, there are practical reasons -
taking into consideration the building of mines, tunnels, and 
the like -which compel recognition of the fact that this 
subsoil can be acquired through occupation. With regard to 
the status of the subsoil of the high seas, Oppenheim has 
51. Oppenheim, supra, p.629. 
suggested the following rules:52 
(1) The subsoil beneath the bed of the open sea is no man's 
land, and it can be acquired on the part of a littoral 
state through occupation, starting rrom the subsoil 
or the maritime belt into the subsoil or the open sea. 
(2) This occupation takes place ipso racto by a tunnel or 
a mine being driven from the shore through the subsoil 
or the open sea. 
(3) This occupation or the subsoil of the open sea can be 
extended up to the boundary line of the territorial 
maritime belt of another state, for no state has an 
exclusive claim to occupy such part of the subsoil 
of the open sea as is adjacent to the subsoil of its 
territorial maritime belt. 
(4) An occupation beneath the bed of the open sea for a 
purpose which endangers the freedom of the open sea 
is inadmissible. 
(5) It is likewise inadmissable to make such arrangements 
in a part of the subsoil beneath the open sea which 
has previously been occupied for a legitimate purpose 
as would indirectly endanger the freedom of the open 
sea. 
According to these five rules, there is nothing to 
prevent coal and other mines which are exploited on the 
shore of a littoral state from being extended into the 
52. Ibid, p.630. 
75. 
subsoil beneath the open sea up to the boundary line of 
the subsoil beneath the territorial maritime belt of another 
state. Consequently, a tunnel which might be built between 
two parts of the same state separated by the Qpen sea would 
fall entirely under the territorial supremacy of the state 
concerned. On the other hand, for a tunnel between two 
different states separated by the open sea special arrange-
ments would have to be made by a treaty concerning the 
territorial supremacy over that part of the tunnel which 
runs under the bed of the open sea. An example of this 
case is the Channel Tunnel Project. 
The Channel Tunnel Project for liru{ing the U.K. and 
France has been the subject of important discussion between 
the two countries since 1802. 53 These long negotiations seem 
to have reached its final stage by a mutual understanding 
of the benefit of the project to the two parties. This 
became apparent when in 1966 the two governments concerned 
took the decision-that the Channel Tunnel should be built, 
subject to finding a solution for the construction work on 
mutually acceptable terms.54 The international commission, 
which was appointed by the two Governments in 1876, made a 
report on the construction and working of the proposed 
tunnel.55 The Report enclosed a memorandum, recommended by 
the commissioners as a basis for a treaty between the U.K. 
76. 
53. Colombos, 'Le tunnel sous la Manche et le droit international 
(historical introduction) pp.3-45). 
54. The Times, July 9, 1966. 
55. See Parl. papers, C.1576, Report of the Commissioners for (contd_) 
and France. From the draft articles of this memorandwn, 
it appears that the legal problems are not likely to 
present any serious difficulty. 
Article 1, of the proposed treaty, suggested that the 
boundary between the U.K. and France in the Tunnel (and for 
the purposes of the tunnel and the railway alone) should be 
half way between low-water mark (above the tunnel) on the 
coast of England and low-water mark (above the tunnel) on 
the coast of France. This boundary applies, however, solely 
to the tunnel and to submarine railways, and has no effect 
with regard to any questions of nationality, navigation or 
fisheries or any other rights in the waters surrounding the 
tunnel. All these questions were to be regulated by 
municipal legislation within the respective territorial 
jurisdiction of the U.K. and France. Article 4 recommended 
that an international commission consisting of six members, 
three of whom should be nominated by the British Government 
and three by the French Government, should submit to the two 
Governments its proposals for supplementary conventions with 
77. 
respect to (a) the apprehension and trial of alleged criminals 
for offences committed in the tunnel or in trains which have 
passed through it, and the summoning of witnesses; (b) 
customs, police and postal arrangements, and other matters 
which it might be found convenient so to deal with. Finally, 
the Channel Tunnel and Railway, 1876; reprinted in 
Colombos, supra, p.143. 
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Article 15 advised that each Government should have the right 
to suspend the working of the submarine railway and the 
passage through the tunnel whenever such Government, in the 
interest of its own country, thought necessary to do so, 
and even to damage or destroy the works of the tunnel or 
submarine railway, or any part of them, in the territory of 
such Government, and flood the tunne+ with water.56 
When the question of the construction of the tunnel was 
again raised after the First Great War, the Report of the 
Special Committee, which was appointed by the two Governments 
for that purpose, was definitely of the view that the subsoil 
could be effectively occupied by the two countries, and that 
the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the U.K. and 
France in the tunnel could be settled without difficulty 
by a treaty between them. 57 As the Anglo-French negotiations 
had preceded the establishment of the doctrine of the 
Continental Shelf, the draft treaty to which such negotia-
tions had lead would only require that it should be brought 
up to date in conformity with present conditions. However, 
the present state of law does not affect this right of 
coastal states as long as the operations to exploit the 
subsoil beneath the high seas do not interfere with the waters 
above it.58 
56. This stipulation was proposed in the interest of defence 
in time of war. 
57. Parl.papers 1930 (Cmd.3591 ), and State Papers, Vol.134, 
pp.1 -5. 
58. Article 7 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
Conclusion: 
From this study of the various theories of acquisition 
of land territory, it appears that the principle of conti-
guity is the most advocated theory in justifying claims to 
the Continental Shelf. The effectiveness of state activity 
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in the area of the shelf cannot be reduced to a mere proclama-
tion, although it does not require from the state concerned 
to make an impact in every nook and cranny of the area 
claimed. What is required is a minimum of state activity 
displayed in that area, without which the principle of 
contiguity would be misused to justify expansionist claims 
to all submarine areas. Furthermore, if title to the 
Continental Shelf is to follow from mere contiguity the 
logical distinction between claims to contiguous seabed and 
contiguous high seas wears thin. 
It is inferred from this conclusion that:-
(a) The mere fact that a littoral state is unable to proceed, 
upon its own technical ability, to e~ploit the natural 
resources of its Continental Shelf, does not deprive 
that state of the right to exercise jurisdiction and 
control over such resources, and 
(b) The littoral state, while exercising its rights over 
the shelf area, must not unreasonably interfere with 
the freedoms of the high seas. 
Finally, it is not suggested that this conclusion gives 
any certain and final result on the subject. In fact, 
neither the practice of states nor the convention on the 
Continental Shelf, which remain to be discussed here, 
support, in toto, any of the theories which have already 
been examined. 
2. The Practice of States 
The practice of states with regard to the legal nature 
of claims to the Continental Shelf may be divided categori-
cally into three main groups, namely (1) The Anglo-American 
practice, (2) The Latin-American practice, and (3) The 
Practice of Arab states in the Arabian-Persian Gulf. 
This classification stems from the policy followed in 
each group, without attaching any importance to the chrono-
logical analysis of the claims. Therefore, I shall deal 
first with the Anglo-American policy starting with the 
Truman proclamation on the shelf for the historical 
importance which is given to this proclamation, though it 
is not the first governmental document on the subject.59 
(1) The Anglo-American Practice 
A. The U.S. Practice: Truman's Proclamations60 
The fourth recital of Truman's proclamation on the 
Continental Shelf, from which the legal theory is mainly to 
be extracted, asserts that 'the exercise of jurisdiction 
80. 
59. The Truman proclamations were preceded by the 1942 Treaty 
between the U.K. and Venezuela over the submarine areas of 
the Gulf of Paria, and also by the Argentina Decree No.1, 
386, dated Jan.24, 1944, by which Argentine proclaimed 
sovereignty over the 'Argentina Continental Shelf' and the 
'Argentina Epicontinental Sea.' 
60. See note 65 in Part One. 
over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of 
the Continental Shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable 
and just.' This assertion is supported with four arguments: 
(i) 'The effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve 
these resources would be contingent upon co-operation 
and protection from the shore.' This means that the 
adjacent coastal state is in a better position than 
any other state to make an 'effective occupation' 
of the shelf and assume effective jurisdiction and 
control over its resources. It is a fact that the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the shelf, 
without some co-operation from shore, is scarcely 
feasible. 61 
(ii) 'The Continental Shelf may be regarded as an exten-
sion of the land mass of the coastal nation and 
thus naturally appertenant to it.' This is one 
of the geographical doctrines, referred to 
earlier, 62 which are based on the principle of 
contiguity. 
(iii) 'These resources frequently form a seaward extension 
of a pool or deposit lying within the territory.' 
Waldeck describes this provision of being 'partly 
a specialised geographical doctrine and partly a 
claim to protect the u.s. which might be tapped 
61. Waldeck, supra, p.124. 
62. See note 23 above. 
81 • 
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from the high seas.' 63 Finally, 
(iv) 'Self protection compels a coastal nation to keep 
63. 
64. 
65. 
close watch over drilling and mining operations 
off its shores •• o.o••' 'Self protection' has 
been successfully advocated recently to justify 
a variety of claims, which may be termed as 
'specialized sovereign competence, , 64 made by 
coastal states to adjacent zones on or above the 
high seas, such as the contiguous zone, fisheries 
zone, and air defence zone (ADIZ and CADIZ). 65 
It is also suggested that 'self protection' is 
one of the roots of territorial waters. 66 
Supra, p.124. 
Amador uses this term in substitution of the various terms 
and phrases which are used to describe the nature of the 
coastal state's right to exploit the natural resources of 
the Continental Shelf. By analogy one may say that any 
special right asserted by a coastal state in any area 
beyond the sphere of its territorial sovereignty is, in 
fact, a 'specialized sovereign competence': see Amador, 
note 55 in Part One, on p.129. 
The u.s. air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and the 
Canadian air defence identification zone (CADIZ~: for 
further details about these two zones, consult Murchison, 
J. T.: The Contiguous Air Space Defence Zones in 
International Law, 1956~ 
66. Waldoolt, supra, p.124; but on p.138, Waldeck states that 
'self protection' has no place in law as a title to 
territory. 
In addition to this, the first and the second recitals 
of the proclamation find arguments based on 'social needs.' 
These are: 
(a) A world-wide need exists for new sources of 
petroleum and other minerals, and 
(b) These resources according to expert opinion 
lie under the shelf and technological progress 
has made their exploitation practicable either 
now or in the near future. 
This shows that it was principally petroleum whi:Ch the 
American Government had in mind when proclaiming this new 
policy. 67 It is also apparent that 'social needs,' accord-
ing to the proclamation, justify this change in the old 
rules of international law. In his comments on this point 
of the proclamation, Sir Cecil Hurst says 'Now in the face 
of an increasing demand for a diminishing supply I feel 
that international lawyers must approach this subject of the 
Continental Shelf on a realistic basis •••••••• we must do 
so fully realising that some of our old ideas about inter-
66. Waldock, supra, p.124; but on p.138, Waldock states that 
'self protection' has no place in law as a title to 
territory. 
67. In fact, while the preamble refers only to 'petroleum 
and other minerals,' the operative sentence says 
comprehensively 'the natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed of the Continental Shelf.' 
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national law may be found to be inadequate, or even 
unsatisfactory, in the light of modern requirements . . . . . . . . 
If the world must have petroleum and petroleum is present 
in available quantities in the Continental Shelf, and the 
engineering experts say that from such sources it is a 
feasible proposition to obtain it, the necessary operations 
to obtain it will be undertaken. That is the situation 
which international lawyers must face.' 68 
The above examination of the proclamation shows that, 
apart from 'soc.ial needs' and 'self protection,' the u.s. 
used arguments drawn from the principles of contiguity and 
effective occupation. This new policy of the u.s. seems 
to be incompatible with the previous u.s. attitude in 
regard to effective occupation and contiguity. Firstly, 
the u.s. Government has strenuously contended, particularly 
with respect to Polar lands, that title by occupation 
requires actual settlement and use. 69 Secondly, the u.s. 
Government, more than any other, was responsible for 
establishing that contiguity of territory alone without 
effective occupation does not give title. 70 On this 
68. Hurst, note 49 in Part One, pp.185, 189. 
69. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law, Vol.1 
(1940), pp.399-400. 
70. Moore, International Arbitrations, vol.1 (1898), pp. 
265, 266. However, it all depends on what is really 
meant by effective occupation at the seabed. 
84. 
controversy in the U.S. policy, Professor Waldeck remarked 
by saying 'It would scarcely be consistent for the u.s. 
to wrest the guano resources of barren islands from coastal 
states by denying the_title of contiguity in the 19th 
century and to claim the natural resources of the seabed in 
the 20th century by reliance primarily on that title. 
Moreover, it was one of the parties to the Island of Palmas 
case where Judge Huber, in the course of, perhaps, the most 
distinguished judicial award in the whole of international 
law, so firmly rejected the claim to title by bare conti-
guity.' 71 
However, the principle of contiguity has by no means 
been unknown to the u.s. practice in the 19th century. Thus 
it seems not inapposite to recall the words of Sir William 
Scott in the Anna case.71a The Anna, an American ship, was 
seized by a British privateer at a place more than three 
miles from the main land of the u.s. but approximately two 
miles from the alluvion islands of the mouth of the 
Mississippi. Sir William regarded these uninhabitable 
mud-banks a 'kind of portico to the mainland' which ought 
71. Supra, p.138. 
71a. The Anna, (1805), 5C Rob. 373, 385. Also reported by 
Green, L. c., 'International Law through the Cases,' 
p.397. 
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by common sense to be United States territory. To reach 
this conclusion, he relied on the principles of increment 
by alluvion and contiguity. With regard to the latter 
principle, he stated: 
'Consider what the consequence would be if lands of 
this description were not considered as appendant to 
the mainland, and as comprised within the bounds of 
territory. If they do not belong to the u.s.A., any 
other power might occupy them, and they might be 
embanked and fortified. What a thorn this would be 
in the side of America •••••••• whether they are 
composed of earth or solid rock, will not vary the 
right of dominion, for the right of dominion does 
not depend on the texture of the soil.' 
Accordingly, he released the ship to her American owners 
on the grounds that she was captured within the United 
States' territorial seas, which was to be reckoned from 
the islands. 
Therefore, if such islands, in the 19th century, formed 
a portico to the mainland, adjacent submarine areas may well 
be regarded, in the 20th century, as a door step to which 
consideration should apply. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the u.s. Government 
has taken a unilateral action the legality of which does not 
86. 
87. 
d d "t" 72 epen on recogn1 1on. This argument is inferred from 
the fact that, unlike the fishery proclamation, the shelf 
proclamation does not undertake reciprocally to recognise 
the right of other states to assert a similar right.73 
According to Professor Waldeck, 'The absence of any similar 
undertaking in the shelf proclamation, issued on the same 
date, can hardly be accidental and does rather indicate 
that the u.s. did not consider recognition by other states 
as in any way necessary to give legal propriety to its 
claim to the resources of the shelf.'74 This view is 
incompatible with the third recital, of the preamble, which 
declares: 'recognized jurisdiction over these resources is 
required in the interest of their conservation and prudent 
utilization when and as development is undertaken.' Purther, 
the attitude of the u.s. governments towards the claims of 
other countries shows that reciprocity is granted to the 
extent to which such claims are in conformity with the 
Truman proclamation and the generally accepted principles 
of international law.75 
72. Waldeck, supra, pp.138, 139. 
73. The fishery proclamation provides that 'The right of any 
state to establish conservation zones off its shores in 
accordance with the above principles is conceded, provided 
that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing 
interests of nationals of the u.s. which may exist in such 
areas.' (See note 60 above). 
74. Supra, loc.cit. 
75. See protests made by the u.s. Government against the 
Chilean, Peruvian and Argentinian Decrees, A/CN/4/19, 
March, 1950, pp.113-116. 
Lastly, the third recital of the preamble, and in 
particular the phrase ' •••••••• when and as development is 
undertaken,' may suggest that there should be a distinction 
between the legal situation before the development of the 
resources of the Continental Shelf began, and the situation 
after such development had begun. In other words, the 
intention of the proclamation was to draw a distinction in 
law between the claims to the Continental Shelf and its 
resources before any development of such resources and the 
claims to the shelf and its resources after development had 
begun. 76 In fact, the Executive Order issued by the 
President on the same day, and which affords some guide to 
the proclamation's interpretation, does not draw any 
distinction between the situation before and the situation 
after, the commencement of development work.77 Sir Cecil 
Hurst summed up the situation on this point by saying 'taking 
the two docwnents together I think one must deduce from the 
text an intention on the part of the u.s. Government to claim 
as from the issue of the proclamation and without waiting 
for the commencement of any development work an exclusive 
76. Hurst, supra, p.160. 
77. The Executive Order states, 'It is ordered that the 
natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed of the 
Continental S.helf beneath the high seas but contiguous 
to the coasts of the u.s. declared this day by proclama-
tion to appertain to the u.s. and to be subject to its 
jurisdiction and control, be and they are hereby 
reserved ••••••••••••• ' (See note 60 above). 
88, 
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right to control the Continental Shelf adjacent to the 
,78 coasts of the u.s.A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
B. The U.K. Practice79 
The U.K. has approached the problem of mineral resom~ces 
under the high seas by the path of occupation. 80 This is 
clearly shown in the 1942 Treaty on the Gulf of Paria. 81 
The Treaty, which is regarded as the earliest state document 
on the Continental Shelf, divides the submarine areas of the 
Gulf into two spheres of interest combined with mutual 
recognition of any rights of sovereignty or control lawfully 
acquired by each of the two parties in its own sphere. This 
means that the Treaty looked forward to the legal occupation 
7 8. Supra, p .1 61 • 
79. The first legislation concerning the Continental Shelf of 
the United Kingdom itself was given by the Continental 
Shelf Act, 1964, which came into force on April 15 of the 
same year. The Act, indirectly, incorporates the conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf which was ratified by the 
U.K. Government on May 11, 1964, and came into force on 
June 1 0, 1 96L~. However, there are few, but important, 
differences between the provisions of the Act and those 
of the Convention, which shall be referred to where appro-
priate. For a study on the Act, see Alec Samuels, 'The 
Continental Shelf Act, 1964,' published in Developments 
in the Law of the Sea, 1958 - 1964, by the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
International Law Series No.3. 
80. Waldeck, supra, p.131. 
81 • See note 64 in Part One. 
of parts of the seabed. In fact, the legal technique used 
by Venezuela and the U.K., both of which started soon after 
the conclusion of the Treaty to annex the submarine areas 
each on its side, was undoubtedly derived from the law of 
occupation. 
In 1945, the Bahamas Petroleum Act was passed to 
regulate oil exploitation of the seabed off the Bahamas 
without asserting exclusive rights over the whole shelf. 
'rhis Act was augmented in 1948," by Order in Council. 82 The 
first recital of the Order states that it is desirable to 
extend the boundaries of the colony of the Bahamas so as 
to include the Continental Shelf contiguous to the coasts 
of the colony. Article 2 of the operative part of the Order 
declares, 'The boundaries of the colony of the Bahamas are 
hereby extended to include the area of the Continental Shelf 
which lies beneath the sea contiguous to the coasts of the 
Bahamas.' This also indicates that the case was regarded as 
one of occupation of territory. 
Finally, similar claims were made by Order in Council 
with regard to the Continental Shelf of British Honduras, 83 
Jamaica, 84 and the Falkland Islands.85 
90. 
82. Statutory Instruments, 1948, Vol.III, p.27. As to the 1945 
Petroleum Act, see note 67 in Part One, p.30. 
83. Statutory Instruments, 1950, Vol.I, No.2100. 
84. Statutory Instruments, 1948, Vol.XI, p.111. 
85. The same citation in note 83 above. 
(2) The Latin-American Practice 
The Latin-American claims, which followed the Truman 
Proclamation, deviate to a large extent from the policy 
declared by Truman with regard to the shelf area. They 
seem to be directed to the appropriation of vast areas of 
the high seas rather than the assertion of certain rights 
over the shelf. With such claims the principle of 'effective 
occupation' wears thin. It is only by virtue of the 
principle of contiguity that a coastal state may attempt to 
embrace vast areas of the high seas. In fact, this principle 
was adopted by most Latin-American countries. 86 
The Argentina Declaration87 starts with the recital 
'The submarine platform, known also as the submarine 
plateau or Continental Shelf, is closely united to the 
mainland both in a morphological and in a geological sense.' 
Another recital grants conditional recognition to the right 
of other states to make claims both to their Continental 
Shelf and epicontinental sea. This recital, according to 
Waldeck, shows a consciousness that the acquiescence of 
91 • 
other states in Argentina's pretensions is at least desirable~7a 
86. Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Costa Rica. 
87. A.J.I.L., Vol.41 (1947), supp.11-12. This declaration was 
preceded by the Decree No.1 ,386 of Jan.24, 1944, concern-
ing national sovereignty over the Argentine Continental 
Shelf and Epicontinental Sea. 
87a. Waldeck, supra, p.129. 
Furthermore, the Declaration asserts that the u.s. and 
Mexico88 have proclaimed their sovereignty both over the 
shelf and epicontinental sea. It is apparent that this 
assertion is not true in regard to the u.s. as to the 
epicontinental shelf. Finally, the Declaration refers to 
modern international law and contributions of national and 
foreign publications as another argument in support of the 
Argentina claim. 
The most that one may say about these recitals is that 
the Argentine in effect claims to extend her territorial 
waters to the edge of the Continental Shelf, leaving the 
shelf area undefined. 
The Brazilian Decree, of 1950, uses a different technique 
for integrating into national territory the adjoining part of 
the Continental Shelf. 89 In the preamble of that Decree we 
read: 'Whereas the Continental Shelf contiguous to continents 
and islands and extending beneath the high seas is in reality 
submerged territory •••••••••••••••• '9° 
88. The Presidential Declaration, 29 October, 1945, supra, 
note 67 in Part One. This declaration, which came a 
month after the Truman proclamations, refers only to 
the Continental Shelf which is limited by 200 metres 
depth. However, the Amendment to the Mexican Constitu-
tion, introduced in 1949 for the purpose of translating 
the declaration, and which was perhaps influenced by the 
Latin-American proclamations, declared national sover-
eignty over the epicontinental shelf to the extent laid 
down in international law. 
89. Supra, note 67 in Part One, p.299. 
90. Ibid. 
92. 
The fact that in some governmental documents and in 
publications and discussions the Continental Shelf is 
referred to as 'submerged territory,' suggests that this 
term is used to strengthen the idea that it once belonged 
to the riparian state and that there is nothing strange in 
the fact that a state claims control and jurisdiction over 
the resources in the shelf, or even sovereignty over that 
area.91 This is, in fact, the view of some geologists who 
believe that the shelf, or part of it, have been once dry 
land. 92 However, the same geologists agree that this 
happened during the last glacial period, between 10,000 and 
12,000 years ago, a period which deprived the riparian state 
of 'continuous possession.'93 
The Chilean Decree of June, 1947 declared an immediate 
protection zone extending 200 miles from all the coasts of 
the mainland and islands.94 Chile sought to justify these 
large claims in recitals which asserted that the u.s., Mexico 
93. 
and the Argentine had already proclaimed (1) Their sovereignty 
over their adjacent shelf and adjacent seas within the limits 
91 • The press release accompanying the Truman Proclamations 
uses similar words where it says, 'Valuable deposits of 
minerals other than oil may also be expected to be found 
in these submerged areas.' Article III of the Petroleum 
Act of the Philippines states, 'All natural deposits ••••• 
whether found in or under the surface of •••••••• lakes, 
or other submerged lands.' 
92. See p.5above. 
93. An attempt to apply the principle of 'prescription' would 
fail for the same reason. 
94. ILQ, 2 (1948), p.135. 
necessary to preserve for the said States the natural 
riches belonging to them, whether already known or to be 
discovered, and (2) Their right to protect and control 
fisheries with the object of preventing damage to the 
natural riches in the seas adjacent to their coasts. A 
further recital asserted that international consensus of 
opinion recognises the right of every country to consider 
as its national territory any adjacent extension of the 
epicontinental sea and the Continental Shelf. 
In his comments on these recitals, Professor Waldock 
says 'Plainly, these recitals exaggerate the extent of 
international agreement concerning the Continental Shelf, 
distort the United States' views and show little conscious-
ness of the limits inherent in the geological concept of the 
Continental Shelf.'95 
Finally, the Declaration argues that Chile's life, 
owing to the narrowness of her land boundaries is peculiarly 
linked to the sea. One may add to this reason another one 
relating to the narrowness of her Continental Shelf which 
scarcely extends beyond the three miles limit. Chile, 
therefore, has nothing to gain from any doctrine associated 
with the geological concept of a distinct submarine shelf. 
Hence, it has been suggested that the term 'Continental Shelf' 
in the Chilean Decree is employed as a mere catch-phrase to 
9 5 • S upr a, p .1 31 • 
94. 
cover the expansion of territoPial waters and fishing 
96 monopolies in the high seas. 
( 3) The Practice of Arab States in the Arabian-Eersian Gulf 
We come, at last, to the series of proclamations which 
were issued by Saudi Arabia and nine Sheikhdoms over .the 
submaPine areas of the Arabian-Persian Gulf.97 The Saudi 
Arabian pronouncement follows the main lines of the Truman 
PPoclamat1on.98 According to this Royal Pronouncement, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the resources (of the conti-
guous seabed and subsoil Lmder the high seas in the Gulf) 
is claimed to be reasonable and just since the'effectiveness 
of measures would depend on co-operation from shore and a 
coastal state in self-protection needs to keep a close watch 
on off-shore activities. In other words, both the principles 
of 'effective occupation' and 'self protection' are invoked, 
with the omission of the geological arguments in the Truman 
proclamation. 
95. 
The Rulers Proclamations, on the other hand, were inspired 
by Britain.99 The main recital of these British inspired 
96. Ibid; The Peruvian Decree of 1 August, 1947, ILQ, 2 (1948), 
p.137, and the Decree-Law of Costa Rica of 2 November, 
1949, note 67 in Part One, p.9, both follow the form of 
the Chilean proclamation with variations in detail. 
97. For the Royal Pronouncement of Saudi Arabia, see AJIL, 34 
(1949), supp. p.156. The proclamations of the Sheikhdoms 
are published in the same supplement, pp.185-6; (For 
Bahrein see note 67 in Part One, p.24). 
98. This is probably because the oil concessions in Saudi 
Arabia are held by U.S. companies. 
99. Apart from Kuwait which became independent in 1961, all 
other Sheikhdoms and emirates are still British 
protectoPates. 
proclamations reads: 'Whereas it is just that the seabed 
and subsoil extending to a reasonable distance from the 
coast should appertain to and be controlled by the littoral 
state to which it is adjacent . . . . . . . . According to this 
recital, the seabed and subsoil belong to the adjacent 
coastal state on grounds of justice, and not by the law of 
nations. Further, the area claimed is restricted to a 
'reasonable distance.' 
The practice of other states is invoked by all the 
proclamations. Saudi Arabia declares that 'various other 
nations now exercise jurisdiction over the subsoil and seabed 
of areas contiguous to their coasts.' The rulers go further 
by saying that 'the right of a littoral state to exercise its 
control over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil 
adjacent to its coasts has been established in international 
law practice by the action of other states.' Professor 
Waldeck suggests that this phrase in the British inspired 
proclamations should not be tal<:en as meaning that the U.K. 
now regards every coastal state as ipso jure exercising 
jurisdiction over the adjacent seabed.100 He refers to the 
Qatar Arbitration which was decided after the proclamations 
were made. 101 In that case, the U.K. considered the issue of 
the proclamations as an essential step in the acquisition by 
the several sheikhs of oil rights in the seabed outside 
100. Supra, p.135. 
101. See note 84 in Part one. 
96. 
97. 
terri tori'al waters •1 02 In other words the U.K. in these 
proclamations still looked on a coastal state's rights in 
submarine areas as being dependant on an act of appropriation. 10~ 
Finally, the absence of any reference to the Continental 
Shelf in these proclamations is explained by the fact that 
the depth of the waters in the Gulf nowhere exceeds 100 
fathoms. 
Conclusion 
It is apparent that the above examination of state 
practice does not give any certain result on the principle 
or principles which may justify claims to the Continental 
Shelf. It only suggests that, while Latin-American practice 
leans towards a natural right founded on contiguity, Anglo-
American practice seems to lean towards the law of occupation. 
Of these two princi]!lles contiguity has been expressly rejected 
as a principle of international law while occupation is an 
established and, indeed, fundamental rule. 
The fact that the main weight in the Latin-American 
claims is put on contiguity has been met forcefully and 
with much indignation by the British Government.104 Apart 
from the fear that contiguity once adopted as a legal 
principle would lead to the appropriation of huge areas of 
102. Waldeck, op.cit. 
103. Ibid. 
104. See protests made by the U.K., the u.s., and the French 
Governments against the Latin-American claims; reported 
by Mouton. 'The Continental Shelf,( 1952, pp.89-95. 
the high seas, it may be also used to attack established 
titles to islands occupied by other states, particularly 
to islands of the Latin-American coasts.105 It is perhaps 
because of this that the U.K. provides in the 1942 Treaty 
on the Gulf of Faria, and in other British inspired pro-
clamations for the safeguarding of existing sovereignty of 
islands on the Continental Shelf. 
Finally socio-economic considerations based on 'self 
protection' and 'social needs' were invoked by most countries, 
especially by the Latin-American states. These protective 
factors, which are indispensable to the welfare and progress 
of the coastal state have become part of modern international 
3. Under the Convention of the Continental Shelf 
The legal theory upon which the doctrine of the shelf 
is based has been discussed throughout the International Law 
Commission's debates on the subject. The Commission did not 
show any signs of adopting rules, as a lex ferenda, on this 
question. Hence, the principle or principles which, according 
to the Commission, justified the establishment of this new 
doctrine were always referred to in the commentary on the 
105. See the Antarctica Cases: U.K. v. Argentina, and U.K. 
98. 
V. Chile· ICJ Pleadings, March 16, 1956; (Removal from 
the list~. The two cases relate to disputes over certain 
Antarctica and sub-Antarctica islands which belong to 
the U.K., as part of the colony of the Falkland Islands. 
draft articles of the Commission's Reports to the General 
Assembly. 
In its report to the General Assembly concerning its 
second session, 1950, the Commission took the view that a 
coastal state could exercise control and jurisdiction over 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas off its coast 
in order to explore and exploit the natural resources exist-
ing there.106 In the opinion of the Commission, the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas referred to above were not 
to be considered as either res nullius or res communis, and 
that the exercise of such control and jurisdiction was 
independent of the concept of occupation.107 
The fundamental principle contained in the commentary 
99. 
on Article 2 of the 1951 draft articles on the shelf did not 
differ in nature from what had been discussed in 1950.108 
These commentaries, which were based on Hudson's proposals, 109 
excluded the treatment of the shelf areas as res nullius, 110 
defining the right of the coastal state over the Continental 
Shelf without reference to the notion of occupation, whether 
106. 2 YBILC, 1950, p.384, para.198; This conclusion is based 
on Hudson's first proposal which is extracted from the 
report of the ILA to the Copenhagen Conference, see 
1 YBILC, 1 950, p .218. 
1 07. 2YBILC, 1 950, pp .384-385. 
1 08. 2YBILC, 1 951 , p .1 42. 
1 09. Hudson's text, 1 YBILC, 1951 , p .407. 
110. Paragraph 4 of the commentary on Article 2, supra, loc.cit. 
effective or notional, or any formal assertion by the 
sovereign state.111 The Commission tried to justify this 
attitude by stating:-
'It would serve no purpose to refer to the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas in question as res 
nullius capable of being occupied by the first occupier. 
--That conception might lead to chaos, and it would dis-
regard the fact that in most cases the effective 
exploitation of the natural resources will depend on 
the existence of installations on the territory of 
.,the coastal state to which the submarine areas are 
contiguous.' 11 2 
1 oo. 
In the final analysis of this paragraph, it appears that 
the principle of occupation assumes importance only in 
relation to the principle of contiguity. In other words, 
it is the littoral state which exercises the rights asserted 
in Article 2. This means that the principle of occupation, 
though rejected vis-a-vis coastal states other than the 
littoral state, is, in fact, one of the principles upon 
which the new doctrine rests. The Commission, however, 
seems to contradict itself when it comes to say that the 
exercise of the right of control and jurisdiction is 
independent of occupation because, in its opinion, effective 
111. Para.5, Ibid. 
112. Para.4, Ibid. 
occupation of the submarine areas in question would be 
practically impossible.113 On the one hand, the Commission 
presupposes the existence of effectiveness in the littoral 
state for the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
shelf area, but on the other hand, it considers the right 
of jurisdiction and control to be subject ipso jure to the 
coastal state without regard to occupation effective or 
1 01 • 
notional. This uncertainty and confusion in the Commission's 
views stems from the fact that instead of forming new norms 
of law for the regime of the shelf, the Commission is mixing 
these with the old rules of international law. 
Furthermore, the Commission rejected attempts to base 
on customary law the rights mentioned in Article 2. 11 4 The 
Commission was of the opinion that the numerous proclamations 
which have been issued over the past decade were far from 
being part of customary international law. 115 The Commission 
was satisfied to state that 'The principle of the Continental 
Shelf is based upon general principles of law which serve 
the present-day needs of the international community.' 116 
What are these '-general principles of law which serve the 
present-day needs of the international community' if they 
are not the same principles set up by the various proclama-
tions which were issued mainly because of the present-day 
113. Para.5, Ibid. 
114 .• Para.6, Ibid. 
11 5. Ibid. 
11 6. Ibid. 
needs of the international community? In fact, Hudson's 
proposal, upon which this phrase is based, states '•••••••• 
the proclamations are baaed upon concepts of international 
law which serve the present-day needs of the international 
community.• 117 Finally, Hudson proposed replacing the words 
'concepts of international law,' in his text, by the words 
0 
'general principles of law," the term employed in Article 
118 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J., thus, the only thread 
which is left for linking these two phrases is that both 
the proclamations and the Continental Shelf are based on 
something (concepts? or general principles?) which serve the 
same purpose, namely, 'The present-day needs of the inter-
national community.'119 
The 1953 and 1956 Commentaries do not differ from each 
other in substance.120 They also follow the same basic idea 
of the 1951 views which are discussed above. It is, however, 
worthwhile quoting the final views expressed by the ILC, in 
1956, in order to understand the fundamental principles upon 
which the new doctrine rests: 
117. Hudson, note 109 above, p.408. 
11 8. Ibid. 
102. 
119. In fact, the effect of the proclamations on establishing 
a customary law, and the value of such proclamations as 
a rule of customary law in process of formation cannot 
be ruled out entirely. See Yepes and Scelle in 1 YBILC, 
1951, p.408. 
120. 2YBILC, 1953, p.214, paras.72 and 73; and 2YBILC, 1956, 
p .• 298, paras. 7 and 8. 
'7. The rights of the coastal state over the Continental 
Shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or 
notional, or on any express proclamation. 
8. The Commission does not deem it necessary to 
expatiate on the question of the nature and legal 
basis of the sovereign rights attributed to the 
coastal $tate. The considerations relevant to 
this matter cannot be reduced to a single factor. 
In particular, it is not possible to base the 
sovereign rights of the coastal state exclusively 
on recent practice, for there is no question in 
the present case of giving the authority of a 
legal rule to a unilateral practice resting solely 
upon the will of the states concerned. However, 
that practice itself is considered by the Commission 
to be supported by considerations of law and of fact. 
In particular, once the seabed and the subsoil have 
become an object of active interest to coastal states 
with a view to exploration and exploitation of their 
resources, they cannot be considered as res nullius, 
i.e. capable of being appropriated by the first 
occupier. It is natural that the coastal states 
should resist any such solution. Moreover, in most 
cases the effective exploitation of natural resources 
must presuppose the existence of installations on the 
1 03. 
'territory of the coastal state. Neither is it 
possible to disregard the geographical phenomenon 
whatever the term -propinquity, contiguity, 
geographical continuity, appurtenance or identity -
used to define the relationshi~ between the 
submarine areas in question and the adjacent non-
sub@erged land. All these considerations of 
general utility provide a sufficient basis for 
the principle of the sovereign rights of the 
coastal state as now formulated by the Commission. •121 
At the Fourth Committee of the Geneva Conference, 1958, 
four proposals based on the foregoing views of the ILC were 
suggested as new articles and amendments to the 1956 text. 
First, Mexico proposed an amendment to Article 68 (Article 
2 of the Convention) to read: 'The coastal state exercises 
sovereig.ilty over the seabed and subsoil of the Continental 
104. 
Shelf and over the natural resources thereof, to the exclusion 
of other states, physical or virtual occupation not being a 
necessary condition.• 122 The phrase 'physical or virtual 
occupation not being a necessary condition,' which is our 
only concern here, would not have been rejected if it were 
not for the first part of the proposal which introduces the 
concept of full sovereignty instead of 'sovereign rights' for 
the limited purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural 
121. Ibid. 
122. Doc.A/CONF.13/C.4/L.2 
resources of the shelf. As a result, the Mexican amendment 
was rejected by the Committee.123 
105. 
Secondly, both Argentina and Yugoslavia had submitted 
each a proposal, which were substantially the same •1 24 These 
two proposals were suggested as a second paragraph to Article 
68. The Argentine amendment, which was adopted without much 
opposition, read: 'The rights of the coastal state are 
exclusive in the sense that if that state does not explore 
or exploit the Continental Shelf no other may undertake 
these activities. 1125 
Finally, Mr. Garcia Amador, the Cuban delegate, proposed 
a new article which, according to him, should be placed 
between Articles 68 and 69.126 This proposed article simply 
repeated the last paragraph of the Mexican proposal and the 
text of paragraph 7 of the Commission's commentary on Article 
68.127 It stated: 'The rights of the coastal state over the 
Continental Shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or 
notional, or on any express proclamation.' 128 
123. U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea, Fourth Committee, p.69; 
The Mexican amendment was based on a statement made by the 
representative of the Government of Mexico, at the third 
meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, Mexico, 
1956; see Acts and Doc. of the Third Meeting, Pan-American 
Union, Washington, D.(:. 1956, p.56; see also the comments 
of the Mexican delegation in the General Debate of the 9th 
Meeting, Fourth Committee, supra, pp.14-15. 
124. The Yugoslav amendment was not voted on; for this amend-
ment, see Doc.A/CONF.13/C.4/L.13. 
125. Doc.A/CONF.13/C.4/L.6/Rev.2. 
126. Doc.A/CONF.13/C.4/L.45. 
127. See notes 120 and 122 above. 
128. Supra, note 126. 
1 06. 
According to some representatives, the Cuban proposal 
hinged on the concept of occupation, which in turn was 
linked with that of sovereignty, and since the Committee had 
decided to substitute the word 'exclusive' for 'sovereig~' 
consideration of the Cuban proposal would, in effect, mean 
re-opening discussion of a matter already decided by a vote.129 
Further, as the Cuban proposal was virtually identical with 
the last phrase of the Mexican amendment, which was rejected 
at an earlier meeting, it was therefore superfluous and out 
of order. 13° 
Mr. Amador, replying to the objections raised by the 
Netherlands representative, said: 'In adopting the term 
'exclusive rights' 1 31 the Commission had decided that the 
coastal state did not have complete sovereignty over the 
seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf, but it had 
recognised the sovereign nature of the rights of the coastal 
state for the purpose of the exploration and exploitation of 
the natural resources of the shelf. It might happen that 
another state might be unaware of such rights, because there 
was no occupation, either effective or notional, because the 
coastal state laclced the technical means for the exploitation 
129. Mouton (The Netherlands), 25th Meeting, para.22; and 
Muncb; (Germany), 26th Meeting, para.4. 
130. Mouton, 26th Meeting, para.5. 
131. Amador must have been referring to the Fourth Comrni ttee, 
because the Commission had adopted the term 'sovereign 
rights.' 
of the resources beyond the depth of 200 metres provided in 
Article 67. The Cuban amendment made provision for such a 
case.' 
132 
After considerable discussion on the Cuban proposal, it 
was adopted as paragraph 3 for Article 2. This leads us to 
the conclusion that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2, enun-
ciating the legal basis of the new doctrine for the first 
time as a positive law, grant each coastal state exclusive 
107. 
rights of exploitation of the Continental Shelf off its coast. 
The- basic concept of this new regime provides: 
Article 2 - 1 • The coastal state exercises over the 
Continental Shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this article are exclusive in the sense that if the 
coastal state does not explore the Continental Shelf 
or exploit its natural resources, no-one may undertalce 
these activities, or make a claim to the Continental 
Shelf, without the express consent of the coastal state. 
3. The rights of the coastal state over the 
Continental Shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
132. Fourth Committee, 26th Meeting, para .11 ; Moreover, and as 
the representative of Guatemala remarked, the Mexican 
proposal which was partly reintroduced by the Cuban propo-
sal, had been rejected because a number of delegations had 
objected to the nature of the rights it sought to confer 
upon the coastal state, rather than to that part of it 
which corresponded to the Cuban proposal; see, supra, 
para.7. 
. 1 08. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing provisions of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and the various views expressed in the ILC 
and in Fourth Committee, it is apparent that the considera-
tions relevant to the legal basis of the sovereign rights 
attributed to the coastal states cannot be reduced to any 
one principle. The position under the convention may be 
summed up as follows:-
(1) According to Article 2(2), the Continental Shelf was 
meant to belong ipso jure to the littoral state. 
Consequently, the right derived from this theory might 
arise in various forms: the littoral state might declare 
that it had no intention of exploring or exploiting the 
seabed and subsoil of its Continental Shelf. It might 
leave it to others to do so, even without granting them 
a formal concession as long as the express consent of 
the coastal state is proven. On the other hand, it 
might equally exercise its right over the Continental 
Shelf by granting a concession. In all these circum-
stances, the right to exercise jurisdiction and control 
would still be vested in the littoral state. In other 
words, the situation is somewhat analogous to that of 
the territorial sea. 
(2) The first part of Article 1(a) together with the 
Commission's commentary on Article 68 suggest that the 
principle of contiguity was given much consideration as 
a basis for the rights granted. This means that the 
principle of contiguity, which has been rejected as 
a distinct root of title apart from effective occupa-
tion, assumes importance from the fact that effective 
exploitation of the natural resources of the shelf 
presupposes the existence of installations on the 
adjacent land territory. 
(3) Under Article 2(3), although the rights of the coastal 
state do not depend on occupation, various views 
suggest that 'effective occupation' was thought to 
exist in the adjacent coastal state. 
(4) Finally, in spite of the fact that the Convention does 
not refer to the practice of states as one of the 
principles underlying the new doctrine, one may 
easily deduce from the various views which led to the 
Convention that the unilateral actions of some coastal 
states had influenced to a great deal such views. 
109. 
Section II - Rights of Coastal States over the Continental 
Shelf 
1 • The Nature of the Rights Asserted and the Freedoms of 
High Seas 
(A) Under the Unilateral Action of Coastal States 
The various proclamations and enactments relating to 
submarine areas do not supply a clear answer to the question 
whether the rights asserted are rights of sovereignty, or 
merely rights of jurisdiction and control, and whether they 
are rights over the submarine areas or over their resources. 
Their cumulative result is that in relation to the subject 
matter of these instruments the rights asserted amount to a 
kind of appropriation. 
11 o. 
The absence of intention to distinguish between exclusive 
'jurisdiction and control,' on the one hand and sovereignty 
on the other hand, is shown in the Brazilian Decree which 
speaks of the 'interest in the declaration of sovereignty 
or of the dominion and jurisdiction of states over the region 
thus accruing to the national territory.• 133 Article 1 of 
this Decree states, "It is expressly recognised that the part 
133. Decree No.28, 840, 8 November, 1950, Supra Note 89. 
of the seabed which corresponds to the continental and 
insular territory of Brazil is incorporated in the said 
territory, under the exclusive jurisdiction and dominion 
of the Federal Union." 'l'he Mexican Proclamation of 1 945, 
while declaring that 'it is not reasonable, wise or possible 
that Mexico should ignore jurisdiction, exploitation and 
control,' over the Continental Shelf, proceeds to state that 
'the Government of Mexico claim the ·whole of the continental 
platform or base adjacent to its coasts.' 134. 
Full sovereignty over the Continental Shelf is claimed 
explicitly in some proclamations such as those of Argentina, 
Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El 
Salvador.135 The purely British proclamations such as those 
relating to the Gulf of Paria, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and 
111 • 
Falkland Island amount, by clear implication, to an assumption 
of rights of full sovereignty.136 The 1964 Continental 
Shelf Act of the U.K. incorporates the provisions of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf by virtue of Section 1(1) 
which says that, "Any rights exercisable by the United 
Kingdom outside territorial waters with respect to the seabed 
and subsoil and their natural resources •••••••••• are hereby 
vested in Her Majesty."137 The words 'any rights' mean 
134. Declaration, 29 October, 1945, Supra Note 88. 
135. For these proclamations see supra pp.91-92. 
136. All cited above, Notes 82, 83, 84 end 85. 
137. The Continental Shelf Act, 1964, AJIL, 1964, p.1085. 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
the Continental Shelf, which the Convention confers upon 
the coastal state.138 
It is only with regard to 'safety zones' that the Act 
112. 
deviates from the Convention and other rules of international 
law. Under Section 2(1 & 2)'of the Act, the assumed power of 
the Parliament to impose criminal penalties upon alien 
masters navigating ships sailing under an alien flag is 
plainly contrary to the general rule of international law, 
because penal or disciplinary proceedings may only be 
instituted before the juridical or administrative authorities 
either of the flag state or of the state of which such person 
is a nationa1.139 Section 3(1) of the Act states: 'Any act 
or omission which -
(a) takes place on, under or above an installation in 
a designated area or any waters within 500 metres 
of such an installation, and 
(b) would, if taking place in any part of the United 
Kingdom, constitute an offence under the law in 
force in that part, shall be treated for the 
purposes of that law as taking place in that part.' 
It is apparent that the U.K. Government treats the area 
of the safety zone as part of the main land. The English 
criminal law, which is territorial in its nature, has been 
138. Article 2(1) of the Convention. 
139. See Article 11 of the Convention on the High Seas. 
extended by virtue of this section. This is, perhaps, the 
first straight forward provision in an English Act which 
proclaims full sovereignty over certain areas of the high 
seas. 14° 
These claims to full sovereignty are in contrast to the 
TrL~an proclamation on the Continental Shelf. This proclama-
tion declared that 'The Government of the United States 
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of 
the Continental Shelf ben~ath the high seas but contiguous 
113. 
to the coast of the United States as appertaining to the u.s., 
subject to its jurisdiction and contro1.• 141 According to 
this passage of the proclamation, it is not only that the 
assumption of 'control and jurisdiction' was preferred to 
assumption of 'sovereignty,' but also that the 'control and 
jurisdiction' thus claimed had reference not to the seabed 
and subsoil of the Continental Shelf as such but merely to 
the resources of the shelf area. 
Lauterpacht has suggested more than one cause for this 
intentional wording of the proclamation:142 
140. SeeR. V. Martin, 1956, 2QB, p.272; R. V. Naylor, 1962, 
2QB, p.527; and Cox, V. Army Council, 1963, A.C., p.48. 
The three cases are decided in connection with Articles 
60 and 62 of the 1949 Oivil Aviation Act. See also 
Section 10 of the Tokyo Convention Act, 1968, which 
deals with crimes on board aircraft. 
141. Truman Proclamation, supra, Note 60 on p.79. 
142. Lauterpacht, 'Sovereignty over Submarine Areas,' BYIL, 
1950, p.388. 
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1 • It may have been due, in the first instance, to the fact 
that according to the constitution of the u.s. formal 
annexation or acquisition of terri tory requires ·legis-
lative approval and cannot be accomplished by presidential 
proclamation. 
2. Secondly, in view of the persistent attitude of the u.s. 
in the matter of acquisition of sovereignty over arctic 
and antarctic regions -an attitude based on a rigid 
insistence on effective occupation as a condition of 
acquisition of a valid title - it was deemed preferable 
to give a somewhat different and less emphatic 
formulation to a claim based on the fact of contiguity. 
3. Finally, it is possible that some importance was attached 
to the theory that 'sovereignty and ownership go together' 
and that in view of domestic controversy in the u.s. 
concerning the ownership of the subsoil of the Continental 
Shelf the express assumption of sovereignty was deemed 
to be prejudicial to an as yet unresolved issue. 
This cautious formulation by the U.S. of its title over 
the Continental Shelf has not been followed by other states. 
In spite of much similarity between the Saudi Arabian pro-
nouncement and the Truman proclamation in many respects, 
Saudi Arabia, in this case, followed the attitude of those 
states which regarded the seabed and subsoil of the Continental 
Shelf to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control 
of the state concerned.143 
The only feature common to the various proclamations is 
that all of them explicitly provide, either in general terms 
or specifically, for the preservation of all or some of the 
freedoms of the high seas. With regard to the Latin-American 
proclamations which assert national sovereignty over the 
Continental Shelf and epicontinental sea, the right of free 
navigation has been expressly preserved. Other freedoms of 
the high seas, including the right of fishing and flying 
over the area claimed, are, undoubtedly, prohibited, since 
the claims amount in their nature to an extension of the 
territorial sea. Hence, the Argentine Decree states, 'For 
purposes of free navigation, the character of the waters 
situated in the Argentine epicontinental sea and above the 
Argentine Continental Shelf, remains unaffected by the 
present declaration.' 144 In the Chilean Decree, we read, 
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'This declaration •••••••• does not affect the rights of free 
navigation on the high seas.' 145 This reference, in the 
Chilean Decree, to the area claimed as 'high seas' is 
incompatible with the national sovereignty proclaimed over 
the same area. 
143. Royal pronouncement, supra note 97; the proclamation of 
the Sheikhdoms on the Arabian-Persian Gulf adopted the 
same wording. 
144. Art .2. 
145. Art.4. Art.5 of Costa Rica Decree uses the same wording. 
While Honduras, in Art.5, and Peru, in Art.4, both add 
the words: ' •••••••• in conformity with international 
law.' 
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Other Latin-American countries which did not make direct 
claim to the waters above the shelf, such as Mexico and Brazil, 
also refer only to the right of free navigation,_ with the 
exception that the Mexican declaration describes the waters 
above the shelf as 'high seas,' while in the Brazilian 
Decree dubious terms are used. 1'hus the Mexican proclamation 
disclaims any intention to interfere with the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas. 'rhere is also a statement in 
the declaration in regard to 'closed fishing zones,' con-
cerning the supervision of fishing activities.146 However, 
the amendment to Articles 27, 42 and 48 of the Constitution 
declared, in addition to the Continental Shelf and submarine 
bed, the waters covering these areas to the extent fixed by 
international law, to be included in the national property.147 
It seems that the sovereignty claimed over the waters above 
the shelf is directly related to the supervision of the 
closed fishing zones. The important point is the establish-
ment of sovereignty over the shelf and ~ts waters. This 
entity of shelf and sea, in the practice of Mexico, is 
identical with that of the first group of the Latin-American 
countries. As to the Brazilian Decree, Article 3 states, 
"Rules governing navigation in the waters covering the 
146. U.N. Doc.A/CN 4/61, p.15. 
147. These articles are cited in Auguste B., 'The Continental 
Shelf, 1 960', pp .1 30-131 • 
aforesaid Continental Shelf shall continue in force without 
prejudice to any further rules ••••••••• especially as 
regards fishing in that area." Vlhethero the Brazilian claim 
was intended to apply to living resources, e.g. fish, is 
not stated in the Decree. However, at the time of this 
legislation there were fishery limits in existence under 
the Brazilian laws.148 
In the Anglo-American and associated proclamations, 
freedoms of the high seas are preserved always in general 
terms, but in some of them the right of free navigation is 
mentioned along with the general terms. Proclamations 
coming under the first heading are those of the Bahamas, 
British Honduras, Jamaica and the Falkland Island. The 
Order-in-{;ouncil concerning each of them states, 'Nothing 
in this Order shall be deemed to affect the character as 
hi~h seas of any v1aters above the Continental Shelf and 
outside the limits of territorial waters.' 149 On the other 
hand, both the Treaty of 1942 on the Gulf of Faria and the 
Order-in-council made under the Treaty were declared not to 
affect in any way the status of the waters nor freedom of 
navigation or passage in the Gulf.15° The Arab states in 
the PePsian Gulf go even further in mentioning specifically 
various freedoms of the high seas. Each Ruler declares that 
I 
148. 12 miles, 1930, cited in Amador, supra note 64, p.31. 
149. Art.3 of each Order. 
150. Arts. 5 and 6 of the Treaty. 
11 7. 
11 8. 
his proclamation is not to affect the character as high 
seas of the superjacent waters, nor the air space above 
those waters, nor the fishing and traditional pearling rights 
in them.151 • It will be noted that the free air space is 
now mentioned, as well as the high seas, and that fishing 
rights are expressly preserved. Finally, the Truman 
proclamation declares that ''the character as high seas of 
the waters above the Continental Shelf and the right to 
their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus 
affected."152 The proclamation also refers to the Continental 
Shelf as 'beneath the high seas.' This reservation has a 
direct bearing on the question of fishery which is the 
subject matter of the second proclamation. 
In the Coastal Fisheries Proclamation153 President 
Truman proclaims as proper the establishment of conservation 
zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the 
coasts of the U.S. in which fisheries either have been or in 
future may be developed on a substantial scale. Such zones, 
unless the u.s. nationals are the only participants in 
fishery, shall be regulated and controlled by the u.s. and 
other state or states whose nationals are engaged in the 
fishery. The proclamation also asserts the right of the u.s. 
foreign fishing vessels in particular areas of the high seas 
where the U.S. interests are conceived to be threatened. 
151. Supra, note 97. 
152. The last para. of the operative part. 
153. AJIL, Vol.40, 1946, Off. Doc., p.45-48. 
Finally, there is a reservation of freedom of navigation in 
the same terms as in the shelf. 154 
Taking the two docwnents together, it is apparent that 
the U.S. claims, unlike those of most Latin-American 
countries, do not amount to an extension of territorial 
waters.155 In spite of this, it was perhaps unfortunate 
that the u.s. on the day on which it issued the proclamation 
as to the Continental Shelf also issued the proclamation 
relating to fisheries. Whatever may have been the propriety 
of the latter, it was independent of theClaim to the 
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Continental Shelf. Yet, and as Lauterpacht says, some Latin-
American countries have combined in the same instrument the 
claim to the adjacent submarine areas with sweeping assertions 
of sovereignty over the hiGh seas; while Mexico did no more 
than join in one proclamation the substance of the two 
separate proclamations of the United States.156 
154. The proclamation concedes the same right to establish con-
servation zones to other states off their coasts on con-
dition that similar recognition is given to any existing 
interests of U.S. nationals in the fisheries concerned. 
155. This conclusion is confirmed in the Montebello case, where 
the Court of Claims decided that the vessel Montebello, 
which was sunk off the coast of California outside the 
three mile limit but over the Continental Shelf, was not, 
according to the language of the Truman proclamation, 
.within the u.s. or within a place 'as may be determined 
by the President to be under the dominion and control of 
the u.s.;' see full details in Matson Navigation Co., and 
Union Oil Co. of California V. u.s., 141F. supp.929, 934 
(Ct.Cl., 1956). This decision rejects the suggestion of 
Professor Bingham and other writers that by virtue of the 
proclamation the territorial waters of the u.s. should be 
extended: Rep. of the 'International Law of Pacific 
Coastal Fisheries.' Bonchard 1946, AJIL, 61. 
156. Lauterpacht, supra note 142, p.412. 
(B) Under the Convention of the Continental Shelf 
(1) The Historical Development of Article 2(1) 
The difference in terminology used to ascertain coastal 
states' rights over the submarine areas of the Continental 
Shelf was also dealt with by the ILC. In 1950 the Commission 
debated the subject generally. Those members who voiced a 
reasoned opinion on this matter expressed themselves in 
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favour of the view that the powers of the state in the 
adjacent submarine areas are those of sovereignty.157 However, 
the provisional report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly used a different language. It stated that 'the 
seabed and subsoil were subject to the exercise, by the 
littoral state, of control and jurisdiction for the purposes 
of their exploration and exploitation.' 158 From this report, 
it appears that the Commission was at variance, apart from 
the single exception of the proclamation of the u.s., with 
the relevant proclamations and enactments of all other states 
which have claimed sovereignty either expressly or impliedly 
in as much as they included these areas within their boundaries 
or declared them to belong to their states. 
This preliminary report of the Commission passed without 
much opposition. It was not until the Commission had reported 
its first draft articles to the General Assembly, in 1951, 
that the split between Governments over this issue became wide. 
157. 
158. 
This was the view of Professor Brierly and the Rapporteur, 
Professor Francois, (A/CN.4/SR.68, pp.6-8). 
Special supp. No.12 (A/1316, p.22). 
The text of Article 2 (Article 2(1) of the Convention) of 
the 1951 draft read: 
'The Continental Shelf is subject to the exercise by 
the coastal state of control and jurisdiction for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources.' 159 
This text was criticised by the Governments of Chile, 
France, Iceland, the Union of South Africa and the U.K., all 
of which considered that coastal states should exercise 
sovereignty over the Continental Shelf, though, with the 
exception of Chile, they did not claim sovereignty over the 
. t t d th . b 160 Th S d' h superJacen wa ers an e a1r space a ove. e we 1s 
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Government and certain others had endorsed the Commission's 
views.161 The Brazilian and Danish Governments believed that 
coastal states should exercise 'exclusive' jurisdiction, 
whereas the u.s. Government would be satisfied if that were 
brought out clearly in the commentary. 162 
While objections to this article from those countries 
which assumed full sovereignty over the Continental Shelf 
was likely to follow, the u.s. disapproval is hard to 
appreciate. In spite of similarity between the Truman 
proclamation and Article 2, the u.s. Government in its 
comments on this Article stated, ' •••••••• this Government 
159. U.N.G.A. Off.Rec., supp. No.9 (A/1858, p.18): also 
2YBILC 1951 , p .141 • 
160. 1YBILC, 1953, p.83, para.56. 
161. Ibid. 
162. Ibid. 
wonders, accordingly, whether it would :not be advisable to 
make it clear, at least in the commentaries, that control 
and jurisdiction for the purpose indicated in the draft 
articles mean in fact an exclusive, but functional, right 
to explore and exploit.• 163 
The only justification to the u.s. attitude seems to be 
that in the Truman Proclamation the word 'appertain' -belong 
to -is mentioned along with jurisdiction and control. In 
other words, the u.s. Government was anxious to make clear 
that the Continental Shelf belonged to the coastal state, 
and that the rights are exclusive so that no other state 
would be entitled to exploit the reso~ces of the shelf 
without the express consent of the coastal state concerned. 
Along these lines of the various Governments' policies, 
the Commission had decided to adopt the term 'sovereign 
rights' instead of 'jurisdiction and control' at its seventh 
and eighth sessions in 1953 and 1956 respectively. The 1956 
text for Article 68 (Article 2(1) of the Convention) which 
was identical with its 1953 draft of this article read: 
'The coastal state exercises over the Continental 
Shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting its natural resources.• 164 
163. U.N. Off.Rec., Supp.No.9 (A/2456), Annex II, p.70. 
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164. 2YBILC, 1956, p.297 'Sovereign rights' was replaced by 
'exclusive rights' in Committee IV, finally, the Plenary 
Session adopted the Commission's terminology of the 1956 
draft. See comments and criticisms on this term in the 
234 and 238 Meetings of the Commission. 
From the Commission's commentary on this draft it is 
understood that the Commission desired to avoid any language 
lending itself to interpretations alien to an object which 
is considered to be of decisive importance, namely, the 
safeguarding of the principle of the full freedom of the 
superjacent sea and the air space above it.165 Hence it was 
unwilling to accept the sovereignty of the Continental Shelf. 
On the other hand the text as now adopted leaves no doubt 
that the rights conferred upon the coastal state cover all 
rights necessary for and connected with the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the Continental 
Shelf. Such rights include jurisdiction in connection with 
the prevention and punishment of violations of the law of 
the Continental Shelf. 
Many observers did not see any difference between 
'jurisdiction and control' in the 1951 draft, and 'sovereign 
rights' in the 1953 and 1956 drafts. Professor Brierly, 
for instance, believes that 'if the littoral state had 
exclusive rights of control and jurisdiction over the 
subsoil, it could be regarded as enjoying sovereignty.• 166 
Sir Cecil Hurst, when dealing with the •rruman Proclamation, 
also states that, 'The distinction between the jurisdiction 
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and the exclusive control which are claimed and sovereignty 
is so small as to be little more than a question of name.• 167 
1.65. Ibid, para .2. 
166. U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/SR.68, p.8. 
167. Grotius Transactions, 1948, 'The Continental Shelf,' p.161. 
He goes even further to say, 'If the rights claimed over 
the Continental Shelf and its resources were called 
sovereignty, they would be no more extensive than what are 
claimed in the Proclarnationo• 168 Finally, the Governments 
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which believed that coastal states should exercise sovereignty 
over the Continental Shelf had argued that control and 
jurisdiction amounted to the same thing, the more so if the 
latter term were reinforced by the qualification 'exclusive'; 
and it was upon this view that Professor Francois had 
suggested the substitution of 'sovereign rights' for 
'jurisdiction and contro1.• 169 
This point, however, is highly controversial. If the 
text of the 1956 draft for Article 2(1) were intended to 
confer on the coastal state jurisdiction and control over 
the Continental Shelf, then the change made in terminology, 
if it was an improvement at all, does not merit the time 
spent on it. ·:If, on the other hand, the text was adopted 
to grant the coastal ~tat~ rights more than those accorded 
to it in the 1951 draft, then it would be detrimental to the 
Commission's prestige to reverse the views which it had 
officially and publicly expressed in the report on its third 
session. In fact, nothing had occurred to justify such a 
change of position. Any Government which, in its comments 
on the 1951 draft, had expressed the view that sovereignty 
168. Ibid, p.162. 
169. Supra, note 160, para.57. 
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ought to be conferred upon the coastal state, had probably 
already expressed that view before, and in more solemn form, 
for example by making a proclamation on the subject. 
Therefore, if the change made had been necessary as a 
result of political pressure, then it would have been more 
appropriate for the Commission to leave this to a political 
body, such as the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
where every coastal state would play its role as a maritime 
power. 
Be that as it may, 'sovereign rights' or 'rights of 
jurisdiction and control,' what actually matters is the 
impact of the rights granted on the status of the superjacent 
waters as high seas. 
(ii) The 'Sovereign Rights' of the Coastal State and the 
Freedom of the High Seas 
In view of the manifold uses of the high seas, the right 
of a coastal state to exploit the natural resources of its 
Continental Shelf adds ~rima facie merely another form of 
user to the list of those already existing. The exclusive-
ness of this right, under Article 2(2) of the Convention, 
does not create any presumption in favour of the coastal 
state to the preju~ice of other forms of uses of the high 
seas. On the contrary, by the terms of Article 3 of the 
Convention, 'The rights of the coastal state over the 
Continental Shelf do not affect the legal status of the 
superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space 
above those waters.' This Article, which is couched in 
categorical terms, is self-explanatory. For the articles 
on the Continental Shelf are intended as laying down the 
regime of the Continental Shelf only as subject to and 
within the orbit of the paramount principle of the freedom 
of the s.eas. 
While Article 3 lays down in general terms the basic 
rule of the unaltered legal status of the superjacent sea 
and the air above it, Articles 4 and 5(1) apply that basic 
rule to the main manifestations of the freedom of the seas, 
namely, the freedom of laying and maintaining submarine 
cables and pipelines on the Continental Shelf and the freedom 
of navigation and fishing in the superjacent waters. Thus 
Article 4 states: 'Subject to its right to take reasonable 
measures for the exploration of the Continental Shelf and 
the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal 
state may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine 
cables or pipelines on the Continental Shlef.' The term 
'reasonable measures' was critized by some lawyers.170 Apart 
from the vagueness of this term, it is not clear which of 
170. Hudson, in 1YBILC, 1951, p.278, para.93, suggested the 
substitution of 'necessary measures' for 1 reasonable 
measures.' He thought that one could prove almost 
anything by reasoning. Professor Schwarzenberger also 
wrote in his International Law, 1957, pp.350-351, 'If 
reasonableness is the test of the compatibility of any 
particular type of user with the freedom of the seas, 
a user cannot be excluded on the grounds of novelty 
and hypothetical impairment of established forms of 
user alone.' 
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the two interests, namely, the exploitation of the natural 
resources and the establishment or maintenance of submarine 
cables and pipelines, would prevail.171 
Article 5(1) lays down that 'the explot¢ation of the 
Continental Shelf ana the exploitation of its natural 
resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference 
with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living 
resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with 
fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research 
carried out with the intention of open publication.' It 
will be noted that what the Article prohibits is not any 
kind of interference, but only unjustifiable interference. 
The manner and the significance of that qualification were 
the subject of prolonged discussion in the Commission.1 72 
The Commission, by formulating the test of unjustifiable 
interference, thought it advisable to eliminate any semblance 
of rigidity in adapting the existing principle of the 
freedom of the sea to what is an essentially novel situation. 
1 27. 
To lay down, therefore, that the exploration and exploitation 
of the Continental Shelf must never result in any interference 
whatsoever with navigation and fishing might result in many 
cases in rendering somewhat nominal both the sovereign rights 
1 71 • 'rhis is so because the Article says, 'subject to its 
right •••••••• the coastal state may not impede ••••••• 
172. See the 201 and 202 meetings, 1UBILC, 1953. 
of exploration and exploitation and the very purpose of 
the articles as adopted. In fact, the progressive develop-
ment of international law, which takes place against the 
background of established rules, must often result in the 
modification of. those rules by reference to new interests or 
needs. The extent of that modification must be determined 
by the relative importance of the needs and interests 
involved. The case is clearly one of the assessment of the 
relative importance of the interests involved. According to 
the Commission, interference, even if substantial, with 
navigation and fishing might, in some cases, be justified; 
on the other hand, interference, even on an insignificant 
scale would be unjustified if unrelated to reasonably 
conceived requirement of exploration and exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf.173 However, unlike article 4, according 
to the imperative manner of this Article, vrhere there is 
unjustifiable interference, the choice, as to which of the 
two interests must prevail, is not with the coastal state. 
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Finally, the Commission thought it desirable to rule 
out expressly any right of interference with navigation in 
certain areas of the sea. These areas are defined in Article 
5(6) of the Convention as 'recognised sea lanes essential to 
international navigation.' The importance of these areas 
173. Ibid, page 215, para.77. 
for the purpose of international navigation is such as to 
preclude the construction therein of installations or the 
maintenance of safety zones even if such installations or 
zones are necessary for the exploration or exploitation 
of the Continental Shelr.1 74 
Summary and Conclusions 
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that this 
radical change in the Commission's attitude towards Article 
2(1) has not been logically justified. In spite of the fact 
that the Commission had in many cases made changes in its 
drafts on the law of the sea, it would seem that, in the 
generality of cases, the Commission made changes to please 
certain governments, rather than because they were any real 
improvement. In fact, the term 'sovereign rights' was 
unnecessary in the present instance of Article 2. It was 
not the practice to speak of sovereigh rights over the high 
seas for the purpose of naval engagement, visit, search 
and capture, or for the purpose of exercising control over 
fishing or suppressing piracy and the slave trade. Nor was 
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it the practice to speak of sovereigh rights over the seabed 
of the high seas for the purpose of maintaining sedentary 
fisheries <Dr cable-laying. Nor was it the practice to speak 
174. According to the Commission, loc.cit., para.80, such 
lanes include straits in the ordinary sense. However, 
the position of straits is uncertain because it was 
deleted from the text of this paragraph at the request 
of El-Khoury, and it seems that those who voted in 
favour of its deletion were divided on the intentions 
of the voting, see 1YBILC, 1953, pp.105-106. 
of sovereign rights over the contiguous zone beyond the 
territorial sea for the purpose of enforcing customs, 
fiscal and immigration regulations. Why then should the 
Commission .. speak of sovereign rights over the Continental 
Shelf for the purpose of exploiting its natural resources? 
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To argue that the use of this term is necessary from 
the point of view of national defence sounds somewhat dated 
in the light of modern weapons of long range rockets where 
the main threat to national security lies in the third 
dimension. Hence the use of the term 'sovereigh rights' 
was not only unnecessary but also unjustifiable for five 
main reasons: 
In the first place, freedom of the high seas could be 
subject to restrictions without changing its character, 
just as could sovereignty over territory in a similar 
situation. If iru1ocent passage through the territorial sea 
did not assimilate the territoria~ sea to the high seas, 
there was no reason why exploitation of natural resources 
should necessitate the assimilation of the Continental Shelf 
to territory. Indeed, the enforcement of customs, fiscal 
and immigration regulations in the contiguous zones had not 
converted those zones into territorial sea. What was needed 
concerning the Continental Shelf was exclusive right of 
exploitation, not sovereignty. 
Secondly, it was not the case that the coastal state's 
rights over the Continental Shelf were an existing rule of 
1 31 • 
law. Claims had been made to exercise certain rights over 
it but that was all. Not enough time had elapsed since those 
claims had been made for it to say that they were generally 
accepted. The point was pertinent, particularly because 
what was affected was collective or community interests, 
not interests of individual states; it usually took more 
time for opposition to encroachments on collective interests 
to become articulate. Therefore, it could not be argu~d that 
a claim which was not immediately contested was accepted. 
Final proof of the absence of any new rule of international 
law on the matter was furnished by the very fact that the 
Commission has been seized of it; if there had been general 
agreement, that would have been unnecessary. It is worth 
bearing in mind, moreover, that when the Commission had, in 
1951, provisionally approved a text which made it clear that 
it did not recognise sovereignty over the Continental Shelf, 
not a single government had protested that it was deprived 
of something which it already possessed; the most that any 
government had been moved to do was to say that, in its view, 
sovereignty over the Continental Shelf should be recognised. 
Thirdly, it was unrealistic to suppose that sovereignty 
over the Continental Shelf could be restricted to the seabed 
and subsoil, or merely to the natural resources of such areas. 
In practice, the coastal state cannot enforce compliance with 
its interest in the shelf without being prepared to take 
preventive or repressive action against others who may also 
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desire to exercise their rights in such area. Action of this 
kind can be taken only. on the surface of the high seas. This, 
prima facie, constitutes a challenge to one of the basic rules 
underlying the principle of the freedom of the seas. Therefore, 
those states which, in claiming sovereignty over the Continental 
Shelf, had claimed sovereignty over the superjacent waters as 
well, had been perfectly logical. 
Fourthly, acceptance by the Commission of the principle of 
limited sovereignty over the Continental Shelf had only 
encouraged a mischievous trend which had begun with the Latin-
American claims. It is not to be doubted that the Commission, 
in adopting the concept of sovereign rights had sanctioned 
those sweeping claims which had been made in the past. 
Fifthly, the Commission should have realised that, although 
states were at liberty to parcel out the high seas among 
themselves, the initiative in acts of that kind should be left 
to political bodies such as the General Assembly, or any other 
body set up by it. The Commission, as a legal body, should 
have resisted attempts to encroach upon established principles 
of international law, particularly those favouring the develop-
ment of the community idea, such as the freedom of the high 
seas. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to conclude by referring to 
the five rules governing the high seas, as defined by 
Professor Schwarzenberger •175 Those relating t·o the a ubject 
175. Schwarzenberger, loc. cit., p.338, 349. 
of the Continental Shelf were formulated as follows: 
Rule 4: Under international customary ~aw, the right of 
(reasonable?) user of the high seas, the air space 
above them and the bed of the sea may be exercised for 
any purposes not expressly prohibited by international 
law. 
Rule 5: The assumption of exclusive jurisdiction over any 
portion of the high seas is prohibited. 
2. The Meaning of the Term 'Natural Resources.' 
(A) From the ILC to the Plenary Meeting 
The scope of the rules of international law concerning 
the Continental Shelf depends on the definition given to the 
term 'natural resources.' As the sovereign rights of the 
coastal state may be exercised only for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting these resources, the objects with 
respect to which this 'functional sovereignty' may be 
exercised must be clearly defined. Therefore, Article 2(4) 
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of the Convention setting forth the definition of the 'natural 
resources,' provided the occasion for considerable discussion. 
The study of this definition started with a general commentary 
from the Commission. Then it turned into a hot debate in the 
fourth Committee which reproduced the definition in the text 
of the Convention. Finally, the definition was subjected to 
certain modifications in the 8th Session of the Conference, 
before it became paragraph 4 of Article 2.1 76 
The question of adequately defining the term 'natural 
resources' has caused the Commission some difficulty. At 
its Third Session, in 1951, the Commission had only dealt 
with 'mineral resources,' and some members proposed adhering 
to that course.177 Those members pointed out that the 
Truman Proclamation had referred to nat ural resources, but 
that the preamble referred only to 'mineral resources.' 
Hence, they suggested, the exploitation of natural resources 
might perhaps be restricted to mineral resources. The 
Commission, finally, decided to postpone consideration of 
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the question whether the word 'mineral' should be substituted 
for 'natural' in Article 2. 1 78 
At its Fifth Session, in 1953, the Commission decided 
I 
after long discussion to retain the term 'natural resources,' 
as distinct from the more limited term 'mineral resources.' 179 
176. Article 2(4) lays down: 
'The natural resources referred to in these articles 
consist of' the mineral and other non-living resources of 
the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move 
except in constantPhysical contact with the seabed or 
the subsoil.' 
177. See Sandstrom and Francois in 1YBILC, 1951, pp.276, 277, 
paras.46 and 53 respectively. 
178._Ibid, p.276. 
179. 2YBILC, 1953, p.214, para.70 (Rep. to the General 
Assembly). 
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The Commission, however, came to the conclusion that the 
products of sedentary fisheries, in particular, to the 
extent that they were natural resources permanently attached 
to the bed of the sea, should not be outside the scope of 
the regime adopted and that this aim could be achieved by 
using the term 'natural resources.' 180 It is clearly 
understood, however, that the rights in question do not 
cover so-called bottom-fish and other fish which, although 
living in the sea, occasionally have their habitat at the 
bottom of the sea or are bred there.181 
At the Eighth Session, in 1956, it was proposed that the 
condition of permanent attachment to the seabed should be 
mentioned in the Article itself (Article 68). At the same 
time the opinion was expressed that the condition should be 
made less strict; it would be sufficient that the marine 
faWla and flora in question should live in constant physical 
and biological relationship with the seabed and the Continental 
Shelf; examination of the scientific aspects of that question 
should be left to experts. The Commission, however, decided 
to leave the text of the article and of the commentary as it 
stood. 1 82 
When the text of the 1956 draft of the ILC was brought 
before the Fourth Committee, a joint proposal was introduced 
by several delegations with the view to finding a compromise 
180. Ibid, mentioned in the Report. 
181. Ibid. 
182. Report to the General Assembly, 2YBILC, 1956, pp.297-298. 
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formula with regard to the meaning attributed to the expression 
'natural resources.' This was the one that eventually became 
the definition contained in paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the 
Convention.183 That text as adopted in the Fourth Committee 
contained the additional phrase, '; but crustacea and 
swimming species are not included in this definition.' 184 A 
Mexican oral proposal to delete the words 'crustacea and,' 
only, failed by a vote of 27.27.13.185 
At the 8th Plenary Session of the Conference, the final 
phrase, '; but crustacea and swimming species are not included 
in this definition' was rejected with the approval of 
Australia.186 Australia had, meanwhile, come to regard the 
phrase as superfluous. The phrase had been voted upon in 
two parts: the words 'cr.ustacea and' were rejected on roll-
call by a vote of 22 in favour, 42 against and 6 abstensions.187 
The voting was confused, for the reason that it apparently 
was not clear whether an affirmative vote was a vote in 
favour of retention or in favour of deletion of these words. 
The remaining words ' ; but swimming species are not included 
in this definition' were rejected by 11+ in favom• (of 
retention), 43 against and 9 abstensions.188 
183. This proposal was submitted by Australia, Ceylon, Federa-
tion of Malaya, India, Norway and the U.K., A/CO~W.13/C.4/ 
L.36. 
184. A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.24, p.7. 
185. Ibid. 
186. A/CONF .13/SR. 8, pp.11, 1 2. 
187. Ibid. 
188. Ibid. 
(B) The Construction of Article 2(4) in the Light of the 
various Views 
Treaty stipulations are often regarded as mirroring the 
common practice of states, but state practice regarding 
rights over the Continental Shelf is frequently vague and 
subject to disputes. The Geneva drafters were hampered by 
137. 
a lack of detailed and practical principles, particularly in 
regard to the Continental Shelf, from which they could draw. 
Therefore, the interpretation of Article 2(4), like most 
other provisions of the Convention, has given rise to 
controversies in recent state practice.189 
The resources covered by the definition are 'mineral 
and other non-living resources,' and also 'living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species' i.e. organisms which, at 
the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical 
contact with the seabed or the subsoil. Accordingly, the 
natural resources may be divided categorically into:-
(A) i - mineral resources, and 
ii - other non-living resources, together with 
(B) i immobile living organisms 
ii - living organisms which move only few feet 
or less, and 
iii - living organisms which move considerable distance. 
189. See the dispute between France and Brazil over lobster 
fishing in the Atlantic, the so-called 'Lobster War,' 
by Issam Azzam,. ICLQ, 1964, p.1453-1459. 
Apparently, Article 2(4) includes only the first four 
items. Item (B)(iii) is clearly not covered by the Article. 
As to (A)(i), it has never .been disputed that the definition 
of natural resources should at any rate include the mineral 
resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular oil 
deposits. State practice is uniform in accepting this 
minimum. The controversial issue was whether, and if so 
to what extent, it would be reasonable to go beyond that 
minimwn. With regard to (A)(ii), it has been suggested that 
although most of the non-living resources of the seabed.and 
the subsoil were, of course, mineral resources, the words 
'and other non-living resources' had been added ex 
abundanti cantila to ensure that the Article would definitely 
apply to resources such as the shells of dead organisms.19° 
However, it must be noted that 'non-living resources' 
do not include abandoned property lying on the seabed or 
covered by sand. This was made clear in the Commission's 
commentary where it was stated: ' •••••••• nor do these 
rights cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes 
(including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the 
sand of the subsoil.' 191 In the case Gasparroni ed altri, 
decided in 1952 by the Tribunal of Trani, Italy, defendants, 
accused of theft, had dragged certain munitions of war 
190. See Professor Bailey's comments in the Fourth Committee; 
A/CO~W.13/C.4/SR.21, pp.7-8. 
191. 2YBILC, 1956, p.298, para.5, (Rep. to the General 
Assembly). 
abandoned by the Allies from the bottom of the sea at a 
place 22 miles off the Italian coast. The Tribunal held 
that neither by international law nor by Italian law was 
the Italian State entitled to this property or authorised 
to grant an alleged exclusive concession for its recovery 
from the high seas. Rather, the only way to acquire title 
to the property, the Tribunal. ruled, was through occupation, 
i.e. the taking of possession of the munitions coupled with 
animus occupandi.192 
It is only in respect of Group B that controversies 
arise. In fact item (B)(i) is unlikely to raise any problem 
even with those states which preferred adherence to 'mineral 
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resources' in the strict sense. Indeed, it would be unreason-
able to give coastal states exclusive rights over mineral 
resom1 ces such as the sands of the seabed but not over the 
coral, sponges and other immobile living organisms. The 
major point of dispute between states relate to the 
inseparable relation between categories (B)(ii) and (B)(iii). 
It is hard to tell where the line should be drawn between 
these tv1o categories. 
As we have seen earlier, the Plenary Session of the 
Conference rejected the additional proviso, '; but crustacea 
and swimming species are not included in this definition,' 
and marine crustacea v.rere thus left in an uncertain position.193 
192. Case of Gasparroni ed altri, XXXVIII Rivista Di Diritto 
Internazionale, 1955, 90-94. 
193. Supra, note 186. 
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This uncertainty resulted from the fact that the words 
'crustacea and,' as distinct from the other part of the phrase, 
were voted on separately. First, the Mexican proposal to 
delete the words 'crustacea and' failed on the basis of 
27.27.13; had it been approved it would have meant that 
crustacea, unlike swimming fish, is included in the definition. 
Secondly, when the whole phrase was voted out, the words 
'crustacea and' were, again, voted on separately.1 94 But, 
as mentioned earlier, it was not clear whether an affirmative 
vote was a vote in favour of retention ~r in favour of 
deletion of these words. It was this special treatment of 
the subject of crustacea which created the unhappy situation 
with regard to its status, being left hovering at the border 
line between categories (B)(ii) and (B)(iii). 
What are crustacea? 
In his article on the Franco-Brazilian dispute over 
lobster, hlr. Azzam wrote: 
'Crustacea, ranging in size from the most minute of 
creatures to the great Japanese crab of the Western 
Pacific with legs of sixteen feet, owe their name to 
the carapace or crusted external skeleton which 
protects their soft bodies. U II The term lobster has been 
loosely applied to a large number of crustacea. The 
commercial lobster, however, is of three varieties: 
the Homarida·e, Palinuridae and Norweigian - all 
194. The first vote on these words was tal~en in the Fourth 
Committee. 
characterised by numerous limbs used for specialised 
functions of feeling, fighting, sYlimming and walking. 
The Palinuridae (Spiny or Rock lobster which also is 
knovm as 'African lobster,' 'Crawfish' or 'Langouste') 
are distinguished from the Homaridae in that their 
first two legs do not terminate in chelae (pincers). 
'l'heir usual habitat are tropical, subtropical and 
some temperate waters. The problem of culturists in 
recent years has been the prevention of their steady 
depletion, for lobster fishing is an interesting and 
important industry both in Europe and the U.S. We 
know very little of the variation, inter-relation 
and locomotion of spiny lobsters. Averaging in 
length from approximately eighteen inches to several 
feet, they are stalk-eyed with five pairs of legs. 
'rheir jerlcy swimming is achieved by hooking their 
body backward with the curved tail in retrograde 
notion. After hatching, the larvae spend from three 
to five weeks irresponsibly floating around near the 
surface, "somevvhat laclcing in the powers of' co-
ordination and orientation." At the fourth or fifth 
stage, they leave the surface to dwell among coral 
reefs from which they do not leave of their own accord. 
Tagging experiments have cast doubt on their migratory 
propensity on the ocean floor, which has led some to 
say that "lobsters biologically are closer relatives 
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to spiders rather than to fish. 1111 95 
This explains why lobsters, in their habitat, must be 
dissociated from fish. Similarly, the same should apply to 
other kinds of crustacea such as shrimp and crab.196 
In spite of these scientific findings about the biology 
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of crustacea, lawyers seem to have adopted a different theory. 1 97 
Thus Dr. Amador considered curstacea, unquestionably, excluded 
from the regime of the shelf.198 Professor Bailey of 
Australia, an original sponsor of the six-power compromise 
proviso, suggested that 'no crustacea or swimming species 
should be covered by the definition.• 199 Miss Gutteridge 
is also of the opinion that 'the definition entirely excludes 
all swimming fish; it also excludes all swimming crustacea.• 200 
Dean, the Chairman of the u.s. Delegation to the Conference, 
summed up the situation not very plai~ly: 'The Convention 
now explicitly excludes from the domain of the coastal state 
organisms which are able to move other than in constant 
195. Supra, note 189, pp.1457-8. 
196. But see the U.S. policy, below note 197. 
197. The U.S. Government also treated lobsters and shrimps as 
not included in the natural resources of the shelf 
(letter, Oct.11, 1963, MS. Dep. of State, file pol.33-L~, 
UK-US); on the other hand, it considered king crab as 
part of the natural resources (Dept. of State press 
release, Nov.14, 1964, u.s. TIAS5688). 
198. Amador, 'The Exploitation and Conservation of the 
Resources of the Sea,' 1959, p.128. 
199. Supra, note 186. 
200. Gutteridge, 'The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf,' 35 BYIL, 1959, pp.117-119. 
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physical contact with the seabed or the subsoi1.• 201 Earlier, 
in 1954, the !LA made a similar vague statement: 'The 
natural resources of the Continental Shelf include marine 
resources permanently adhered to the seabed sedentary 
fis:heries but not any other fisheries.' 202 
On the other hand, the Inter-American Council of Jurists, 
at its third meeting in Mexico, 1956, adopted a broad inter-
pretation to the meaning of natural resources. Article XII 
of Resolution XIII, which was passed by the Council at that 
meeting, states: 
'The right of the coastal state With respect to the 
seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf extends to 
the natural resources found there, such as, petroleum, 
hydrocarbons, mineral substances, and all marine, 
animal, and vegetable species that live in a constant 
physical and biological relationship with the shelf, 
not excluding the benthonic species .••....... coastal 
states have, in addition, the right of exclusive 
1 1 t t h t ,203 exploitation of species close y rea ed o t e coas ••.• 
Apparently, the resolution claims for the coastal states all 
the living species which are normally associated with the 
bottom of the waters, including benthonic species. Such a 
201. Dean, A. 'The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,' 
1958, 52 AJIL, p.621. 
202. ILA, 46th Conference, Report (7) - (2) - (a), p.viii, 
1954. 
203. Pan American Union, Dep. of State Bulletin, 34 (1956), 
p.298. 
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wide interpretation of natural resources would have brought 
within the definition n~t only crustacea, but any other 
swimming species which, according to their habitat, are 
normally associated with the sea floor. 
However, at the Inter-American Specialised Conference 
in Ciudad Trujillo in 1956, efforts for a similar broad 
interpretation of the coastal state's rights were not success-
ful. The Conference refused to act on resolution XIII of the 
Inter-American Council of Jurists, and adopted a much more 
moderate position. Th~ Conference stated that 'Agreement 
does not exist among the states here represented with respect 
to the juridical regime of the waters which cover the said 
submarine areas nor with respect to the problem of whether 
certain living resources belong to the seabed or to the 
superjacent waters. 1204 
All in all, it is a matter of adjustment between the 
interests of the coastal state and the international 
community at large. After all, most of the rules underlying 
the new doctrine are novel. Therefore, it would not be 
incompatible with the general interest to consider crustacea 
as part of the natural resources of the Continental Shelf. 
This trend of thought may be justified by the social needs 
of the coastal state, the welfare of whose population depends 
204. Final Act, Conferences and Organisations Series, Vol.50, 
Pan American Union, 1956. 
largely on the resources of the sea. 205 In the Franco-
Brazilian dispute, Brazil had relied on this principle. 
In spite of the fact that neither of the two countries was 
a party to the convention at the time of the dispute, both 
had relied on its provisions to support their claims. 206 
France maintains that the Conference's rejection of the 
proviso, 'but crustacea and swimming species are not 
included in this definition,' supports its position of a 
self-evident principle which requires no further clarifica-
tion.207 On the other hand, Brazil contends that inclusion 
of crustacea within the Continental Shelf is self-evident 
and requires no mention, a position which is concurred in 
145~ 
by other Latin-American countries desiring to curtail 
foreign development of their fisheries, and who have adopted 
broad interpretations of their rights over the Continental 
Shelf. 208 
Finally, the meaning of 'harvestable stage' has a direct 
bearing on the whole question of which living organisms are 
included in the definition. Does 'harvestable stage' mean 
the stage of life during which the resources are harvestable 
205. This was expressly referred to in Article XII of 
resolution XIII, supra note 203. 
206. France acceded to the Convention in 1965, while Brazil 
has not accepted it yet. 
207. M. Trirncaud, 'La Convention de Geneva at le plateau 
continental,' Le Monde, Feb.27, 1963. 
208. Lissitzyn, o. J., 'International Law in a Divided 
World,' International Conciliation, March, 1963. 
or the particular moment at which they are captured? 
According to Professor Bailey the intended meaning of 
'harves table stage' was 'that s.tage of life during which 
the resources are harvestable. 1209 
Swnmari{ 
The Commission's Report of 1951 limited state rights 
over the Continental Shelf only to mineral resources. Two 
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years later the Commission extended state rights to sedentary 
fisheries also. This position was maintained in its final 
comprehensive draft articles which were the basis of dis-
cussion at the Geneva Conference. When the matter was 
discussed by the Conference's Fourth Committee, the inter-
pretation of the phrase 'natural resources' led to the 
submission of numerous proposals and amendments. The various 
views of the participating countries may be summed up as 
follows:-
1. Those tending toward strict and limited interpretation 
of the term 'natural resources' maintained that it 
included only mineral (non-living) resources, a view 
which the Fourth Committee rejected. 
2. Those which held that the regime of the Continental Shelf 
incorporated all resources ( li viP..g and otherwise). This 
position was unacceptable to the majority. 
209. Cited by Whiteman, M. 'Confepence on the Law of the Sea: 
Convention on the Continental Shelf,' 52AJIL, 1958, 
PP. 636-640. 
3. Finally, six states submitted a compromise proposal in 
which mineral resources and sedentary fisheries were 
included, with an additional proviso stating: ';but 
crustacea and swimming species are not included in 
this definition.' The 8th Plenary Session did not 
adopt the additional proviso, and marine crustacea 
were thus left in an uncertain position; while the 
debate continues as to their position. 
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Section III - Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between 
Opposite or Adjacent States 
1. The Problem of the Delimitation of Sea Boundaries in 
International Law 
One of the most unsatisfactory portions of the Geneva 
Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and 
the Continental Shelf is that concerned with the specific 
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limits of seaward areas under national jurisdiction. Problems 
relating to the limits of the shelf fall within two categories: 
(a) Lack of a precise outer limit of the Continental Shelf 
off the coasts of states bordering the vast seas where 
the nearest opposite state may be many hundreds or 
thousands of miles away. This is the problem associated 
with Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 210 
(b) Lack of well developed acceptable techniques and 
principles for the delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between opposite or adjacent states. This is 
the problem which may depend on an authoritative 
interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention. 
210. This problem is discussed in Part Three in connection 
with the regime of the deep sea floor. 
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Relatively little has been written on the techniques and 
principles applicable to the delimitation of boundaries of 
seaward areas under national jurisdiction, Vlhether such areas 
belong to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, or the 
Continental Shelf. 211 It is with this side of the problem, 
and only in c~nnection with the Continental Shelf, that the 
present section is concerned. 
2. Delimitation Principles and Techniques Under Article 6 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention 
Article 6 lays down the provisions relating to the 
delimitation of the Continental Shelf between two opposite 
or adjacent states as follows: 212 
1 • Where the same Continental Shelf is adjacent to the terri-
tories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite 
each other, the boundary of the Continental Shelf appertain-
ing to such States shall be determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is the median line, every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is 
measured. 
211. According to Boggs, s. w., International Boundaries, 1940, 
p.32, authors who have written on water boundaries include 
Fauchille, de Lapradelle, and Gidel. 
212. As to the delimitation of the territorial and contiguous 
zone between opposite or adjacent states see Articles 
12(1) and 24(3) of that Convention. 
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2. Where the same Continental Shelf is adjacent to the 
territories of two adjac.ent states, the boundary of the 
Continental Shelf shall be determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
the boundary shall be determined by application of the 
principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
of each state is measured. 21 3 
In the absence of agreement between the parties, the 
principles and techniques provided for in this article will 
be considered in the following order: 
A. "Special circumstances" lines 
B. Baselines for delimiting the territorial sea, and 
C. Equidistance lines which m?Y be divided into: 
(i) Median lines between opposite states, and 
(ii) Lateral lines between adjacent states, 
from land to the high seas. 
A. "Special Circumstances" 1 ines 
The term 'special circumstances,' Which justifies 
departures from the equidistance principle, has not been 
213. The Commission, when adopting this Article, stated that 
it was in the position to derive some guidance from the 
proposals made by the Committee of Experts on the delimi-
tation of territorial sea and contiguous zone, see 
A/CN .L~/61, Add .1 • It should be noted that 'special 
circumstances' are mentioned in relation to the delimi-
tation of the territorial sea and the Continental Shelf, 
but not in relation to the contiguous zone. 
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defined by .a text of positive law. Such circumstances, 
however, ca1mot be listed exhaustively, in view of the 
extreme variety of legal and material factors which may be 
of account. 
In short, a special circumstance affecting the equi-
distance method may be the effect of a particular legal 
situation: historic waters. 21 4 It may also be the consequence 
of geographical considerations, such as those mentioned by 
the Commission. 21 5 Other explanations to what may constitute 
a special circumstance under Article 6 was given by various 
governments when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the 
Convention. 
In acceding to the Convention, the French Government 
declared that there are special circumstances within the 
meaning of Article 6 in the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of 
Granville, and the sea areas of the Straits of Dover and of 
216 the North Sea o:fl!' the French coast. In signing the 
Convention, the Republic of Venezuela also declared that there 
are special circumstances to be taken into consideration in 
214. Article 12 on the territorial sea mentions 'historical 
title' as a special circumstance. 
215. In its Report to the General Assembly, the Commission 
states, 'special circumstances would include exceptional 
configuration of the coast as well as the presence of 
islands or of navigable channels:' 2YBILC, 1953, p.216, 
and 2YBILC, 1956, p.300. 
216. Instrument of accession deposited in June 14, 1965. 'rhe 
Governments of the U.K., the u.s. and of Yugoslavia 
refused to accept the reservations made by the French 
Government to Article 6. 
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the following areas: the Gulf of Paria, in so far as the 
boundary is not determined by existing agreements, and in 
zones adjacent thereto; the area between the coast of 
Venezuela and the island of Aruba; and the Gulf of 
Venezllela. 217 F" 11 th I . G t d 1 d 1na y, e ran1an overnmen ec are , 
on signing the Convention, its acceptance to Article 6 on 
the understanding that one method of determining the boundary 
line in special circumstances would be that of measurement 
from the high water mark. 218 
These various reservations in connection with 'special 
circumstances' show that this clause was understood not as 
much as a limited exception to a generally applicable rule, 
but more in the sense of an alternative of equal rank to 
the equidistance method. This view is supported by the fact 
that in the contentions submitted on behalf of all the 
parties to the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, special 
circumstances v1as treated as an alternative to the equi-
d . t . . . 1 219 1s ance pr1nc1p e. Unfortunately, the I.C.J., when 
dealing with these cases, refused to explore the meaning of 
'special circumstance' on the grounds that this matter was 
217. Signed and ratified on 30 October, 1958, and 15 August, 
1961 respectively. The Government of the Netherlands, 
when ratifying the Convention in Feb. 18, 1966, reserved 
all rights regarding the reservations in Article 6 made 
by Venezuela. 
218. Signed 28th May, 1958. 
219. Infra, note 257. 
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irrelevant to the point of dispute, as it will be explained 
220 later. 
B. Baselines for Delimiting the ~erritorial Sea 
Baseline problems are chiefly of three types: 
(i) the shore line; also called the low-tide line, 
or the low-water mark. 
(ii) the line between inland waters and the territorial 
sea - in bays, gulfs, river mouth, and estuaries, 
where it serves as an artificial coastline in 
delimiting the territorial sea, and 
(iii) the definition of 'island' to determine which 
islands are to be used and which are to be 
ignored9 in delimiting the territorial seao 
The three types are here considered: 
(i) The Shoreline Baseline 
The generally accepted rule is that the baseline from 
which the territorial sea is measured is always the line of 
low-water mark followin~ the sinuousi ties of the coast and 
not a straight 1 ine, or lines, drawn from point to point. 221 
The problems, however, becomes more difficult when the shore 
is surrounded or fringed by islands, shoals or rocks 0 
Reference has already been made to the Anna case where Lord 
Stowell described the alluvion islands off the mouth of the 
220. According to the method suggested by Judge Ammoun, infra, 
note 293, special circumstances was considered merely as 
a modification to the equidistance principle. 
221 o This last method is also referred to as the trace parallele 
as opposed to the first one, courbe tangante or 'envelopes 
(contd.) 
Mississippi as forming 'a kind of portico to the mainland,' 
and, consequently, the baseline of the territorial sea was 
drawn along such islands. 222 
The question was further considered by the I.C.J. in 
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the Anglo-Norvvegian Fisheries Case. 223 The Court was asked 
by the two Governments to decide whether the "method employed 
for the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone by the 
Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12, 1935, and the baselines 
fixed by the said Decree in application of that method was 
contrary or not to interna ti anal law. 1122LJ. In its judgment, 
the Court held that 'it had no difficulty in finding that 
for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial 
of arcs of circles' following the line of the coast: 
see Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 6th ed., 
1 967' p .11 3. 
222. The Anna, supra note 71a. 
223. I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p.116. 
224. The Decree defined the limits of Norwegian territorial 
waters by reference to straight baselines drawn between 
48 fixed points some of which were over ten miles apart, 
the longest being 44 miles. The outer limit of 
Norwegian territorial sea was drawn four miles from 
these baselines by parallel lines. It should be 
observed that the U.K. Government did not contend in 
the right of Norway to have four miles territorial 
sea. It also abandoned its protest against the trace 
parallel method; see British reply at p.129 of the 
Judgment. 
sea, it is the low-water mark, as opposed to the high-water 
mark, or the mean between the two tides, which has generally 
been adopted in the practice of states.• 225 The Court, 
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however, found itself obliged to decide whether the relevant 
low-water mark was that of the mainland or of the 'Sl{jaergaard~~E 
It was decided that the Skjaergaard constituted a whole with 
the mainland. Accordingly, it was the outer line of the 
Skjaegaard which should be taken into account in delimiting 
the belt of Norwegian territorial sea. This solution was 
decided, in the Court's opinion, by 'geographic realities' 
and was also influenced by 'economic interests peculiar to 
a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly 
evidenced by long usage.• 22 7 The Court thus arrived at the 
conclusion, by ten votes to two, 'that the method employed 
for the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Decree of 
July 12, 1935, was not contrary to international law,' and 
by eight votes to four, 'that the baselines fixed by the said 
Decree in application of this method was not contrary to 
international law.' 
It is suggested, however, that no exaggerated importance 
should be given to the Court's findings: It cannot be held 
that it created a precedent since it dealt with a unique 
geographical configuration of a coast which - as the Court 
repeatedly said -was 'exceptional.' Nor must the Court's 
225. At p.128 of the Judgment. 
226. A Norwegian term meaning literally rock rampart and 
embracing the various islands, islets, rocks and reefs. 
227. At p.133 of the Judgment. 
judgment be construed as having brought a change in the 
general principles governing the delimitation of the terri-
torial sea. 228 In fact, the Court itself laid stress on the 
proposition that 'the delimitation of sea areas has always 
an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon 
I 
the will of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal 
law. Its validity with regard to other states depends upon 
international law.' 229 
156. 
Finally, in accordance with the Court's decision, the 
Geneva Convention on the 'Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone' 
allows a state to deviate from the general principle provided 
for in Article 3 of that Convention, and claim in certain 
circumstances, the right to delimit its territorial sea 
according to the straight baseline rule. 23° 
(ii) Artificial Coastlines 
Another exception to the shoreline baseline is the use 
of artificial baseline for bays. It is suggested that, 
except where such arbitrary straight lines are regarded as 
having been established by prescription, they be understood 
to be effective only when interested states, or the inter-
national community, specifically accepts the claims of the 
coastal state. 231 
There is no doubt that bays not exceeding six miles 
228. Colombos, supra, p.117. 
229. At p.132 of the judgment. 
230. See Article 4 of that Convention. 
231. Boggs, 'Delimitation of seaward boundaries,' AJIL, 
1 951 , p .253. 
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across at the entrance are internal waters when both sides 
belong to the same state. By custom, however, and by treaty 
and in special conventions, the six mile rule has frequently 
been extended to more than six miles. 
A ten-mile rule was adopted in the Anglo-French Conven-
tion of August 2nd, 1839. 232 The same limit was also 
adopted by the North Sea Fisheries Convention of May 6th, 
1882. 233 However, in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, 
the I.C.J. deemed it necessary to point out that 'although 
the ten-mile rule had been adopted by certain states both 
in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, 
and although certain arbitral decisions had applied it as 
between these states, other states had adopted a different 
limit.' Consequently, the ten-mile rule 'had not yet 
acquired the authority of a general rule of international 
law.'234 
12-mile rule for bays was favoured by the Institute of 
International Law in 1894, unless a continuous usage of a long 
standing has sanctioned a greater width. 235 At its Vienna 
Conference, in 1926, the ILA accepted the principle that in 
232. Herstlet, Treaties, vol.5, p.89. 
233. Both the 1839 and the 1882 Conventions were denounced 
by the parties concerned by the adoption of the 
European Fisheries Convention of 1964. 
234. At pp.116 and 131 of the judgment. 
235. Annuaire, vol.13, p.329. 
th~ case of bays 'territorial waters shall follow the 
sinuosities of the coast unless an occupation or established 
usage generally recognised by nations has sanctioned a 
greater limit.• 236 
Finally, this question has been slightly obscured in 
158. 
the Commission's debate concerning an arbitrary length of 
this line between lov1 water marks: 10, 25, 15 or 24 miles. 237 
At the 1958 Geneva Conference a 24-mile rule was adopted 
for bays. 238 
(iii) The Definition of Islands 
Islands constitute, in relation to baseline problems, 
a third exception to the normal rule of shoreline baseline. 
An island has been defined as 'a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide. r 239 
All ordinary islands, as defined here, have the normal belt 
236. Article 7 of the Draft Convention on the 'Law of Maritime 
Jurisdiction in time of peac,' 34th Rep., p.102. 
237. U.N. Doc • .A/C.6/1. 378. 
238. The definition of a bay is contained in Article 7 of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 
It is not the purpose of this section to comment upon 
the process through which this definition was formulated 
OI' to express any views on the several methods which 
might be used to determine whether a given body of a 
water is a bay within the meaning of the Article. For 
a good study on bays, see Commend M. P. Strohls's 
International Law of Bays, the Hague, 1963; especially 
Chapter Two, where he deals with Article 7. 
239. Article 10(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and <.Jontiguous z:one. 
1§9. 
240 
of territorial sea. If an island is situated within six 
miles from the coast then the whole extent of waters would 
be territorial. In all other cases, an island is to be 
treated as possessing its own belt of territorial waters in 
accordance with the principles already outlined. 
It is also agreed that a low-lying island, or a low-tide 
elevation, which is covered at high tide and dries only at 
low tj_de, has no territorial sea of its own, if wholly 
situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial 
sea from the mainland or island. 241 
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates how the baseline, from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is 
drawn in all the foregoing caseso 
Co The Eguidistance Line 
As already mentioned, the equidistance line, whether 
medium or lateral, is defined as the line every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines 
from wl1ich the breadth of the territorial sea of each state, 
. d 242 lS measure • Normally, the equidistance line constitutes 
a series of straight lines, since it is unreasonable to 
240. Ibid, Article 10(2). 
241. Ibid, Article 11(2). According to paragraph 1 of thb 
Article, "Where a low-tide elevation is situated 
wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the 
breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an 
island, the low-water line on that elevation. may be used 
as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the 
territorial sea." Compare this part of Article 11 with 
Article 4(3) of the same Convention. 
242. Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention. 
THE BASELinE 
FROm WHICH THE TERRITORIAL SEA IS mEASURED 
HIGH SEAS 
( Aho Continenlal shell) 
-I 
•.:'· l j 
.LAND; 
Ba,y OD illand c:out 
,,,;.' 
I 
I 
'· I 
I 
I 
'<':ron1 "':be- TT or; o ')r;~t. o nf' <:;t:--_·::p ~ 11 '~OVr>!'~i. r.-,.,t,r 
n+' t,l,p ')':!"' 11 /1PO"'o "':lpl 1 o '·10 0 .>:~ '·-~·lY'i ]_ 9 1 o,r;--;~ 1:'1,h 0 
nno?Q 1l-8 o 
160. 
expect the line to be so accurately drawn to make every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on 
the opposite or adjacent baselines. 
When a median line passes very near islands in the middle 
of a gulf or sea, if any island be found to be on the wro1~ 
side, i.e. if an island belonging to state A is situated 
closer to state B, it is not clear whether the median line 
should be shifted to accommodate the island in question on 
the grounds that the baseline taken into consideration is 
that of the island rather than the mainland. This is apparent 
from the fact that Article 6 speaks only of baselines, not 
'mainland' or 'island' baselines. The case becomes more 
complicated when the island in question belongs to a third 
par~y, which might turn out to be a land-locked state. In 
spite of the fact Articles 2 to 7, inclusive, refer only to 
the coastal state as having the rights conferred by the 
Convention over the Continental Shelf, Articles 9, 10 and 11, 
refer only to States which, according to Article 8, are 
members of the U.N. or of any of the specialised agencies. 243 
Moreover, Article 1 defines the Continental Shelf as the 
seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coast, which may be the 
coast of a mainland or an island; and there is nothing in the 
Convention to suggest that the islands referred to in Article 
1(b) are those of established sovereignty. Accordingly, and 
243. Articles 9, 10 and 11 deal with ratification of and acce-
ssion to the Convention. The same applies to Articles 12 
and 13, concerning reservations to and revision of the 
Convention, where states as such are mentioned. 
as explained later, 244 if such tiny islands, as those in the 
Pacific and in the Atlantic, are given full rights under 
the Convention, the results would be very harmful to the 
interests of many coastal states which might consider such 
interpretation to the terms of the Convention as contrary 
to the principles of equity. 
With regard to the drawing of a lateral boundary line 
from land to the outer·limi t of the Continental Shelf, it is 
necessary, as a first stage, to determine the segmentaf this 
line which relates to the boundary of the territorial sea. 
If the coast line is not irregular, the most reasonable 
boundary is a single straight line from the baseline of the 
land boundary terminus to the point of intersection of the 
envelopes of T. mile arcs drawn from the nearest points of 
the baselines of the two countries. 245 Such line will 
161'. 
usually be perpendicular to the shoreline. If the coast line 
is exceptionally irregular, so that the two adjacent states 
are, in fact, opposite to each other, the most reasonable 
boundary is a line beginning at the land terminus, and 
continued by median line techniques between the lands of the 
244. Infra, Alternative Regimes for Deep-Sea Floor - see the 
first alternative. 
245. T =Width of the territorial sea (3 nautical miles, 4, 
6, 9, 12 etc.). For the delimitation of the seaward 
limit of the territorial sea by the 'envelopes of arcs 
of circles' method, s.ee Boggs, supra No.231, p.253. 
162. 
t t . 246 wo coun rJ.es. 
Article 6(2) of the Continental Shelf Convention applies 
to the boundary line beyond this first segment. It is, now, 
worth discussing the judicial interpretation of this article, 
which the ICJ has given in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
disputes. 
3. Article 6(2) and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
A. The Application of the Continental Shelf Convention to the 
North Sea 
The waters of the North Sea are shallow, and the whole 
seabed consists of Continental Shelf at a depth of less than 
200 metres, except for the formation known as the Norwegian 
trough, a belt of water 200-650 metres deep fringing the 
southern and south-western coasts of Norway to a width 
averaging about 80-1 00 kms. 
The North Sea has seven coastal states: the U.K., France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Denmark, and Norway. All of them, except for Norway, Germany 
and Belgium, have ratified or acceded to the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. 247 
246. Such is the case in the boundary between Denmark and Norway 
in their North Sea Continental Shelf. Denmark and the 
Netherlands tried to apply the same technique as between 
themselves, but the boundary drawn by them, as explained 
later, was regarded by the ICJ, in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, as incompatible with the 
provisions of Article 6(2). 
247. It is the official view that Norway should not accede to 
the Convention because of the feat that accession might 
prejudice her claim to what she considers now to be the 
effective median line. It has also been suggested that 
the German ratification of the Convention has been delayed 
{Contd.) 
Much of the greater part of the Continental Shelf has 
already been the subject of delimitation by a series of 
agreements: the U.K., which lies along the whole western 
side of it, concluded agreements with some of the eastern 
248 side countries, namely Norway, Denmarlc, and the Netherlands. 
These three delimitations were carried out by the drawing of 
median lines which divided the intervening space equally 
between them. The line XY shown on Map 1, represents these 
delimitations. A similar lateral-median line, line OP on 
Map 1, was established between Norway and Denmark by agree-
ment.249 Two more agreements concluded between the Federal 
Republic on the one hand, and the kingdoms of Denmark and the 
Netherlands divided those areas of the shelf situated in the 
immediate vicinity of their coasts, by the lines AB and CD 
by a desire to secure first for Germany through negotiated 
settlement with Denmark and the Netherlands, a larger off 
shore area than it would receive through application of 
the boundary line provisions in Article 6. However, on 
January 20, 1964, the Federal Government published a pro-
clamation which, .after referring to the Continental Shelf 
Convention and to Germany's intent to ratify it, asserted 
the rights of the Federal Government over its Continental 
Shelf as defined in the Convention. For further details, 
see Young, 'Offshore Claims and Problems in the North 
Sea,' AJIL, 1965, p.505. 
2L~8. U.K.-Nor\''lay, Agreement signed r.1Iarch 10, 1965, and ratified 
June 29, 1 965, Cmnd. 2626. U 0 K. -Denmark, Agreement signed 
March 3, 1966, and ratified Feb.6, 1967, Cmnd.2973. U.K.-
Netherlands, two Agreements signed October 6, 1965, and 
ratified December 23, 1966, Cmnd.2830 and 2831. 
2L~9. Agreement be tween Norway and Denmark, Dec 0 8, 1 965, 
Norwegian St. pr.p., nr.68. 

respectively, as shorm on Map 1 • 25° Finally, in addition to 
the partial boundary lines, Germany/Denmark and Germany/ 
Netherlands, another line,. line EF, has been drawn in the 
area under an agreement between Denmark and the Netherlands. 251 
All the lines drawn in the area are established according 
to the principle of equidistance provided for in Article 6 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention. The areas attributable to 
the continental states all extend to the 'main stern' line, 
YZ, between Britain and the Continent with the exception of 
the West German area, which is pinched off by the meeting of 
the Danish and Dutch areas some 50 nautical miles north-north-
west of Heligoland. 
Under this Geneva-:-type delimitation, rough calculations 
indicate that approximately 46% of the shelf' area of the 
North Sea would appertain to the U.K., about 24% to Norway 
(including the area of the Norwegian trough), 11% to the 
250. Gel,many-Denmark, June 9, 1965, ICLQ, 1966, Po904. And 
Germany-Holland, Dec .1, 1 964, Netherlands 'l'reaty Series, 
1 9 64, nr .1 84 • 
251 • Denmal,k-Netherlands, I.iarch 31 , 1 966, Netherlands 'l'rea ty 
Series, 1 966, nr .130. The Government of the li'ederal 
Republic, taking the view that this delimitation was 
res inter alios acta, notified the Governments of Denmark 
and the Netherlands that the agreement thus concluded 
could not 'have any effect on the question of the 
delimitation of the German-Netherlands or the German-
Danish parts of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea:' 
see paragraph 9 of the judgment of the ICJ in the matter. 
Netherlands, 1 C% to Denmark, 5% to West Germany, and about 
~to each of Belgium and France. 252 2. 
B. The Point of Dis ute Betv1een German Denmark and 
German Netherlands 
'l'he further negotiations between Germany and her neigh-
bours, namely, Denmark and the Netherlands, for the prolonga-
tion of the partial boundaries represented in lines AB and CD 
broke dov1n mainly because Denmark and the Netherlands v1ished 
their prolongation also to be effected on the basis of the 
equidistance principle. This would have resulted in the 
dotted lines B-E and D-E, shown on Map 1. On the other hand, 
the Federal Republic cons ide red that such an out come would 
be inequitable because it would unduly curtail what the 
Republic believed should be its proper share of Continental 
Shelf area, on the basis of proportionality to the length of 
its North Sea coastline. Thus the Federal Republic would 
have wished to obtain in the course of the negotiations, in 
addition to the area already defined by the partial boundary 
lines of AB and CD, the area enclosed by the two pecked lines 
B-F and D-F, also shown on Map 1. 
It will be observed that neither of the lines B-E and 
D-E, taken by itself, would produce this effect on the proper 
share of Germany, but only both of them together - an element 
regarded by Denmark and the Netherlands as irrelevant to what 
they viewed as being two separate and self-contained delimita-
252. Young, 'Off Shore •••••••.••••• ' p.517. 
tions, each of which should be carried out without reference 
to the other. 
The reason for the result that would be produced by the 
two lines B-E and D-E, tal{en conjointly was explained by the 
ICJ as follows: 
"In the case of a concave or recessing coast such as 
that of the F'ederal Republic, the effect of the use of 
the equidistance method is to pull the line of the 
boundary inwards, in the direction of the concavity. 
Consequently, where two such lines are drawn at different 
points on a concave coast, they will, if the curvature is 
pronounced, inevitably meet at a relatively short 
distance from the coast, thus causing the related 
Continental Shelf area to take the form approximately 
of a triangle with its apex to seaward and, as it was put 
on behalf of the Federal Republic, "cut off 11 the coastal 
state from the further areas of the Continental Shelf 
outside of and beyond this triangle. The effect of 
concavity could of course equally be produced for a 
country with a straight coastline if the coasts of 
adjacent countries protruded immediately on either side 
of it •••••••• these effects are directly attributable 
to the use of the equidistance method of delimiting 
Continental Shelf boundaries off recessing •••••.• coasts. 
It goes without saying that on these types of coasts the 
equidistance method produces exactly similar effects in 
166. 
the delimitation of the lateral boundaries of the 
territorial sea of the states concerned. However, 
owing·to the very close proximity of such waters to 
the coasts concerned, these effects are much less 
marked and may be very slight."253 
After the negotiations between the parties had failed 
to result in any agreement about the delimitation of the 
boundary extending beyond the partial one already agreed on, 
it was decided by special agreements between them to submit 
the matter to the ICJ. 254 
C. Pleadings Before the ICJ 
According to the two Special Agreements, the Court is 
1 '67. 
requested to decide the question: "What principles and rules 
of international law are applicable to the delimitation as 
between the parties of the areas of the Continental Shelf in 
the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the 
partial boundary determined by the Conventions of 1964 and 
1965 between the Federal Republic and each of the Netherlands 
and Denmark respectively?"255 
253·. Paragraph 8 of the judgment. 
254. For the two Special Agreements together with a tripartite 
protocol, which were signed a~ Bonn on Feb.2, 1967, see 
the ICJ judgment, pp. 7-1 0. 
255. Article 1 of the Special Agreements. In the protocol, 
it was agreed that, for the purpose of appointing a judge 
ad hoc, the Governments of Denmark and of the Netherlands 
shall be considered parties in the same interest within 
the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute 
of the Court. 
In the course of the oral and written proceedings it 
was submitted on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany 
that: 
(1) The delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the 
parties in the North Sea is governed by the principle 
that each coastal state is entitled to a just and 
equitable share on the basis of proportionality to 
the coastline. 
(2) The equidistance method mentioned in Article 6(2) of 
the Convention is not a rule, or has not become a rule, 
of customary international law. 
(3) Even if Article 6(2) would be applicable between the 
parties, special circumstances within the meaning of 
the same article would exclude the application of the 
equidistance method in the present caxse, and, finally 
1 6"8. 
(4) The equidistance method cannot be used for the delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelf, unless it is established 
by agreement, arbitration, or otherwise, that it will 
achieve a just and equitable apportionment of the 
Continental Shelf among the coastal states. 
The submissions presented by the Government of Denmark were 
identical mutatis mutandis with those of the Netherlands. It 
was stated on behalf of these two Governments that: 
(1) The delimitation as between the parties of the said areas 
of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea is governed by 
the principles and rules of international law which are 
16SJJ. 
expressed in Article 6(2) of the Convention, namely, 
the equidistance - special circumstances rule. 
Accordingly, 
(2) Since the parties are in disagreement, and since special 
circumstances which justify another line has not been 
established by the Federal Hepublic, the boundary between 
the parties is to be determined by application of the 
principle of equidistance indicated in the preceding 
submission. 
However, although the proceedings concerning the two 
kingdomes have thus been joined, the cases -themselves remain 
separate, at least in the sense that they relate to different 
areas of the North Sea Continental Shelf. In fact there is 
no a priori reason why the Court must reach identical con-
elusions in regard to them, - if for instance geographical 
features present in the one case are not present in the other. 
At the same time, the Court felt that the two cases may be 
treated as one, to the extent that the legal arguments 
presented on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands, both before 
and since the joinder have beensubstantially identical, and 
1 b t d . th . . l t. 256 1ave een presen e e1 er 111 common or 111 c ose co-opera 1on. 
Finally, such are the geographical facts, event~ and 
contentions in the light of which the Court has to determine 
what principles and rules of international law are applicable 
to the delimitation of the areas involved. 
256. See paragraph 11 of the judgment. 
D. Findings and Reasoning: Judicium finium regundorurn. 257 
It will not be possible, in the light of the limited 
1 70. 
scope of this work, to analyse and discuss all the principles 
and arguments contained in the judgment and in the various 
separate and dissenting opinions. 258 For this reason, only 
the main points of the judgment will be dealt with here. 
In considering the contentions put forward on behalf of 
the Federal Republic, the Court declared that it was unable 
to accept them, because its task in this case related 
essentially to delimitation and not to the apportionment 
of the areas concerned. 259 Delimitation, the Court explained, 
is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an 
area already appertaining to the coastal state and not the 
determination de novo of such an area. 260 Delimitation in an 
257. The Court, by eleven votes to six, passed its judgment 
in February 20, 1969. Those in favour are: President 
Bustamente, Judges Amoun, Gros, Fitzmaurice, Foster, 
Jessup, lilian, Padilla Hirvo, Perern, Onyeama, and Judge 
ad hoc Mosler. Against: Vice President Koretsky, Judges 
Bengzon, Lachs, Morelli, Tanaka, and Judge ad hoc 
Sorensen. 
258. President Bustamente, Judges Jessup, Padilla Nervo, and 
Ammoun appended separate opinions to the judgment. On 
the other hand, Vice President Koretsky, Judges ~anaka, 
Morelli, Lachs and Judge ad hoc Sorensen appended 
dissenting opinions to the judgment. Judges I<"..han and 
Bengzon, each made a special declaration, in favour 
and against respectively. 
259. Paragraph 18 of the judgment. 
260. Ibid. 
equitable manner is one thing, but not the same thing as 
awarding a just and equitable of a previously undelimited 
261 
area. More important is the fact that the doctrine of 
the just and equitable share appears, to the Court, to be 
wholly at variance with the fundamental rule that the right 
of the coastal state to the totality of the Continental 
Shelf which constitutes a natural prolongation of its 
territory is an inherent right. 262 It follows that even in 
such situations as that of the I'Torth Sea, the notion of 
apportioning the as yet undelimited area considered as a 
whole is quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic 
concept of Continental Shelf entitlement, accordin~ to which 
the process of delimitation is essentially one of drawing a 
boundary line between areas which appertain to one or other 
of the states affected. 263 The Court went on to say, 'the 
delimitation itself must indeed be equitably effected, but 
it can not have as its object the awarding of an equitable 
share, or indeed of a share, as such, at all - for the 
fundamental concept involved does not admit of there being 
any thing undivided to share out.• 264 
The Court, then, turned to examine the contentions 
advanced on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands. The 
261. Ibid. 
262. Paragraph 19. 
263. Par•agraph 20. 
264. Ibid. 
1 71 • 
172. 
question which the Court had to answer in this respect was 
whether the eguidistance - special circumstances principle 
constitute a mandatory rule, either on a conventional or on 
a customary international law basis, in such a way as to 
govern any delimitation of the North Sea Continental Shelf 
areas between the parties concerned. 
As to the first part of this questioh, the Court decided 
that the conventional rule of equidistance - special 
circumstances, contained in Article 6 of the Convention, can 
not be binding on the Federal Republic, since the Republic, 
though one of the signatories of the Convention, has never 
ratified it, and is consequently not a party. 265 But it was 
also contended that the Convention, and in.particular Article 
6, has become ·binding on the Federal Republic in another way, 
namely because, by conduct, by public statements and proclama-
tions, the Republic has unilaterally assumed the obligations 
of the Convention. 266 To these contentions, the Court had 
only to say, 'it is clear only a very definite, very 
consistent course of conduct on the part of a state in the 
situation of the Federal Republic could justify the Court in 
upholding them; and if this had existed, i.e. if there had 
been a real intention to manifest acceptance or recognition 
of the applicability of the Convention, then it must be asked 
265. Paragraph 26. 
266. Paragraph 27. 
1 73. 
why it was that the Federal Republic did not take the obvious 
step of giving expression to this readiness by simply ratify-
ing the Convention.' 267 A further point, which adds to the 
difficulties involved by the Danish-Netherlands contention, 
is that if the Federal Republic had ratified the Convention, 
it could have entered a reservation to Article 6, by r•eason 
of the faculty to do so conferred by Article 12 of the 
Convention. 268 This faculty would remain, whatever the 
previous conduct of the Federal Republic might have been. 269 
According to the foregoing considerations, the Court 
held that Article 6 of the Convention is not, as such, 
applicable to the delimitations involved in the present 
proceedings. Consequently the delimitation of the line E-F, 
as shown on Map 1, which was effected by Denmark and the 
Netherlands under the 1966 agreement to which the Federal 
Republic was not a party, could not in any case find its 
6. 270 validity in Article Furthermore, Article 6 of the 
Convention provides only for delimitation between 'adjacent' 
states, which Denmark and the Netherlands clearly are not, 
267. Paragraph 27. 
268. Article 12(1) states, '~t the time of signature, rafi-
fication, or accession, any state may make reservations 
to articles of the Convention other than to Articles 1 
to 3 inclusive." 
269. Paragraph 30. 
270. Paragraphs 3.4 and 36. As to the Danish-Netherlands 
Agreement of March 31, 1966, see note 251 above. 
or between 'opposite' states which, despite suggestions to 
the contrary, the Court thinks they equally are not. 271 
The validity erga omnes, including the Federal Republic, of 
the delimitation of the line E-F must therefore be sought 
in some other source of law. 
It is a main contention of Denmark and the Netherlands 
that there does in fact exist such a resource. These two 
Governments maintain that the F'ederal Republic, whatever 
its position may be in relation to the Convention, is in 
any event bound to accept delimitation on an equidistance -
special circumstances basis, because the use of this method 
is not in the nature of ammerely conventional obligation, 
but is, or must now be regarded as involving, a rule that 
is of the corpus of general international law. 272 
1 (4. 
According to this contention, the equidistance principle 
is seen as: (a) a necessary expression in the field of 
delimitation, and therefore as having an a priori character 
of, so to speak, juristic inevitability, or (b) if equi-
distance should not possess any a priori character of 
necessity or inherency, it should have become a rule of 
positive law through influences such as those of the Conven-
tion and state practice. 
271. Paragraph 36; see emphasis on this point made by Judge 
Khan in his declaration on p.61 of the judgment. 
272. Mentioned in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment. 
The Court rejected the first contention on the grounds 
that there was no indication in the work done in this field 
by international legal bodies, in particular the Commission 
175. 
and the Committee of Experts, to suppose that it was incumbent 
on the drafters of the Convention to adopt a rule of equi-
distance, because such a rule must be mandatory as a matter 
of customary international law. 273 This conclusion is also 
supported by the fact that the Commission gave priority to 
delimitation by agreement, and by special circunistances 
before recourse can be had to the equidistance principle. 
Yet the record shows that even with these mitigations, doubts 
persisted, as to whether the equidistance principle would 
prove satisfactory in all circwilstances. 274 
With regard to whether on some basis other than that of 
an a priori logical necessity, the equidistance principle 
has come to be regarded as a rule of customary international 
law, the Court examined the status of the principle as it 
was incorporated in the Convention, and in the light of 
state practice subsequent to the Convention. 
The first point can conveniently be considered under 
the reservations article of the Convention. 275 The Court, 
therefore, decided that any articles that do not figure 
among those excluded from the faculty of reservation under 
273. Paragraphs 48-52 of the judgment. 
274. Paragraph 55. 
275. Article 12. 
the said article, were not regarded declaratory of 
previously existing or emergent rules of law; and this is 
the inference the Court had in fact drawn in respect of 
Article 6.276 The Court was critised for such inference 
on the grounds that there are certain other provisions, 
also not excluded from the faculty of reservations, but 
which do undoubtedly relate to matters that lie within the 
principle of customary international law. 277 The Court's 
answer was that these rules ante-date the Convention, and 
not directly connected with it. They were mentioned in the 
Convention not in order to declare their existence, but 
simply to ensure that they were not prejudiced by the 
exercise of Continental Shelf rights. 278 Furthermore, the 
Court was not convinced that such a conventional rule has 
become a general rule of international law within such a 
short periodar time, since the Convention came into force, 
which is less than five years. 279 However, the Court did 
not stress the time factor more than what it regarded as an 
indispensable requirement relating to state practice, 
including that of states whose interests are involved, which 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the 
f th . . . k d 280 sense o e prov1s1ons 1nvo e • 
276. Paragraph 64. 
1 76. 
277. Reference was made to Articles 4 and 5(1 ), relating to the 
freedoms of laying cables and pipe lines, and of fishing. 
278. Paragraph 65. 
279. The Convention came into force in June 10, 1964. 
280. Paragraphs 73 and 74. 
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Secondly, with respect to whether state practice in 
the matter of Continental Shelf delimitation has, subsequent 
to the Convention, been of such a kind as to satisfy this 
requirement, the Court cited some fifteen cases, in which 
Continental Shelf boundar•ies have been delimited according 
to the equidistance principle. It VJas found that over half 
the states concerned were or shortly became parties to the 
Convention, and were therefore acting in the application of 
the Convention. Accordingly, from their action no inference 
could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of customary 
international law in favour of the equidistance principle. 
As regards those states which were not, and have not become, 
parties to the Convention, the Court declared that it did 
not receive any material evidence that such states believed 
themselves to be applying a mandatory rul~ of customary 
international law. Furthermore, in almost all the cases 
cited, the delimitations concerned were median-line ones 
between opposite states, and not lateral delimitations 
between adjacent states; two cases vlhich, according to the 
C t d . ff. . . t 281 ~ur l er ln varlous respec s. 
In the light of these various considerations, the Court 
came to the conclusion that the Convention did not embody or 
crystallise any pre-existing or emergent rule of customary 
law, according to which the delimitation of Continental Shelf 
areas between adjacent states must, unless the parties 
281. Paragraphs 75, 76 and 79; and also para.57. 
otherwise agree, be carried out on an equidistance - special 
circumstances basis; nor has its subsequent effect been 
constitutive of such a rule; and that state practice up-to-
282 date has equally been insufficient for that purpose. As 
a result of this conclusion, the Court decided that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether or not the configuration 
of the German North Sea coast constitutes a 'special 
circumstance' for the purposes of Article 6, since once the 
equidistance method of delimitation is determined not to pe 
obligatory in any event, it ceases to be legally necessary 
to prove the existence of special circumstances in order to 
justify not using that method. 283 
After having arrived at this conclusion, the Court 
declared that its task was not to delimit the areas of 
Continental Shelf appertaining to each party; but merely to 
indicate to the parties the principles and rules of law in 
the light of which the methods for eventually effecting the 
deli~itation will have to be chosen. 284 To that end the 
178. 
Court decided that 'the delimitation of the areas in question 
is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable 
principles, in such a way as to leave to each party all those 
parts of the Continental Shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory under the sea, without 
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory 
282. Paragraphs 69 and 81. 
283. Paragraph 82. 
284. Paragraph ~4. 
179. 
285 
of the other.' In the words of the judgment, 'The 
parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations 
with a view to arriving at an agreement and not merely to 
go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of 
prior condition for the automatic application of a certain 
method of delimitation in the absence of agreement: they 
are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the 
t . t• . f 1 ,286 nego 1a 1ons are mean1ng u , •••••• o ••• The judgment 
justifies such an obligation by stating that 'not only 
• • • • 0 • 
the obligation to negotiate, which the parties assumed by 
Article 1(2) of the Special Agreements, arises out of the 
Truman Proclamation, which, for the reasons given in paragraph 
47, must be considered as having propounded the rules of law 
in this field, but also •••••••• this obligation constitutes 
a special application of a principle which underlies all 
international relations; and which is moreover recognised in 
Article 33(5) of the Charter of the U.N. ' 287 The judgment 
goes on to say, 'so far therefore the negotiations have not 
satisfied the conditions indicated in paragraph 85(a).• 288 
In his separate opinion, Judge Ammoun did not agree with 
the Court that there exists Pactum de contrahendo in this 
case by saying, 'It (the obligation) can not be inferred from 
285. Paragraph 1m (operative part). 
286. Paragraph 85(a). 
287. Paragraph 86. 
288. Paragraph 87. 
the Truman Proclamation, nor yet from Article 33 of the 
Charter, which concerns disputes the continuance of which 
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security •••••••• a submission that there was an 
obligation to negotiate, and that the negotiations carried 
out 'were not meaningful,' would amount to a prejudicial 
objection to the hearing of the case. 1289 
As to what is meant, here, by 'equitable principles', 
the Court declared that 'equity does not necessarily imply 
equality ••••••••••• but in the present case there are 
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three states whose North Sea coastlines are in fact comparable 
in length and which therefore have been given broadly equal 
treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of 
the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is used, 
deny to one of these states treatment equal or comparable to 
that given the other two.' Therefore, the rule which has to 
lJe deduced from the principle of equity in the present case 
is that of 'a reasonable degree of proportionality between 
the extent of the Continental Shelf appertaining to the 
states concerned and the length of their respective coast-
lines.'290 
Although this solution does not refer to any sort of 
practice as how to apply it practically, it starts from the 
idea of natural prolongation of the land territory, and 
289. Ammoun, Separate Opinion, paragraph 47. 
290. Paragraphs 91 and 98. 
implies the realignment, in the form of a single straight 
baseline, of the concave coast of the Federal Republic. 291 
1 81 • 
This method could be criticised in its practical application, 
for failing to avoid overlappings of one sector over the 
Continental Shelf over another at some distance from the 
coast. For this common sector, the Court recommends division 
into equal shares unless the parties agree on a regime of 
joint exploitation to preserve the unity of a deposit. 292 
Furthermore, it amounts to a return from back door to 
Germany's proposal of apportionment into just and equitable 
shares, which the Court has rejected. 
Finally, Judge Ammoun suggested a method based on 
equidistance- special circumstances. 293 This method, 
which was rejected as not being a rule of treaty law or 
customary international law, may, in his opinion, be re-
adopted by a general principle of law, namely equity. 294 
He explains that 'special circumstances' exists in the 
present case by the configuration of the coast of the Federal 
Republic, which should be taken into account to avoid the 
inequitable application of the equidistance line pure and 
simple. 295 The front must thus not be understood as meaning 
291. Paragraph 98. 
292. Paragraph 99. There already exists a number of agreements 
on the joint exploitation, or the regulation by another 
manner, of a deposit extending across a boundary line. 
Most of these agreements are in the North Sea and in the 
Arabian-Persian Gulf; for further details, see the 
separate opinion of Jessup, pp.23-25. 
293. Paragraph 52 of his separate opinion. 
294. Ibid. 
295. Supra, para.53. 
the coast with its more or less pronounced bends on the water 
l . 296 ~ne. Accordingly, Judge Ammoun suggests, as in the 
Fisheries Case and in the case of bays, a single straight 
baseline extending along the coast of the Federal Republic 
from one of its extremities to the other which would com-
pletely obliterate its concavity. 297 The bases for the 
delimitation of the Continental Shelf as between the parties 
having been determined, the equidistance lines would then be 
dravvn taking as the starting point the intersections of the 
said baselines of the Federal Republic and those of the 
Netherlands and Denmark respectively. The area appertaining 
to the Federal Republic would be contained between the two 
equidistance lines and would extent out to sea as far as 
their point of intersection, as shown in Map 2. 298 
Conclusion 
182. 
The problem of delimitation is one of general application 
to all seaward areas under national jurisdiction. Positive 
international law is silent on this matter, and the few 
agreements dealing with sea boundary questions were arrived 
296. Supra, para.54. 
297. Supra, para.55. 
298. This method is in fact identical in many ways with that 
recommended by the Court to the parties in paragraph 98 
of the judgment. In both cases, the coastal front is 
adopted as the baseline for delimiting the areas in 
question. Moreover, the Court emphasises the importance 
of establishing one or more straight baselines, r1here 
the parties wish to employ in particular the equi-
distance method of delimitation. The only difference 
seems to be technical: while the Court considers the 
method of delimitation is a matter for the parties to 
decide, Judge Ammoun prescribes to them the equidistance 
principle as explained above. 

at through negotiations rather• than the application of any 
general rule. The inherited problem 'Iilith regard to the 
delimitation of these areas is that they have never been 
defined precisely under any international convention. The 
outer limits as well as the inward limits of the territorial 
sea, any contiguous zone, and the Continental Shelf are 
mostly regulated by national laws which differ from one 
country to another. 
'l'he principle of equidistance as a fair method of 
determining a boundary was adopted in Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. The trouble comes in 
its application to specific situations where the general 
language of the Convention fails to provide a clear or 
adequate answer. This is the more regrettable because 
Article 6 gives the appearance of furnishing an automatic 
solution on which one could rely when the states concerned 
could not agree. There are, at least, three types of 
difficulties in applying the principle of equidistance as a 
general rule: 
One type of di~ficulty relates to the baselines from 
which the boundary is to be measured. Suppose states A and 
B are opposite each other and both are parties to the Shelf 
Convention, but that only B is a party to the Territorial 
Sea Convention. A measures its territorial sea from base-
lines further seaward than those specified in the Territorial 
Sea Conventiono Under a literal interpretation of Article 6, 
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the shelf boundary between A and B is the line equidistant 
between the baselines, even though A thereby acquires 
substantially more shelf area than B, whose baselines have 
been restrained by the Convention rules. A similar displace-
ment of the line will occur in cases where the states 
concerned are adjacent to one another rather than opposite. 
A second class of difficulties arises from the problem 
of islands. What role is to be assigned to islands in 
determining the equidistance boundary line? The Shelf 
Convention is silent on this point, except to affirm in 
Article 1 that islands also possess shelf areas. Article 6 
speaks only of baselines, not "mainland" or "island" base-
lines. If state A possesses an island three-quarters of the 
way across the sea toward state B, does this mean that state 
A gets seven-eighths of the shelf between itself and B? If 
B possesses other islands close to A, does the shelf boundary 
zig-zag accordingly? Such islands, situated off the coasts 
of other countries, might cause vexing problems if they were 
given full rights under the regime of the Convention. 
A third group of difficulties is the case of adjacent 
states with the coast of one of them either concave or convex. 
This is best exemplified in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases. As already explained, the ICJ refused to apply 
Article 6(2) as a matter of law. This type of difficulty is 
perhaps less problematic since 'special circumstances, 1 which 
justify departures from the equidistance principle, might be 
185. 
invoked successfully. But the Convention fails to define 
the 'special circumstances' in which it recognises that a 
boundary other than the line of equidistance may be justified. 
This gap leaves the way open for raising all kinds of allega-
tions regarding 'special circumstances' in order to prevent 
the application of the equidistance rule. 
There is no doubt that all these obstacles can be readily 
removed, as the Convention provides, by agreement among the 
states concerned. This was also decided by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Cases. Those who may become involved in these 
boundary problems should be aware that the Convent ion rules 
do not furnish guaranteed and automatic applicable solutions, 
even in cases where the parties are bound by them in principle. 
The Convention is only a point of departure for negotiations. 
The 'key' word for any meaningful negotiation is 'equity' 
rather than the application of one method of delimitation or 
another. 'Equity' is the path to any just and lasting 
boundary settlement. It has been provided for in the Truman 
Proclamation as well as in those of the Arab States on the 
Arabian-Persian Gulf. It was also the cardinal principle of 
the ICJ decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 
PART THREE 
The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor 
Section I -The International Law of "Ocean Space."1 
1 • The Impact of Science and Technology on Law 
It is now more than ten years since the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf was concluded at Geneva. During this 
period, the exploitation of mineral deposits, particularly 
oil and gas, in the shelf area has become an important ~)art 
2 
of the world's normal supply. Meanwhile, the technical 
H56. 
1 • Griffin in his article entitled ''l'he Emerging Law of Ocean 
Space,' 1 International Lawyer, 1967, p.545, defines 
'ocean space' as comprehending, 'water surface, water 
column, seabed and subsoil.' "Inner space" was first 
used by President Kennedy, preswnably, in reference to 
the seabed and subsoil of the high seas beyond present 
national jurisdiction. 
2. Some 18 nations have been reported to possess commercial 
production offshore of oil and gas, while at least 60 
countries are engaged in exploitation or development. 
Some 11% of world oil and 6% of world gas production 
comes from offshore areas; for further details, see 
Coene, 'Profile of Marine Resources,' paper presented 
at the Conference on Law, Organization and Security in 
the Use of the Ocean, Colwnbus, Ohio, March, 1967, pp. 
3-6. 
ability of coastal states is now advancing into the deep 
sea beyond the outer limit of the geographical shelf. 
For the present only the u.s., the U.S.S.R., Japan, 
Britain, France, Australia, and Canada have developed 
sufficient technology of oceanography and non-land-mining 
to be able to think of embarking upon exploiting the natural 
resources of the deep ocean floor. The first two countries 
are, moreover, well ahead of the rest. In the U.S. it is 
now precisely those firms which have been prominent in the 
space race who are now largely beginning to look seriously 
at the economic possibilities of the deep.3. 
This technological development led to the discovery of 
considerable mineral deposits on the floor of the ocean. 
The minerals that are likely to be exploited economically 
are chiefly nodules of manganese, copper, nickle and cobalt, 
and phosphates, gas and petroleum. Their general location 
is known in areas of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Ocean 
floors but outside existing national jurisdiction. Until 
recently, such resources were viewed as scientific oddities 
rather than as potential natural resources. Now, there are 
glowing accounts of the vastness of the deposits of these 
materials which are thought to be several times more valuable 
3. 'Russia's call to avert ocean-floor arams race,' The 
Times, Friday, July 12, 1968. 
187 
than those on land.4 
What is more important than the discovery of the 
minerals themselves, is the development within the last few 
years of a submersible craft which can stay submerged at 
great depths for a considerable time. 5 Semi-submersible 
drilling rigs already in operation are capable of drilling 
to depths of 350 metres. 6 These and all the patterns that 
eventually emerge could clearly bring huge international 
problems. They are a menace to navigation and their crew. 
Pollution caused by radio active waste and normal activities 
in drilling oil and gas is also harmful to fishing and fish 
product. There are the disputes over sovereign rights in the 
1 ~~. 
deep sea and national competition to exploit the same deposits. 
4. It has been estimated that some 1,500,000 million tons of 
nodules lie on the floor of the Pacific alone, to which a 
further 10,000 million tons are added every year, most of 
which consist of iron and manganese: see Brown, E. D., 
"Deep Sea Mining: The Legal H.egime of Inner Space." 
Y. B. \V • A • , 1 9 6 8 , p .1 7 4 • 
5. Engineers in the U.S. have produced the RUM (Remote Under-
water Manipulator), which is a tracked vehicle carrying a 
variety of instruments and controlled by console from the 
surface. The Aluminant, another submersible craft, was 
launched by the U.S. in 196L~. It can travel about 100 
miles at depths down to 15,000 feet. It is also fitted 
with 9 ft. arms which can move in six ways and lift 200 
pound weights. Both the Aluminant and RUM-type vehicles 
proved their worth during the search for and recovery of 
the U.S. H-bomb lost off the Spanish coast in 1966: see 
Brown, loc.cit., p.175. 
6. Luard, E., 'Legal tangles over seabed wealth,' The Times, 
June 7, 1 968. 
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There is also the effect on world prices, and therefore 
on the main revenues of some countries. Brooks has estimated 
that the amount of manganese thrown on the market.by a 
sin,gle producer might be so great that the price would drop 
from 90¢ per unit to 50t. The cobalt price might drop from 
$1 • 50 per pound to $1 • 00; and nickle from 70¢ to 65t a pound. 7 
Two or three prodLlcers would have even greater effect. 
Therefore, if no adjustment could be reached both by the 
users of the minerals and by the producers of the alternative 
sources of supply, such production might be economically self-
defeating.8 
There have been equally sensational developments in the 
military field. Some of the military benefits that could be 
derived from the use, or the permanent occupation, of the 
seabed are obvious. Anti -submarine 1varfare could be ass is ted 
by the establishment of detection and tracking under sea 
stations. v7ith regard to surface ships, offensive action 
against them might be also undertaken from permanent under-
sea. stations, through the occupation of the strategic 
mountain ridges that cross the ocean bed. What is perhaps 
less obvious is the possible value of the deep sea for 
missile warfare. It has been suggested that, for offensive 
purposes, missiles fired from the seabed would not only be 
7. Brooks, B., 'Deep-Sea Manganese Nodules,' Paper presented 
at the 1967 Law of the Sea Institute Conference, University 
of Rhode Island, Kingston. 
8. Ibid. 
far closer to their targets than those fired from the 
mainland, and therefore more difficult to intercept, but 
the launchers would be more difficult to put out of action.9 
Still more impoPtant, now that anti-ballistic systems are 
being deployed, would be the defensive value of missiles on 
the seabed. Because they could be launched far earlier in 
the light of the incoming missile, seabed anti-missiles 
would have a far greater chance of hitting them before their 
multiple war heads had separated.10 
190. 
These various developments in relation to the use of the 
oceanic floors would not be so alarming if international law, 
and in particular the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, was clearer about national rights on the seabed. 
There could, therefore, shortly arise innumerable disputes 
and untold dangers - the development of a new dimension in 
the arms race, bitter conflicts on rights of sovereignty, 
the under-mining of present markets in minerals, even perhaps 
a new form of competitive colonialism beneath the sea - unless 
some international action is taken. The law of the sea, as 
has been so far developed, remains essentially the law of the 
surface waters and the Continental Shelf. The ocean depths 
have been as far beyond the reach and concern of the law as 
they have been beyond the knowledge and range of action of 
oceanography. The law must now follow the oceanographers into 
the depths, formulate whatever code for their exploration and 
9. Luard, supra No.6. 
10. Ibid. 
exploitation may prove to be required, and determine right 
of user of and title to whatever resources may be found 
there. "Vie must add on Ocean Depths 'rreaty to the U.N. 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea ••••••••• the prototypes 
for such a treaty already exist in the U.N. Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty, the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Liability Conventions, and the Outer 
Space Treaty. 1111 
2. The U,N. Takes the Initiative: 
(a) The Problem Before the General Assembly 
This new problem received much attention on both 
international and national levels, by public and private 
bodies. In the U.N., significant resolutions were adopted 
at the 1966 and 1967 sessions of the General Assembly. The 
1966 resolution requested the Secretary General to survey 
the existing state of knowledge with respect to marine 
resources beyond the Continental Shelf, excluding fish, to 
review with the aid of a group of experts, current activi-
ties of marine science and technology and formulate proposals 
for expanded international co-operation in understanding the 
marine environment; and to report thereon to the Assembly at 
its 1968 . 12 sess1on. 
The 1967 action originated in a proposal put forward by 
191 . 
Malta for a 'Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation, 
11. Jenks, C. ·a., 'The New Science and the Law of N"ationa,' 
ICLQ, 1968, p.327, at 329. 
12. G.A. Resolution 2172 (XXI), December 8, 1966. 
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and of the 
ocean floor, underlying the sea beyond the limits of present 
jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in.the interests 
of mankind.' 13 In an ace ompanying memorandum the Maltese 
Government expressed the fear that technological progress 
would soon expose the ocean floor to competitive national 
appropriation and use, with risks of militarisation and 
exploitation for the national advantage of technologically 
developed countries. It therefore urged immediate steps to 
establish by treaty the propositions that the deep-sea floor 
is not subject to national appropriation in any manner and 
shall be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; that 
its exploration be undertaken in a manner consistent with 
the Charter; and that exploitation be carried on in the 
interests of mankind, with the financial benefits therefrom 
being 'used primarily to promote the developmentaf poor 
countries.' 14 An international agency ·was envisaged to 
assume jurisdiction over the seabed and ocean floor as 
"trustee" for all states and to exercise supervisory and 
13. U.N. Doc.A/6695, August 18, 1967. 
14. Ibid. 
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regulatory functions. 15 
The Maltese proposals, revised to call only for an 
examination of the question, was the subject of extensive 
debate in the Assembly's First Committee. In due course a 
resolution v1as framed and subsequently adopted unanimously 
by the Assembly on December 18, 1967.16 This provides for 
the creation of an ad hoc Committee of 35 members to study 
15. Ibid, p.3, para.4. Many Congressmen in the u.s. opposed 
vigorously the Maltese proposal. Their comments reveal 
a strong anti-United Nations flavour and a national 
economic interest. Some two dozen resolutions were 
introduced in the Halls of Congress opposing any move 
to vest title to the ocean floor in the U.N. Opposition 
was based on the view that such action was premature 
and ill-advised; that the organisation, being a "mediator" 
not a "sovereign," was hardly capable of undertaking the 
task. The U.N. was described by some representatives as 
a "wind tunnel" and an "unstable" organisation. Certain 
representatives impunged the veroy motives of r,Jalta, the 
so-called "chunk of rock out in the Mediterranean." 
Some regarded the Maltese as acting for the U.K., others 
for the U.S.S.R., and still others for the purpose of 
preventing a v:.ride interpretation of the exploi tabili ty 
provision of the Continental Shelf Convention. Malta, 
they declared, was "not a sounding board for any State," 
and 11 nobody put the Maltese Government up to it. 11 The 
policy of this group was expressed by Congressman Hanna 
where he says, "our attitude towards the law of the sea 
should continue to be that of offering prescriptive 
rights,"to those who can obtain and develop the resources, 
"and then talce to a mediation point how you are going to 
resolve the possible frictions between states." Finally, 
a number of legislators described u.s. acceptance of the 
Ualtese plan a giveaway, the "biggest giveaway in the 
his tory of America 11 of "American property11 and 11 sovereignty.' 
For further details, see 'i/eissberg, G., "International 
Lavl meets the Short-term National Interest; T:tle Maltese· 
proposal on the seabed and ocean floor - Its fate in Two 
Cities·~ ICLQ, January, 1969, pp .41 -1 02. 
16. Resolution 2340 (XXII) was adopted by a vote of 99.0.0. 
This resolution was based on a draft resolution introduced 
by Belgium in the First Committee: U.N. Doc.A/6964, 
Dec.12, 1967. 
and report on the topic at the Assembly's next regular 
session. The study woul~ include: 
(1) A survey of past and present activities of the U.N., 
the Specialised Agencies, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and other Inter-Governmental bodies 
with regard to the seabed and the ocean floor, and 
of existing international agreements concerning these 
areas. 
(2) An account of the scientific, technical, economic, and 
legal aspects of this question; and 
(3) An indication of the practical means to promote inter-
national co-operation in the exploration, conservation 
and use of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the 
subsoil thereof, and of their resources. The Assembly 
stated that the exploration and the use of the 
environment concerned should be conducted in accordance 
with the principles and purposes of the Charter, in the 
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interest of maintaining international peace and security 
and for the benefit of all mankind. 
(b) The Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Committee17 
As in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the 
speeches made at the first two sessions of the elected Ad Hoc 
Committee had witnessed another clash between the national 
17. States elected to serve on the Committee were: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Equador, El Salvador, 
France, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya, Malta, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Rumania, 
Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Thailand, U.A.R., U.K., 
u.s.A., U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. 
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and international interests.18 At the first session, the u.s., 
for example, while favouring international co-operation, 
stressed the study aspects of the Committee's work and 
adopted a most cautious approach on the establishment of an 
international regime. The Deputy u.s. Representative to the 
Ad Hoc Committee emphasised that before the implications of 
the Maltese proposal could be assessed in any definite manner 
the ground had to be prepared through legal studies and 
scientific technical evaluations. He considered it 11 quite 
clear 11 that, before treaties could be concluded, States 
would need "a great deal 11 more knowledge than they currently 
had at their disposal.1 9 
At the second session, the Committee discussed the 
proposals of various countries, in particular those of the 
U.S.S.R. and the u.s. Regarding scientific, technological 
and economic questions both the representatives of the Soviet 
Union and of the u.s. had welcomed the proposal for an Inter-
national Decade of Ocean Exploration which would include more 
than simply an expansion of existing international co-operative 
18. The first two sessions were held at the U.N. Headquarters 
from March 18 to 27, 1968, and June 17 to July 9, 1968. 
During the first session, a Legal Working Group, and a 
Technical and Economic Working Group were set up by the 
Committee. The Chairman distributed the work between 
the Committee and the two working groups. The Committee 
would deal with the political and international aspects 
of the subject, while each group should report to the 
Committee on the matters relating to its task. 
1 9 • U. N. Doc • A/ AC • 1 3 5/1 , pp .1 2 -1 7 • 
20 
efforts. The legal questions were extremely complex. 
A more precise definition of the notional jurisdiction of 
coastal states was necessary; this was also true for the 
outer boundaries of the Continental Shelf. 21 However, the 
Representative of the Soviet Union proposed the text of a 
draft resolution which would: (a) call on all States to 
utilise the seabed and the ocean floor "beyond the limits of 
territorial waters" exclusively for peaceful purposes, and 
196. 
(b) request the Eighteen-National Disarmament Committee (ENDC) 
to consider, "as an urgent matter," the issue of prohibiting 
th f th "d f "l"t 22 e use o e sal area or ml l ary purposes. 
As in the first session, the u.s. representative again 
avoided the legal issue by saying that a general agreement 
on every important point was necessary. According to him, if 
legal agreements were to be created for the seabed environment, 
they must rest on an accurate appreciation of both the 
physical features of the seabed and the technical and scienti-
fie capabilities for exploration and exploitation. However, 
he agreed with the Soviet Representative that the issue of 
prohibiting the use of the area for military purposes should 
20. 'rhe propos:al was declared both by the Bureau and Advisory 
Board of the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission 
and by President Johnson for the years 1970-1980; see 
U.N. Monthly Chronicle, July 1968, pp.47-48. 
21. Such views were advanced, inter alia, by Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France and Italy: U.N. Doc.A/AC.135/1, pp.26 and 
33. 
22. U.N. Doc.A/AC.135/20, June 20, 1968. 
be studied by the ENDc. 23 
A number of other draft resolutions were submitted for 
consideration by the Committee but it was decided to defer 
~ction to the third and final session. 24 
(c) The Ad Hoc Committee's Final Report 
The Committee held its third and final session in Rio 
de Janeiro from August 19 to 30. The Chairman in his final 
statement declared that in its three sessions the Committee 
had reached a wide measure of agreement which was "a solid 
foundation of achievement on which the General Assembly can 
build." The concluding part of the Report states that the 
Committee had studied the various aspects of the issue and 
had identified the main problems. It had recognised the 
need for further study and offered suggestions for this 
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purpose. Certain considerations which related to the seabed 
and ocean floor 11appeared to commend themselves with varying 
23. U.N. Doc.A/AC.135/24, June 28, 1968. At the ENDC meeting 
held in Geneva between July 15 and August 28, 1968, 
several suggestions were made with regard to the problem 
of the prevention of an arms race on the seabed. The 
Committee concluded that this subject would be a 
"fruitful area" for its future worl\:: U.N. Doc.A/7189/DC.231, 
p.6, para.29, September 4, 1968. 
24. Most of these proposals advocated the establishment of 
some form of internationalism, or urged that the present 
situation be frozen, or suggested that the Ad Hoc 
Committee recommended to the Assembly adoption of a 
declaration analogous to the Declaration regarding Outer 
Space. See in particular the Indian Declaration: U.N. 
Doc.A/AC.135/21, June 20, 1968. 
degrees of acceptance." In spite of efforts to the very end, 
however, "final agreement" on a set of principles could not 
be reached. 25 
The Report then lists two sets of draft principles -
one proposed by 15 developing countries, and another 
introduced informally by the U.K. The proposal submitted 
by developing countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin-America 
enunciates the following principles:-
1. The seabed and the ocean floor as defined in the title of 
the item are the common heritage of mankind and no state 
may claim sovereignty or exercise it over any part of the 
area.
26 
2. The exploration, use and exploitation of the seabed shall 
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be carried on exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
3. The exploration, use and exploitation of the area shall 
be carried out for the benefit and interest of mankind. 
4. It shall be carried out in accordance with the principles 
and purposes of the U.N. Charter "and an international 
regime to be established" with the purpose of contributing 
to the maintenance of peace, respect for territorial 
integrity, the interests of the coastal states, and the 
promotion of economic development, particularly of the 
developing countries whether coastal or land-locked. 
25. U.N. Doc.A/7230, p.17, paras, 87 and 88, September, 1968. 
26. This area was defined as the part of the seabed which lies 
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction. 
However, as stated earlier, this requires a more precise 
definition for the outer limits of present national jurisdiction; supra note 21. 
5. The international regime shall also consider the most 
appropriate application of benefits derived from activi-
ties in the seabed, throursh international machinery, for 
the economic, social, scientific and technological 
progressaf the developing countries. 
6. All activities in the seabed shall conform to a set of 
guidelines aimed at protecting the rightful interest 
of other states. 
7. The seabed shall be open to scientific investigation 
without discrimination, and states shall foster inter-
national co-operation in this investigation; and 
8. The U.N. with the Specialised Agencies shall ensure the 
observance of these principles and guidelines. 27 
During the discussion on these principles there was 
unanimity that the seabed beyond the limits of national 
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jurisdiction should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
The problem here is to determine the precise meaning of the 
word "peaceful." It may be interpreted as meaning either non-
military or non-aggressive. In the Antarctica Treaty and 
the treaty establishing the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, "peaceflul" means non-militai'Y. 28 However, its usual 
meaning in internationalJaw and in the context of the Charter 
27. The U.K. draft principles do not differ in substance from 
those already mentioned, except in minor details which do 
not call for comments. 
28. Article 1 of the Antarctica Treaty signed in 0ashington 
on December 1, 1959; and .Article 2 of the Atomic l!:nergy 
Agency established on 26 October, 1956: see also the 
Report of the ILA, 52nd Conference, 1966, p.17. 
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of the U.N. is non-aggressive. 29 Therefore, in the absence 
of any specific agreement to the contrary 9 11 peaceful 11 in the 
context of deep-sea floor must be taken in its ordinary 
meaning in international law, and be understood as non-
aggressive. 
It was also widely recognised that an internationally 
acceptable definition of the precise limits of the area under 
consideration was central to the whole question. This requires 
a more precise definition of the outer limit of the shelf. 
Connected with this question is the problem that limits of 
territorial waters are not fixed and vary from state to state. 
Finally, the proposed principles envisage free access by 
all nations to all areas of ocean space, the rejection of 
national claims to ocean space, and the creation of a U.N. 
authority to grant exploration and exploitation licences to 
states and international organisations.3° 
A list of draft resolutions and other proposals submitted 
during the three sessions of the Committee is annexed to the 
Heport, together with the reports of the t\'IO 'Harking Groups 
29. See r~~cf.1ahon, J. F. , 1 Legal Aspects of Outer Space, 1 BYIL, 
1962, p.339, at 360; see also Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty in AJIL, 1967, p.644. 
30. This part of the Report is similar to a resolution intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate by Senator Pell of Rhode Island, 
calling for efforts to secure General Assembly action on 
a proposed "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Exploitation 
of Ocean Space." Later Senator Pell introduced a revised 
resolution setting forth a draft treaty instead of a 
declaration; seeS. Res.186, 90th Gong. Sess. Nov.17, 1967, 
and S. Res. March 5, 1968. 
and a list of documentation prepared by the Secretariat for 
the consideration of the Committee. The resolutions refer 
JGo such matters as the prohibition of military uses of the 
seabed, principl~s governing the activities of states in 
the environment, a U.S. proposal for an International Decade 
of Ocean Exploration, and a proposal by Iceland aimed at 
pPeventing ocean pollution as a result of seabed exploration. 
This Report and the annex to it were submitted to the General 
Assembly for consideration at its 23rd regular session. 
(d) The General Assembly's Four Resolutions 
The F'inal Report of the Ad Hoc Committee was considered 
I 
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by the First Committee of the General Assembly, at 18 meetings 
held between 28 October, 1968~and 11 November, 1968,during 
which the Committee studied various draft resolutions. 31 The 
Committee deferred voting on these resolutions until December 
1968. 
In its Final Report to the General Assembly, the First 
Committee recommended four draft resolutions on the subject 
which was considered by the Ad Hoc Committee.32 In draft 
resolution A, the FiPst Committee recommends the establish-
ment of a permanent Committee on the peaceful uses of the 
seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. The duty of this Committee would be to study 
31. See ti.N. Monthly Chronicle, December 1968, pp.53-61. 
32. See Resolutions A, B, C, and D in paPagraph 27 of the 
First Committee's Final Report to the General Assembly, 
No.A/7477, December 20, 1968. 
the elaboration o~ the legal principles and norms which 
would promote international co-operation in the exploration 
and use of submarine areas beyond national jurisdiction for 
the benefit of mankind as a whole. Such co-operation would 
include the prevention of marine pollution and the use of 
such areas exclusively for peace~ul purposes. To that end 
the Committee should work in close co-operation with the 
specialised agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the inter-governmental bodies dealing with the problems 
referred to in this proposed resolution.33 
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Draft r~solution B calls upon states to adopt appropriate 
safeguards against the dangers of pollution and other 
hazardous and harm~ul effects that might arise from the 
exploration and exploitation o~ the areas concerned. 34 
Draft resolution C requests the Secretary-General of 
the U.N. to undertake a study on the question of establishing 
in due time appropriate international machinery for the 
promotion of the exploration and exploitation of the resources 
of this area and the use of these resources in the interests 
of mankind. 35 
Finally, according to draft resoltuion D the concept 
of an Internal Decade of Ocean Exploration should be undertaken 
33. This draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee 
by 96.0.6. 
34. The First Committee adopted this resolution by 101 .0.1. 
35. Unlike the three other resolutions, this was subject to 
much criticism from the socialist block. It was adopted 
by 77.9.18.; ~or ~urther details see below. 
within the framework of a long-term programme of research 
and exploration and the aegis of the U.N. Member states 
are invited to formulate proposals for national and inter-
national programmes to be undertaken during the Decade with 
due interest to the developing countries. Such proposals 
should be submitted to the U.N.E.s.c.o. for the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission in time to begin 
the Decade in 1970.36 
These four resolutions were approved by the General 
Assembly. 37 It was also agreed that the new permanent 
Committee, which replaces the Ad Hoc Committee, shall be 
42 members. 38 'fhe extra seven seats went mainly to South 
America and to the Afro-Asian developing countries. 
The main objection of the U.S.S.R. on resolution A 
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was that the draft did not explicitly i.ncl ude the Continental 
Shelf within the limits of the area to be used exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union was resolutely in 
favour of prohibiting military use of the seabed and the 
ocean floor, including the entire Continental Shelf. It also 
felt that the membership of the Standing Committee, as now 
36. This draft.was adopted by 101 .0.2. 
37. See Resolutions 2467 A-D (XXIII), A/PV.1752, December 22, 
1968. Resolution A was adopted by 112.0.7, with the 
abstention of the U.S.S.R. Resolution B was adopted 
unanimously. Resolution C was adopted by 85.9.25, with 
the abstention of both the U.K. and the u.s.A., while 
U.S.S.R. voted against. Resolution D was adopted without 
a vote. 
38. The Ad Hoc Committee comprised 35 members. 
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defined, meant that the socialist countries were inadequately 
represented; at least one additional seat should be granted 
to them if the Committee was to have a wider membership than 
that of the Ad Hoc Committee.39 According to the Soviet 
representative, the membership of the Committee, which 
would be dealing with questions of war and peace, should be 
determined through a political, not an arithmetical, approach.40 
Accordingly the U.S.S.R. abstained in the v~te on that 
~esolution expressing its support to the idea of setting up 
the Committee. 
As in the First Committee, the U.S.S.R. voted against 
draft resolution C because it objected to establishing 
machinery that would serve only the interests of capitalist 
and imperialist monopolies. The Soviet representative said 
that the vote on the resolutions had shown that there was a 
broad consensus on most of the issues under consideration; 
only on the establishment of international machinery was 
there no consensus.41 Concluding the U.S.S.R. representative 
said that the work of the Standing Committee, if it acted 
in accordance with the interests of all states and if its 
decisions and recommendations reflected a universally held 
viewpoint, would be useful.42 
39. The socialist countries received six seats in each of the 
Ad Hoc Committee and in the permanent Committee. In other 
words, the socialist block gained nothing of the extra 
seven seats in the new Committee. 
40. See U.N. Doc.A/PV.1752, pp.27, 28, December 21, 1968. 
41. Ibid, at p.31. 
42. Ibid, at p.32. 
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Finally, the established Committee held its first 
session on 6 and 7 February. At the three meetings comprising 
the session, the Committee elected its officers, discussed 
its worlcing methods and agreed to hold two sessions in New 
York from 10 to 28 March, 1969, and 11 to 28 August, 1969.43 
It is hoped that the progress made by the General Assembly 
in adopting these four resolutions would be implemented by 
the Special Committee which was set up for this purpose. 
3. The Problem before the !LA 
'rhe ILA gave special consideration to the legal regime 
of deep-sea mining at its 52nd Conference held in Helsiruti, 
1966. The Conference examined two preliminary questions 9 
namely: 
(1) Are mineral resources present in the ocean bed in 
commercial quantities? 
(2) If the question under (1) can be answered affirmatively, 
is it technically possible to exploit these mineral 
resources? 
After the Conference had answered both questions affirmatively 9 
it turned to discuss and devise a distinct legal regime for 
deep-sea mining.44 To that end the Conference rejected the 
application of the criterion of exploitability in Article 1 
of the Shelf Convention, since that would lead to the parti-
tioning of the submarine areas of the oceans between coastal 
43. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, March, 1969. 
44. ILA, 52nd Conference, 1966, p.787. 
states, which, according to the Conference, exceeds the 
intention of the Convention to an unacceptable degree. 45 
Accordingly, the Conference had before it three different 
approaches to the problem: 
(1) That deep-sea mining should be governed by the principle 
of the freedom of the seas. This was rejected because 
the Conference realised that nobody would make large 
investments for exploration purposes in any area of 
the ocean floor where everyone else could freely drill 
in the same area and make a profit from this discovery. 
(2) The partitioning of the ocean floor. This was also 
ruled out because it gives the coastal state a 
privileged position since there is no natural link 
between the coastal state and the ocean bed. In 
addition the choice of the basis on VIhich the partition 
will have to take place may lead to great difficulties, 
some of which are the present day problems of 
delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arabian-
Persian Gulf and the North Sea. 
(3) The institution of an international legal regime. This 
can be developed along the following lines: 
(a) a special convention on deep-sea mining 
(b) the supervision of the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources could 
be submitted to a deep-sea mining authority, 
45. Ibid, at p.788. 
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as an international organisation under the 
auspices of the U.N., and 
(c) The exploration and exploitation of the 
mineral resources would not take place by 
the U.N. itself because of the enormous 
financial risks involved.46 
One of the main advantages of this proposal is that 
exploration and exploitation levies would benefit the U.N. 
and, accordingly, the whole community of states. 
Finally, the Conference recommended the establishment 
of an International Committee for the study of the legal 
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regime of deep-sea mining. This Committee which was set up 
in 1967, submitted a preliminary report with two main 
proposals:47 
(t) That the outer limit of the Continental Shelf should be 
drawn at a depth of 500 metres,48 and 
( 2) A treaty-based regime for the ocean bed and its subsoil 
should give control of these areas to a specialised 
46. This proposal is based on the Report of the Netherlands 
Branch Committee to the Conference, supra, p.797. 
47. ILA, International Committee on Deep-sea Mining; 
L. J. Bouchez, Rapporteur; Report on the Exploration and 
Exploitation of Minerals on the Ocean Bed and in its 
Subsoil, January 24, 1967. 
48. In a subsequent Draft Report, November 22, 1967, the 500 
metre isobath was linked with a distance criterion from 
the coast. In the Final Report of the Commitlt.ee, dated 
21 February, 1968, the same limit, with variations 
thereon, is recommended to the 53rd Conf'erence of the 
Association. 
agency of the U.N. which would be empowered to give 
concessions and collect levies but vwuld neither 
in~olve itself in the financial risks nor undertake 
exploration and exploitation.49 
4. The Problem on the l\~ational Level 
Official u.s. interest in deep-sea resources has also 
increased dramatically in the past three years. By the 
P:larine Resources and Engineering Development Act of June 1 7, 
1966, Congress created both a National Council on Marine 
Resources and Engineering Development, and a Commission on 
Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. 50 Both bodies 
are currently engaged in wide-ranging studies of national 
needs and goals in this field, including points of inter-
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national law and relations. Their reports and recommendations 
L~9. The ILA held its 53rd Conference in Buenos Aires, in 
August, 1968. It is understood that this subject has 
received a special consideration by the various Branches 
of the Association, in particular the British and the 
Netherlands Committees on Deep-sea Mining. As the 
Conference's Report was received too late to allow any 
further discussions on the subject, it would be sufficient 
to mention, here, that the Conference has adopted a 
resolution by which it requests the International Committee 
to continue its work. The Conference declared that various 
regimes -freedom of exploration and exploitation; the 
right of the first occupier; the granting of concessions 
by a super national authority - may be considered for 
adoption in respect of the areas beyond the depth of 200 
metres. The Conference also realised that the importance 
of the investments necessary for submarine exploration 
and exploitation requires a regime offering a satisfactory 
degree of security. Accordingly, the Conference directed 
the Committee to examine this question in all its aspects: 
See Bulletin of the 53rd Conference, Buenos Aires, 
25th-31st August, 1968, pp.20-21. 
50. 80 Stat. 203, 33 U.S.C. Sess.1101-1108. 
may be expected to have substantial influence on the course 
of American policy. 51 In the Congress itself the subject 
has also received increasing attention. 52 In addition to 
this official activity, many private American Groups, both 
legal and technical, are involved in conferences and study 
projects on various aspects of deep-sea development.53 In 
the following section, some of the views expressed there 
will.be displayed and looked at more closely. 
51. See Marine Science Affairs, 1967, 'A year of Transition: 
First report of the President to the Congress on Marine 
Resources and Engineering Development;' see also 'A 
Year of Plans and Progress: Second Report of the 
President,' in the 1968 Marine Science Affairs. 
52. Supra, notes 15 and 30. 
53. Among the Conferences which were held during the year 1967 
are the following: A Conference by the American Bar 
Association, Institute on Marine Resources, held in June, 
1967, Long Beach, California; the Conference on Law, 
Organisation, and Security in the Use of the Ocean, 
Columbus, Ohio, March, 1967; The Conference on Marine 
Frontiers, University of Rhode Island, July, 1967; and 
the Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Rhode Island, June, 1967. 
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Section II - Optional Criteria for Deep-sea Mineral 
1 • The Present Status of Deep-sea Floor 
The present international law of the sea provides for 
freedom of the high seas for various purposes with recog-
nition of the need for regulation of fisheries for purposes 
of conservation; for sovereignty of the maritime belt by the 
adjacent state subject to the right of innocent passage by 
vessels of all states; and for the exclusive right to 
exploit the resources of the shelf by the adjacent state. 
According to some writers, this latter right, i.e. 
the right to exploit the resources of the shelf, extends to 
all submarine areas including the bottom of the oceans.54 
As we have seen earlier, the principal legal argument in 
support of this view is based on the language of Article 1 
of the Continental Shelf Convention.55 If technology mal{es 
exploitation activity possible anywhere in the deep-sea, 
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the argL~ent goes, then the limits of coastal state jurisdic-
tion are automatically extended w1der this language up to 
the point Ythepe Article 6 of the Convention comes into play 
54. See note 130 in Part One. 
55. Ibid. 
to establish boundaries with other coastal states whose 
sovereign rights have been similarly extended.56 
It has been suggested that this litteral interpretation 
of Article 1 of the Convention produces several desirable 
effects: it attributes authority and responsibility to a 
particular state, establishes a uniform seabed regime from 
the coast out"IJard, reduces chances of conflict, and promotes 
the certainty and stability necessary to encourage entre-
preneurs. 57 
On the other hand, it is asserted that such construction 
of Article 1 rests on unsound grounds. 58 The Continental 
Shelf Convention was designed to apply to limited off-shore 
areas related to the neighbouring coast. Although the legal 
shelf concept is broader than its physical counterpart, the 
use of the term "Continental Shelf" itself implies a distinc-
tion bet'.'lfeen the areas so defined and the floor of the great 
oceans. The key phrase in this connection is the reference 
in Article 1 to 11 submarine areas adjacent to the coast." 
\fhi+e 11 adjacency" is not specifically defined, it undoubtedly 
conveys a· notion of limitation which cannot be reconciled 
with indefinite extension into the vast oceans.59 In 
56. Hotes 128 and 129 in Part One. 
57. Uero, The ~ineral Resources of the Sea, 1965, pp.289-290; 
and also CI•aven, 'Technology and the LavJ of the Sea,' 
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paper presented at Columbus Conference, Ohio, note 40 above. 
58. Young, 'The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor,' AJIL, 
1968, p.641, at 6L~. 
59. Ibid. 
addition, the work of the ILC and the 1958 Conference 
suggests that these groups did not think in terms of the 
bed of the deep sea at all, simply because it did not then 
appear to be within reach. 60 
If the Continental Shelf doctrine does not apply beyond 
a certain limit, though one not yet defined, the present 
status of the deep-sea floor must be determined by recourse 
to other principles of customary law. From this point of 
view, the concept of "freedom of the seas 11 covers the bed of 
the sea as well as the waters above it. 61 If the principle 
of acquisition by discovery and occupation were applied to 
this vast area, as it was to the American continents after 
their discovery by Europeans, the world would be faced by 
rivalries and wars even ·worse than those of the last few 
centuries among the maritime nations. 
Therefore, in the interests of world peace, of efficient 
exploitation of vast resources, and of equitable opportunity 
60. See remarks made by Scelle, Fitzmaurice, and Amador in 
1YBILC, 1956, pp.135, 137; and also Mouton's. statement 
in the Fourth Committee, supra note 130 in Part One. 
61. However, as stated in Part Two, Section !(1 ), writers 
are divided on the status of submarine arease Those who 
suggested that sul:;lmarine areas are res nullius were 
faced with the problem of "effective occupation" on the 
seabed, a problem which presents itself more seriously 
on the bottom of the oceans. Young, infra note 64, is 
of the opinion that the existing customary law allows 
a state to acquire rights of a territorial character 
over a portion of ocean bottom through occupation. This 
view is supported in some measure by a limited amount of 
practice with respect to such resources as sedentary 
fisheries. 
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to develop and utilise these resources by all nations and 
peoples, the agreements concerning Antarctica and the Outer 
Space point the way to a general agreement on the bed of the 
high seas. To that end several alternative regimes for 
governing mineral exploitation of the deep-sea have been 
suggested. Before dealing with those alternatives, it is 
even more important that the outer limits of the shelf be 
fixed to avoid any serious international controversy. 
2. The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf 
With regard to the outer limit of the shelf, various 
suggestions have been made in the past. These are:-
62 (1) Definition based on depth only. 
(2) Definition based on a distance from the coast, 63 and 
(3) Definition in terms of a minimum and a maximum dis-
tance. The minimum distance to be stated in miles 
irrespective of depth, or whether the seabed could 
or could not be worked. All the shallows included 
within such limits would belong to the Continental 
Shelf. The maximum distance, on the other hand, 
would depend on depth. 64 
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62. A depth of 550 metres was advocated in Geneva by the Indian, 
Netherlands and U.K. delegations. Another depth of 500 
metres was recommended by the International Committee on 
Deep-Sea Mining in its Report to the ILA, supra note.48; 
for further details, see Brown, infra notes 65 and 66. 
63. See Brown, infra notes 65 and 66. 
64. This proposal was suggested by Mr. El Khoury to the ILC, 
1YBILC, 1951, p.271, paras,74 and 75. Along these lines, 
Mr. Young has recently suggested a limit of 300 metres 
depth or 100 miles line from the coast whichever 
is greater. See Young, "The Limits of the Continental 
(Contd.) 
Declining to agree on any criterion based on depth, 
Mr. Brown favoured a definition in terms of a distance from 
the coast which, according to him, vJould seem open to fewer 
objections than any other. 65 In hi8 opinion, the outer 
limit of Continental Shelf should be one which satisfies 
these tests:-
"(a) The line should be so drawn as to honour existing 
vested rights based upon the formulation of Article 1. What 
constitutes a vested right - for example, does the state 
have a vested right in an area merely because it has been 
subject to Continental Shelf legislation even though no 
concessions,have been granted? - and whether an extensive 
or restricted interpretation of Article 1 is to be relied on, 
are questions which would probably not cause much difficulty 
in practise if the proposals made below were accepted. 
(b) The line should be independent of any particular 
depth criterion so far suggested since any such criterion, 
either by design or in effect, might limit the exclusive 
zone to states possessing a geological Continental Shelf. 
This would be quite unacceptable to less fortunate states. 
A horizontal distance criterion might be a more useful test. 
It is open to the objection that equality of breadth of 
Shelf - and Beyond, 11 American Society of International 
Law, April, 1968, p.229, at p.233. 
65. Brown, E. D., ''rhe Outei' Limit of the Continental Shelf, ' 
The Juridical Review, August 1968, p.141. 
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exclusive zone is no guarantee of equality in resources and 
there would still remain problems relating to deposits 
extending beyond the outer limit of the zone. These draw-
backs seem to be common, however, to any fixed outer limit. 
(c) The outer limit should be such as will satisfy the 
security requirements of the coastal state. A coastal state 
cannot be expected to accept any regime which would require 
it to tolerate exploration and exploitation of the seabed 
off its coast by a foreign power. However, the distance 
out at which this immunity can be expected to be recognised 
would perhaps be covered by criterion (a) above, i.e. a 
line honouring existing vested rights. 
(d) The line should be drawn at such a distance as 
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will satisfy the requirement that resources beyond the outer 
limit are exploitable without the co-operation of the nearest 
coastal state. States would not accept a regime if it 
allowed foreign states to exploit areas which could only be 
exploited if the coastal state granted landing, storage, 
transport and supply facilities. 
(e) It seems desirable that any new regime should be 
capable of facilitating a settlement with the Latin-American 
States over the question of delimitation of maritime areas. 
Agreement on a 200-mile limit would go some way in this 
direction though, in itself, it would not deal with the more 
extreme claims over the high seas. 
(f) The outer line should be so drawn as to cater for 
the interests of the developing states by preserving for 
them exclusive exploitation rights inconsiderable submarine 
66 
areas." 
Mr. Brovm concludes by saying, "The exact distance 
would, of course, be negotiable but it is suggested that a 
line drawn at a distance of 200 miles from the low-water 
line of the coast would meet the above requirements to a 
considerable degree. The fact that previous attempts to 
introduce the idea of a horizontal limit were unsuccessful 
is not necessarily a good reason for rejecting such a 
21 6. 
proposal in the context of an altered appreciation of the 
exploitability of the deep seas and the ambiguity of the 
present positiono" 67 
Certain points in this analysis call for comment. First, 
with regard to "vested rights" mentioned in paragraph (a) 
above, it is apparent that the extent of these rights depends 
on the extent of the Continental Shelf, which is the matter 
of dispute. In other words, if the extent of such rights 
were known there would not have been any need to call for 
fixing the outer limit of the shelf. As to what might 
constitute a 'vested right' under Article 1, the passing of 
66. BroVJn, "Deep-Sea Mining: the Legal Regime of Inner Space," 
YBWA, 1968, pp.179-180. 
67. Ibid. The two articles, referred to in notes 65 and 66 
above, comprise the main part of a report submitted by 
Mr. Brown, Rapporteur of the British Branch Committee on 
Deep-Sea Mining, to the 53rd Conference of the ILA. 
legislation or the granting of concessions, in so far as the 
existence of the right, and not the determination of its 
extent, is concerned, is completely irrelevant by virtue of 
Article 2(3) of the Convention. 68 Secondly, as to paragraph 
(c) above, Professor Schwarzenberger attaches to this aspect 
of the matter as little weight as he does to the sufficiency 
from the point of view of national defence of the breadth 
of the territorial sea under existing international law. 69 
In fact the security argument sounds weak and out of date 
in the light of modern warfare. Thirdly, paragraph (d) does 
not suggest any precise and uniform boundary. 1'he ability 
of foreign states to exploit oertain submarine areas without 
the co-operation of the nearest coastal state is something 
which relates to the efficiency of each particular state, a 
matter which has to be determined by every-day state of 
technology. Fourthly, the fact that the adoption of a 200-
21 7. 
mile limit would go some way in the direction of a settlement 
with the Latin-American countries, as suggested in (e), does 
not justify its adoption. The practice of the Latin-American 
countries, which is incompatible with the rules of the 
Convention, has been regarded by many countries as an 
encroachment on the freedom of the high seas. It goes without 
68. Article 2(3) states, 'The rights of the coastal state 
over the Continental Shelf do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation;' 
supra, p.1 OL~. 
69. Schv1arzenberger, supra note 170 in Part Two, at pp.351-
352. 
saying that this practice, which lacks uniformity and 
generality, is far from becoming part of customary inter-
national law. Finally, Mr. Brown himself admits somewhere 
else that the pr•oposed 200 miles, while it goes far beyond 
the outer linli t of many shelves, would fall far short of 
including the whole of the geological shelves in some parts 
of the world.70 
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It would seem that the third suggestion, i.e. definition 
in terms of a minimum and a maximum distance, could 
adequately meet the interests of the coastal states in the 
area of their Continental Shelf. 'l'he advantage of having 
such a definition is that the minimum distance would secure 
a precise and uniform limit for all coastal states; while 
the maximum criterion of depth covers the interests of 
coastal states enjoying an extensive shelf of shallow seas. 
Such definition cannot be but just and equitable, because, 
as stated by the ICJ, "Equity does not necessarily imply 
equality ••••••••••. 1171 between states; otherwise there is 
no reason why non-coastal states should be excluded from this 
right. Moreover, it is a fact that equality in shares does 
not produce equality in nattiTal resources and benefits. The 
extent and the value of any Continental Shelf depend on 
geological and geographical realities of every coastal area. 
In this context the words of Professor Green immediately come 
70. Brown4 'The Outer Limit note , pp.141 -142. •••••••••• ', supra note 65, in 
71. The ICJ Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
supra note 257 in Part Tow. 
to mind, "Vihen Adam made his will he was so unconcerned with 
the equal rights of his children, that there are some states 
YJhere the land mass does in fact end abruptly and there is 
no Continental Shelf."72 
Therefore~ the definition of the Continental Shelf may 
be worded as follows: 
"Legally the Continental Shelf is constituted by the 
seabed and the subsoil of the submarine regions 
situated off the territorial waters, to a minimum 
distance of x miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, irrespective 
of the depth of the water, or to a maximum depth of Y 
metres (or fathoms) irrespective of distance." 
Whether this minimum distance is 20, or 100, or more 
miles, and this maximum depth is 200, or 550, or more metres, 
is a matter for negotiation. 
3. Alternative Regimes for Deep-Sea Floor 
As a result of the defects seen in the occupation theory, 
four alternative regimes have been suggested for meeting the 
problems raised by the potential development of minerals of 
the sea floor: 73 
72. Green, L. c., 'Freedom of the Seas -The Continental 
Shelf,' CL~, 1959, p.228. 
73. These alternatives are attributed mainly to the following 
writers: Christy, F.T., 'Alternative Regimes for Marine 
Resources Underlying the High Seas,' paper presented at 
the Long Beach Conference, supra note 40; also by the 
same writer, 'Economic Criteria for Deep-Sea !!Iinerals, ' 
2 International Lawyer, 1968, p.224; Young, R., 'The 
Legal Regime •• 0 ••• o 0 o.,' supra note 45; Ely, N., 'The 
(Contd.) 
A. The Division of the Sea Floor Among Coastal States 
This is effected by the extension of the shelf' doctrine 
to all deep sea areas so that none of it remains outside the 
jurisdiction of some coastal state. Under this division, 
islands play a particularly. important role, because of their 
strategic locations off the coasts of the continents. Such 
tiny rocks as Clipperton Island would give France a vast 
territory in the eastern tropical Pacific, and the cr.K. 
would acquire half the South Atlantic because of Ascention, 
St. Helena, and Tristan da Cunha. The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, would obtain relativel,y litte. States without 
territory fronting on the great oceans would be excluded 
entirely. If rights are limited to those islands that are 
sovereign states, the u.s., for example, would be able to 
leap over Bermuda and the Bahamas, but would have to give 
up areas accruing to Hawaii and the Aleutians. 
Another scheme along these lines has been suggested by 
Bernfield.74 It provides that the beds of all the Great 
Seas shall be divided by a median line through the longest 
dimension of each, and then run each coastal nation's rights 
Laws Governing tdinerals Beneath the Sea,' American 
Institute of Mining, New York, Jan.13, 1966; also by 
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the same writer, 'The Administration of hlineral Resources 
underlying the High Seas,' Long Beach Conference, loc. 
cit., and, 'Options in Under Sea Mineral Resources,' 
Long Beach Conference; and Goldie, 'The Geneva Conventions' 
in Lewis Alexander's The I .. aw of the Sea, 1967, pp.273-283e 
74. Bernfield, S. S., ;'Developing the Resources of the Sea-
Security Investment," International Lawyer, 1967, 
PP .67-73. 
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to the seabed to that median between the lines of latitude 
and longitude, as the case might be, from the nation's coastal 
extremities. 
It is most unlikely that the Soviet Union, in addition 
to many other nations that have little or no toe-hold on 
the oceans, would find such schemes to its advantage.75 
B. The Flag-Nation Approach: A Revision of the Occupation 
'rheory 
Under this approach, the "mineral resources" which are 
beyond the coastal states exclusive jurisdiction would be 
treated as open to appropriation and exploitation by the flag 
of the discovering expedition. 'rhere is no argument about 
the geographical extent of the appropriative right unless 
and until a neighbour sets up operations close enough to 
create friction. This system would presumably require some 
affirmative declaration by the flag nation, or some kind of 
international registry office in which national claims to 
specific ocean floor would be recorded in order to acquire 
validity as against other states, and to assure the entre-
preneur that he would be protected in exploiting a particular 
area for a sufficient length of time to get an adequate 
return on his investment. Competing claims might be refused 
registration until settled by neaotiation or by decision of 
the registry or some other impartial body.76 
75. In this context, Christy, 'Economic Criteria ••·"·· supra 
Eo.73, says, "It is unrealistic to think that any 
solution would be viable in the absence of Soviet 
acquiscence." 
76. Ely, 'The Lavis Governing Exploi ta ti on •••••• ' , supra No. 73, 
at pp.377 and 378. 
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Since rights can only be acquired through actual 
exploitation, and since not more than a handful of nations 
are lilcely to have bona fide interests in exploitation, the 
opposition to such an alternative would inde~d be heavy. 
C. An International Registry Office 
This alternative might be considered as falling somewhere 
between the flag nation approach and that of an international 
authority: Like the flag approach, the initiative, under 
this scheme, would lie with the entrepreneur. He would 
record his claim with his country, and his country 'flould 
then record its international claim to exercise jurisdiction 
and control over the entrepreneur's activity with the 
recording agency. The agency would have poDer to issue 
instruments defining the recordinz s-tate's 'Zone of Special 
Jurisdictione' The zone Tiould be limited ~ith respect to 
purposej duration, area and time in which to prove develop-
ment. International recorded claims vlould be protected by 
their reco,3nition in the courts of all states parties to 
the agreement. Finally, charges by the agency for the 
registration of the requisite instrwnents should not exceed 
the costs incurred by the agency for gurposes of administerint; 
its registerin~ system. 77 
77o Goldie, 'The Geneva Conventions,' supPa Ko.73 at pp.281, 
282 and 283. 
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An effective re~ime of this sort would provide more 
security of title than a fla~-nation re.:;ime. I-Io\"Jever, it 
is difficult to see how this regime would operate on anything 
but a 'first come, first served' basis, and it would tend 
to stimulate 'over-capitalisation' and 'congestion' rather 
than avoid them.78 It would appear that the exclusive 
ri~hts would go to the first entrepreneur to record them; 
but the first to record would not necessarily be the most 
efficient producer. As a result the losers are not only 
those who might be best equipped to exploit the resources, 
but also society in that less productive units of capital 
and labour may be employed. In addition the performance 
requirement "use it or lose it" would tend to stimulate 
excessively rapid rates of output. 79 Those v1ho had recorded 
claims vvould have the incentive to produce, even though net 
returns were inadequate or negative, since they mi5ht lose 
the claim by not producing.80 All of these difficulties 
could be a stumbling block to general acceptance. 
78. Ibid. p.280; such tactics were rejected by Goldie before 
he spelt out the princip+es of his regime. 
79. Christy, supra No.75, p.238. 
80. Goldie, supra, suggests, at p.283, that states uhich 
record instruments giving notice of their sovereign 
rights over the working of a resource should be 
required to exercise effective control over the working; 
otherwise they lose the right to such appropriations. 
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D. An International Authority 
This fourth proposal is an extension of the above; the 
chief difference is that it envisages some form of regime in 
which exclusive rights over the resources of the deep sea 
bottom would be vested in the international community and 
administered by some international body. It is based on the 
belief that it would be in the best interest of manldnd 
generally that these resources, now outside national 
jurisdiction, should continue to remain so and be developed 
under the auspices of and for the benefit of the. international 
community as a whole. 
It is suggested that the authority need not operate 
under the aegis of the U.N. 81 However, the U.N. does not 
have, at present, an agency that is equipped to deal with 
such an authority. If the international authority were to 
be established within the U.N. structure, it would be clearly 
desirable for the authority to have a high degree of autonomy, 
similar to that of the World Bank, so that it might operate 
without pressure from the General Assembly. 
It is also suggested that the authority should not have 
the function of distributing the revenues received from the 
82 
market. The revenues above the costs of administration 
should be turned over to another agency for distribution~ 83 
81. Christy, loc.cit., at p.240. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. In 'Alternative Regimes ••••••• ', supra No.73, at 
p.76, Christy suggests the General Assembly as the body 
for such distribution. 
The revenues might be distributed in any of several ways. 
At one extreme, they might be used for the general support 
of the U.N. At another extreme, the revenues miGht be 
returned to the exploiti~ nations. A more likely possibi-
lity is that the revenues would be devoted to some widely 
accepted goal, such as the overcoming of malnutrition. 
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These suggestions for the operation of an international 
authority do no more than characterise its nature. Obviously, 
many difficulties ~ould have to be overc6me and many interest-
ing questions of law would have to be answered. However, the 
acceptability of such a regime would depend upon how the 
exploiting nations would view their ability to complete in 
the market and upon how the non-exploiting nations would view 
their returns. With regard to the latter, the first two 
regimes would provide them nothing. The third alternative 
would also provide them nothing unless there is a provision 
for sharing revenues. Hence, they would do better if they 
support an international authority scheme which it is hoped 
to work under the U.N. for the benefit of all mankind. 
Conclusion 
The C·oncl us ion to be drawn f'rom these observations is 
that the freedom of the high seas in regard to use means 
that each state has the right to use and exploit the high 
seas, and each state has the duty to respect the similar 
right of other states. Freedom of the high seas in regard 
to jurisdiction does not mean that the high seas are subject 
to no state's jurisdiction. It means that the high seas are 
subject to the j~risdiction of each state but only as to its 
nationals and ships. 
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For years international jurists have debated whether the 
seabed of the high seas is res communis like the waters above 
it or whether it is simply territory covered by water and 
theref'ore res nullius. The latter view seems now to be well 
on its way to victory by reason of' the Continental Shelf 
doctrine which assigns sea bottom sovereign rights to the 
adjacent coastal state. 
Propinquity is the basis for allocating to the coastal 
state sovereign rights in the seabed and subsoil of the 
Continental Shelf'. In the absence of a conventional outer 
limit, the juridical shelf terminates where propinquity 
terminates. It must be anticipated that claims to sovereignty 
of the deep sea bottom will be predicted upon "eff'ective 
occupation." Short of claims to sovereignty, states may 
seek to carve out an area of sea bottom for a particular 
exclusive use, or f'or all purposes, for a short or longer 
period. 
Propinquity as the basis for allocating rights in the 
Continental Shelf' has the virtue of preserving shelf 
resources for the benef'it of' the coastal state until it can 
exploit them by itself or by lease to others. Effective 
occupation as the basis for allocating rights in the deep sea 
bottom will mean a race between the technological "have" 
atates, with the technological "have nots" as spectators. 
The undesirability of such a race is self-evident. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the emerging law of 
ocean space will be to balance the interests of the world 
community and the individual states in order to maximise 
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the beneficial uses of global ocean space in the self interest 
of all. Such a policy was charted by President Johnson in 
his remarks at the Commissioning of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey's new ship, 088 Oceanographer, on July 13, 1966:-
"We meet here today at the beginning of a new age of 
exploration. To some this might mean our adventures in 
outer space. But I am speaking of exploring an unknmllfn 
world at our door step. It is really our last f~ontier 
here on earth. I am speaking of mountain chains that 
are yet to be discovered, of national resources that 
are yet to be tapped, of a vast wilderness that is yet 
to be charted. 
This is the sea around us •••••••• Truly great 
accomplishments of oceanography will require the co-
operation of all the maritime nations of the world. 
'l'oday I send out from this platform calling for such 
co-operation, requestinc~ it and urging it ••••.• under 
no circumstance, we believe, must we ever allow the 
prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to 
create a new form of colonial competition among the 
maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race 
to grasp and to hold the lands under the high seas. 
\Ve must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean 
bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human 
beings." 
It may be hoped that this would be regarded as a 
declaration of the true intention of the u.s. to devote its 
best efforts in oceanic science and technology to the 
promotion of peace and happiness for the international 
community as a whole. 
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-Appendix I 
Convention on the Continental Shrlf 
Done at Geneva on 29 April 1958 
Entry into Force: 10 June 1964, in accordance with article 11, 
Ralificaliau, accession (a), 
_,.,.,,,. SigPJa/u1·c IIOiificalioll of succession (d) 
AFGIIANISTAN •••••••••• 0 0 .30 October 1958 
ALBANIA •••••••••• 0 •••••• 7 December 1964 a 
ARGENTINA •••••••••••••• 0 29 April 1958 
AUSTRALIA • 0 ••••• 0 •• •.• 0 •• 30 October 1958 14 May 1963 
noLrVIA o o o o o o o o o o o o o I o o o I 17 October 1958 
JkLGARIA ' ................ 31 August 1962 a 
13\'ELOR{jSSJAN SSR •• 0 ••••• 31 October 1958 27 February 1961 
(A~fnQDIA . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 18 March 1960 a 
CANADA ••••••••••••••••• 0 29 April 1958 
CEYLON ••• 0 •••••• 0 ••••••• 30 October 1958 
CmLE ................... 31 October 1958 
CTIINA •••••••••••••• 0 0 ••• 29 April 1958 
(OLOMBIA ................ 29 April 1958 8 January 1962 
CosTA I\ rcA .. , ............ 29 April 1958 
CPnA ••••••••••••• 0 •••••• 29 April 1958 
CzECHOSLOVAKIA • 0 ••• 0 •••• 31 October 1958 31 August 1961 
DENMARK ................ 29 April 1958 12 June 1963 
DOliiiNICAN REPUBLIC ..... 29 April 1958 11 August 1964 
EcuADOR ................. 31 October 1958 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY .............. 30 October 1958 
FINLAND ................. 27 October 1958 16 February 1965 
FRANCE ................. 14 June 1965 a 
GHANA ................... 29 April 1958 
GuATEMALA .............. 29 April 1958 27 November 1961 
HAITI 29 April 1958 29 March 1960 .................... 
ICELAND ................. 29 April 1958 
!NOONESIA ••••••••••••••• 0 8 May 1958 
IRy .................... 28 May 1958 
IRELAND ................... 2 October 1958 
ISRAEL •••••••••••••••• 0 •• 29 April 1958 6 September 1961 
JAMAICA ... 8 October 1965 a .................. 
LEBANON ................. 29 May 1958 
LIBERIA ............... ··'. 27 May 1958 
MADAGASCAR .............. 31 July 1962 a 
MALAWI ••••• • •• 0 •••••••••• 3 November 1965 a 
MALAYSIA •••••••• 0 0 •••••• 21 December 1960a 
MALTA ................... 19 May 1966d 
YfEXICO .................. 2 August 1966a 
NEPAL .................... 29 April 195R 
NETHERLANDS ............. 31 October 1958 18 February 1966 
NEW ZEALAND ............ 29 October 1958 18 January 1965 
PAKISTAN ................ 31 October 1958 
PANAMA ................. 2 May 1958 
PERU ••••••• 0 •••••••••••• 31 October 1958 
POLA:-JD •••• 0. 0 ••••••••••• 31 October 1958 29 June 1 1962 
PORTUGAL 0 •••••••• 0. 0 •• 0. 28 October -1958 8 January 1963 
ROMANIA ••••• 0 ••••••••••• 12 December 1961 a 
SENEGAL •• 0. 0. 0 0 ••••••••• 25 ~pril 1961 a 
1- Stntus as at April , 1969. 
1-------
Stale Si!Jnulurr 
SIERRA LEONE ............ . 
SouTH AFRICA ........... . 
SWEDEN ................ . 
SwiTZERLAND . . . . . ...... . 22 October 
THAILAND .............. . 29 April 
TUNISIA ................. . 30 October 
UG'ANDA ................. . 
UkRAINIAN SSR ......... . 31 October 
UNION OF SOVIET 
SociALIST Rr.PL'IILics ... . 31 October 
UNITED KINGDOM ........ . 9 September 
UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA .............. . IS September 
URUGUAY ................ . 29 April 
VENEZUELA .............. . 30 October 
YuGOSLAVIA ............. . 29 ;\pril 
Trin:i.cbde: 
1958 
1958 
1958 
1958 
1958 
1958 
195R 
195R 
195R 
1958 
Nalifiralio:t. arcr.u',,, I,,). 
""lifi,·ati,,, oj .wr,·r.;.<iou (r/) 
25 November 
9 April 
I June 
18 :\-lay 
2 .Tul y 
14 September 
12 January 
22 November 
11 May 
12 April 
15 Au~ust 
28 January 
~ ,Tnly 
1906a 
I !)()J a 
19(i', (!. 
1906 
:J?fl8 
19(,-f 0 
1961 
)9(,0 
1964 
1961 
1961 
1966 
1968.1 
Tob:-~~0 Declarations and Rescrvations2 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
"In signing the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
of 29 April 1958, the Federal Republic of Germany 
declares with reference to article 5, paragraph 1 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf that in the opinion 
of the Federal Government article 5, paragraph 1 gua-
rantees the exercise of fishing rights (Fischerei) in 
the waters above the continental shelf in the manner 
hitherto generally in practice." 
•, 
FRANCE 
In depositing this instrument of accession, the Gov-
ernment of the French Republic declares: 
Article 1 
In the view of the Government of the French Re- . 
public, the expression "adjacent" areas implies a notion 
of geophysical, geological and geographical dependence 
which ipso facto rules out an unlimited extension of 
the continental shelf. 
Article 2 (paragraph 4) 
The Government of the French Republic considers 
that the expression "living organisms belonging to 
sedentary species" must be interpreted as excluding 
crustacrans, with the exception of the species of crab 
termed "barnacle" ; and it makes the following res-
ervations: 
Article 4 
The Government of the French Republic accepts this 
article only on condition that the coastal State claim-
ing that the measures it intends to take are "reasonable" 
agrees that if their reasonableness is contested it shall 
be determined by arbitration. 
Artirle 5 ( para~raph 1) 
The Government of the French Republic accepts the 
provisions of article 5, paragraph 1, with the follow-
ing reservations: . 
~ 
2 For objections by ·certain States to some of these declara-
tions and reservations, see p. 333. 
(a) An essential element which should serve as th( 
basis for appreciating any "interference" with the con· 
servation of the living resources of the sea. resulting 
from the exploitation of the continental shelf, particu-
larly in breeding areas for maintenance of stocks, shall 
· be the technical report of the international scientific 
bodies responsible for the conservation of the living 
resources of the sea in the areas specified respectively 
in article 1 of the Convention for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries of 8 February 1949 and article 1 
of the Convention for the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 
of 24 January 1959. 
(b) Any restrictions placed on the exercise of 
acquired fishing rights in waters ahove the continental 
shelf shall give rise to a right to compensation 
(c) It must be possible to establish by means of 
arbitration, if the matter is contested, whether the 
exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation 
of its natural resources result in an interference with 
the other activities protected by article 5, paragraph 
I, which is "unjustifiable". 
Article 6 (paragraphs 1 and 2) 
In the absence of a specific agreement, the Govern-
ment of the French Republic will not accept that any 
boundary of the continental shelf determined by appli-
cation of the principle of equidistance shall be involved 
against it: 
-if such bound~ry is calculated from baselines estab-
lished after 29 April 1958; 
-if it extends beyond the 200-metre isobath; 
-if it lies in areas where, in the Government's opinion, 
there are "special circumstances" within the meaning 
of article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, that is to say: the 
Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Granville. and the sea 
areas of the Straits of Dover and of the North Sea 
off the French coast: 
IRAN 
"In signing this Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
I am instructed bv the Iranian Goverument to make the 
following reserva.tions: 
(a) Article -1: vVith respect to the phrase "the 
Coastal State may not impede the laying or main-
tenance of submarine cables or pipe-lines on the con-
tinental shelf"', the [ran ian Government reserves its 
right to allow or not to allow the laying or maintenance 
of submarine cables or pipe-lines on its continental shelf. 
(b) .·lrticle 6: \\' ith respect to the phrase "and 
unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances" included in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
article. the lranian Govenuncnt accepts this phrase on 
the understanding that one method of determining the 
boundary line in special circumstances would be that 
of measurement from the high water mark." 
VENEZUELA 
In signing t]le present Convention, the· Republic of 
\ · etwzuela declares with reference to article 6 that there 
are special circumstances to he taken into consideratio 
in the following areas: the Gulf of Paria, in so far ~ 
the boundary is not determined by existing agreement: 
and in zones adjacent thereto; the area between th 
coast of Venezuela and the island of Aruba; and th 
Gulf of Venezuela. 
Reservation nrade 1tpon ratification: ... with expres 
reservation in respect of article 6 of the said Conven 
tion. 
YUGOSLAVIA 
Subject to the following reservation m t'espect o 
article 6 of the Convention: 
In delimiting its continental shelf, Yugoslavia re 
cognizes no "special circumstances" which should m 
fluence that delimitation. 
'Objections3 
FRANCE 
The Government of the French Republic does not 
accept the reservations made by the Government of 
Iran with respect to article 4 of the Conventi.on. 
NETHERLANDS 
"In depositing their instrument of ratification regard-
ing the Convention on the Continental Shelf concluded 
at Genc,·a on April 29th 1958, the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands declare that they do not 
find acceptable 
"the reservations made by the Iranian Government 
to article 4; 
"the reservations made_ by the Government of the 
French Republic to articles 5, paragraph 1, and 6, 
paragraphs 1 and 2. 
"The Government ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands 
reserve all rights regarding the reservations in respect 
of article 6 made by the Government of Venezuela 
when ratifying the preseut Convention." 
UNITED KiNGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
"Article 1: The Government of the United Kingdom 
take note of the declaration made by the Government 
of the French Republic and reserve their position con-
cerning it. 
''.-lrtide 2 ( parayraJ•IJ ·I): Tit is declaration docs not 
call for any observations on the part of the Government 
of the United Kingdom. 
"Article 4: The Gon·rnment of the United Kingdom 
and the Government of the French Republic are both 
parties to the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning 
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes done at Geneva 
on the 29th of April, 1958. The Government of the 
United Kingdom assume that the declaration made by 
the Government of the French Republic is not intended. 
:J Unless otherwise indicated, the objections were made upon 
ratification or accession .. 
to derogate from the rights and obligations of th~ 
parties to the Optional Protocol. 
"Article 5 (paragraph 1): Reservation (a) does not 
call for any observations on the part of the Government 
of the United Kingdom. 
"The Government of the United Kingdom are un-
able to accept reservation (b). 
"The Government of the United Kingdom are pre-
pared to accept reservation (c) on the understanding 
that it is not intended to derogate from the rights and 
obligations of parties to the Optional Protocol of Sig-
nature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes. 
"Article 6 (paragraphs 1 and 2): The Government 
of the United Kingdom are unable to accept the reserva-
tions made by the Government of the French Re-
public."• 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA11 
"The United States does not find the following re-
servations acceptable: 
1. The reservation made by the I ran ian Govern-
ment to article 4. 
2. The reservation made by the Federal Republic 
of Germany to article 5, paragraph 1."0 
"The reservations r made hy France] to arriclcs 4, 
5 nnd o. The declarations hy Fraucc witl1 respect to 
articles 1 anti 2 arc noted without prej udice."7 
YUGOSLAVIA 
The Government of Yugoslavia does not accept the 
reservation made by the Government of the French 
Republic with respect to article 6 of the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf."8 
4 Communication received on 14 January 1966. 
5 See footnote 9, p. J2J. 
8 Comrnuuication received on 19 September 1962. 
7 Communication received on 9 September 1965. 
8 Communication. received on 29 September 1965. 
APPENDIX II 
Bilateral Agreements on the Continental Shelf 
Parties 
U.K.-Venezuela 
Bahrein-saudi Arabia 
Federal Republic of 
Germany-Netherlands 
U.K.-Norway 
Finland-u.s.s.R. 
Denmark-Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Kuwait-saudi Arabia 
U.K~-Netherlands 
(Two agreements) 
Denmark-Norway 
U.K.-Denmark 
Denmark-Netherlands 
Italy-Yugoslavia 
Iran-saudi Arabia 
(a)Date of ratification. 
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(Concluded recently) 
